had listened to me the whole thing needn't have happened they were outraged; that was no matter for me and if I didn't like it I could go and look for another job. I was about to get up and do just that when the atmosphere changed abruptly, smiles all round. A compromise would have to be reached, the visiting teacher would be asked seriously to curtail his practical work. Instead of getting each student to do an experiment he would himself conduct it, in the manner of a demonstration, once, in front of the class, and if by these means it proved difficult, if not impossible for each student to acquire the necessary practical skills, then optical aids, an overhead projector, even mirrors could be brought to his assistance. If this illusionism would still allow the course to continue in the context described in the prospectus was a matter we did not discuss. With handshakes we parted professional colleagues once more. The next day I went to phone the railway to get them to collect an empty case. As I lifted the receiver I heard a voice; I had intruded on the senior teacher as he was about to advise the visitor of our deliberations the day before. The visitor was unable to disguise his apprehension that the course might be meaningless in the terms of the compromise he was being asked to adopt, a compromise which our friend was presenting not as the outcome of an agreement among colleagues, but as forced upon them by the laziness and incompetence of a refractory junior employee. He was then, as he had been from the first, using every device to ensure that if the course failed it would be seen as due simply to the fault of a subordinate, and never as an error of administration.

A teacher told me of how on his first appointment to a technical college the principal had said to him, 'You may think, coming as you do from teaching in a grammar school, that the students come first. Here it is different, here the registers come first.' He thought he was being joked with, but he was not, and nothing can illustrate better the mystification in further education. It is tempting for technicians to see their jobs only in comparison with the conditions of the teachers, but this leaves the real problem untouched; a fact which some of my friends unwittingly acknowledge when their resentment, often highly charged with racialism, focuses on the students as the source of their ills. But they are mistaken; so long as the students are treated as simple objects for the purposes of a professional class, so will they be. Any realistic and just claim for advance the technicians make must start from this fact, must start with an affirmation of the proper aims of education. After all I have said it may seen ironical now to say that it is we, the technicians, who should be reminding the teachers of their ideals, but it is not so far fetched. Most of the technicians and all of the trainees are themselves part-time students at this or other polytechnics and are therefore liable to suffer from the same evil on two levels. They practically all start as enthusiasts, but how much longer can they be expected to put up with being robbed of their enthusiasm *twice*, from within *and* from without? The only alternative is to become the image others fashion for them; unco-operative, indifferent, lazy, even aggressive, simply an object to be manipulated, albeit with caution.

H.B.

Irving Wohlfarth

Presentation of Adorno

The following essay on the relation of sociology and psychology should serve as a long overdue introduction of the work of Theodor Adorno to an English audience. While the English reader will be familiar with the writings of Herbert Marcuse (cf. NLR 30 and 45), who, along with Adorno and Horkheimer, is a founder-member of what has come to be known as the 'Frankfurt School', the only work of Adorno's that was until recently available in English-speaking countries is his contribution to *The Authoritarian Personality*. (An English translation of one of his most important volumes, *Prisms*, has however now been published by Neville Spearman.) This essay has been chosen not merely for its intrinsic merit and its critique of developments relevant to the English context, but also on account of the particular timeliness of its theme. At least since the publication of the first volume of Sartre's *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*, which in its methodological introduction focuses on the 'problem of mediations', the inter-relations and complementarities of 'subjective' and 'objective' approaches, Marxism and existentialism, sociology and psychology, have been acknowledged as one of the central issues with which a developing Marxist theory will have to grapple. Adorno's text represents the prolegomenon to an investigation of the relations between microcosmic and macrocosmic social dimensions sketched out at a recent congress by R. D. Laing. Precisely because of the need to do away with the monopolistic practices of academic guilds, however, the courses in inter-disciplinary studies presently offered at the new universities should be all the more closely studied for signs of the helplessness that Adorno (who can himself hardly be accused of being a jealous specialist) claims to detect in recent inter-departmental fads.

In view of the range and complexity of their work—Adorno alone has written over 20 books, on philosophy, sociology, music and literature—it is not possible in the space of a few paragraphs to give more than a merely biographical and bibliographical account of the Frankfurt school, and a simplistic sketch of some of the specific emphases which relate the following text to Adorno's whole philosophy.

The Frankfurt school came into being in the early 1930's around Max Horkheimer and his Institute for Social Research. Its early work can be studied in its legendary, but relatively inaccessible journal, the *Zeit-*

schrift für Sozialforschung, in which Horkheimer developed his concept of 'critical theory' in a series of remarkable essays (notably 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', Vol. 6, 1937). Marcuse's essays from this period have been recently republished in two small volumes *Kultur und Gesellschaft* by Suhrkamp, and provide a clear exposition of this position, as does Horkheimer's own later book written in English, *Eclipse of Reason*. With the rise of Nazism the institute was forced into exile, and the journal continued to appear first in France and then in the early war-years in the United States (as *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*). During their American exile Horkheimer and Adorno together wrote *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, probably their major work, but, like the journal, hard to come by. In the late 'forties they returned to Frankfurt as directors of the newly re-established Institut für Sozialforschung. Apart from Adorno's own books, the place of the old journal was taken by the *Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, a series of sociological monographs which also include Alfred Schmidt's book on Marx's concept of nature. The most important collaborators to have emerged since the war are the philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas and the philosopher Karl Heinz Haag (whose essay 'Das Unwiederholbare' in *Philosophischer Idealismus* constitutes the best short introduction to the philosophy of the Frankfurt school; for these purposes, too, Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, especially Chapter 5, should be consulted). In the last decade the Frankfurt school has begun to exert a wide influence in German philosophy, sociology and social and cultural criticism. It also acts as a rallying-point for socialist students, despite tensions between them and their professors, who, when pressed on the relation of theory and practice, argue that when real political practice is at an impasse, theory should not be blamed for its powerlessness or arrested in the name of practice. It should, on the contrary, confront and analyse the impasse.

The Frankfurt school has consistently, but without regressions into some pre-specialist feudalism, opposed the intellectual division of labour, while acknowledging its relative validity. Within the social sciences the practical upshot of this has been such works as *Studies in Authority and the Family* (published in German in Paris in the late 'thirties) and *The Authoritarian Personality*. The following essay draws the theoretical conclusions from this long effort to think through the relation of psychology and sociology. Frankfurt sociology has, further, remained as philosophical as its philosophy has always been social, and it is one of the triumphs of Adorno's style that it has developed a terminology which freely, yet rigorously, expresses the constant interplay of otherwise compartmentalized approaches. Given the tendency of the dominant positivist orthodoxy in England to dismiss the history of philosophy as so much verbal muddle, and the tendencies in the Marxist tradition to dismiss philosophy as so many merely interpretative ideologies, it will doubtless be the philosophical dimension of the Frankfurt school that will be most foreign to the English reader. If the unfamiliar phenomenon has at all costs to be catalogued, it may be called a Hegelian materialism that is constantly redefining itself in both close and polemical relation to Hegel's idealist dialectics; neither uncritically immanent nor abruptly external, its 'determinate negation' of Hegel neither stops at the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach nor falls behind it. The decisive link here for intellectual history is doubtless Lukács's *History and Class-Consciousness*, since which it is the only significant philosophical undertaking to have emerged within the materialist tradition in Germany.

But if Frankfurt philosophy resists bald definition and bureaucratic classification, this is not because it makes a virtue of elusiveness. It is true that as a critic of the deductive, reductive idealism of philosophical systems Adorno writes mostly essays, of a mutually allusive and reciprocally explanatory character which often presuppose some familiarity with the philosophical, sociological, psychological and aesthetic traditions he is working in and against. His recently published *Negative Dialektik* (1966) was partly written to justify and develop in sustained philosophical argument the premises and implications of his past work. When, however, Adorno writes in that book that 'philosophy cannot be summarized', he is not arguing in the name of some philosophical poetry it would be heretical to paraphrase. He neither denies nor hypostatizes the distinction between art and philosophy and indeed accuses Heidegger, the centre of the opposite school in contemporary German philosophy, of blurring it. What he advocates is a 'negative dialectics' which opposes the quasi-imperialist reductionism that Western philosophy, including Hegel's positive dialectics, has hitherto committed in justification of Western social practice. This inextricability of reason and violence, philosophy and domination, is the central theme of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, which argues that Western reason has never liberated itself from myth (itself already a form of rationality) and has in recent history rapidly, but immanently, reverted to it: the dialectic is a largely Freudian one and it is, as always, with a vengeance that the repressed returns. It is because, on this argument, the constitution of human (or at least Western) identity, the control of nature and the domination of man by man have hitherto interacted as the inseparable moments of one long fatal syndrome, that such central categories of the Frankfurt school as 'identity' and 'non-identity', and the domination of the latter by the former, refer simultaneously to the relation between society and individual, man and nature, ego and id, male and female, concepts and their objects. If this in turn sounds reductive, it is the reductiveness of history itself, which philosophy, the logic of domination, has helped codify. Walter Benjamin, the philosopher and aesthetician who was closely associated with the Institute until the most murderous system of our time caught up with him,[1] once wrote that whereas historians traditionally identify with the victors the historical materialist must write history 'against the grain' (*Schriften*, Vol. 1, p. 498). Frankfurt philosophy, likewise, is a permanent critique of the theory and practice of 'Identitätsphilosophie', and its aim is the rescue of the non-identical. But justice can be done to the non-identical only in, through and against identity itself, the *abstract* negation of which would be literally tantamount to complete

[1] It was against Nazism that the *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, which attempts to understand it, was written. Since Adorno's alleged 'fear of the masses' and 'flight from Fascism' have been recently made responsible for his views on popular music (cf. NLR 39), it should be asked what else there was to do but fear and flee, and pondered whether fear and flight are necessarily synonymous with blindness.

regression. *Negative* dialectics, however, refuses to make a virtue of necessity, to hypostatize identity, which should serve as the medium of non-identity. The 'critical theory' analyses the totality, for, as Hegel showed, 'the whole is the truth'. But since, in Adorno's variation of that phrase, the whole is also the untruth, a big lie, it simultaneously focuses on the insulted and the injured, the last that shall be first, the victims of totalitarian practice and its philosophical correlative, all-devouring systems and grasping, domineering concepts, the long, conceptualized arm of law and order. Its complementary themes are a social reality that comes increasingly to resemble an idealist system and, against the charisma of the universal, the aura of the particular.[2]

It is within the context of this very schematically presented conception that the following essay takes its place. The critique of reductionism is the invisible thread that links what might initially appear to be aphoristic asides. It is behind the serious pun that Freud's drive towards the totalization of concepts is totalitarian (not *only*, needless to say) and behind the analysis of psychoanalytic reductionism as analagous to homosexual indifference towards women. Lack of differentiation is associated with hostility, abstractness with brutality, and, conversely, 'love' and 'humanity', as synonyms for openness to the non-identical and the capacity to differentiate, are rescued from their ideological misuse. The passage on the impact of big ideas exemplifies the characteristic interplay of usually dissociated dimensions mentioned above. The claim that the subconscious foots the bill of progress and the section on rationality and sacrifice refer back to central motifs from *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. The notion of the utopian relativity of rationality itself points forward to the argument in *Negative Dialektik* that dialectics, by turning formal logic against itself, remains bound to it and would ideally wither away along with the state.

[2] There seem to be two close parallels to these emphases in recent English studies on the left, neither of them, significantly, directly philosophical. E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* is a marvellous model of history written from below. The psychoanalytic and philosophical approaches of R. D. Laing and Adorno to the problem of identity, despite all differences, overlap. Laing's claim in *The Divided Self* that Freud used his theory as a 'Medusa's head' and 'an instrument of defence' can be instructively compared with Adorno's observations on Freud in the following essay.

Theodor Adorno

Sociology and Psychology

For more than 30 years,the tendency has been emerging among the masses of the advanced industrial countries to surrender themselves to the politics of disaster instead of pursuing their rational interests and, chief of all, that of their own survival. While they are promised benefits, the idea of personal happiness is at the same time emphatically replaced by threat and violence; inordinate sacrifices are imposed on them, their existence is directly endangered, and an appeal made to latent death-wishes. Much of this is so obvious to its victims that in endeavouring to understand its workings one finds it difficult to rest content with the decisive task of establishing the objective conditions of mass movements, and not to be tempted into believing that objective laws no longer obtain.

The Failure of Social Psychology

By itself the old explanation that all the media of public opinion are controlled by groups will not do. For the masses would hardly succumb to the brazen wink of untrue propaganda if something within them did not respond to the rhetoric of sacrifice and the dangerous life. To be able to come to terms with fascism it was, therefore, considered necessary to complete social theory by psychology, and particularly by analytically oriented social psychology. The interplay of studies into both social determinants and the prevailing instinctual structures was to provide a full account of the inter-connecting totality. While on the other side of the iron curtain docile scholarship exorcized analytical psychology—the only one seriously to go into the subjective conditions of objective irrationality—as the work of the devil and lumped Freud, along with Spengler and Nietzsche, together with the fascists (a claim Lukács did not shrink from making), on this side the emphasis was, with no little satisfaction, shifted to the inner life and the human being and his so-called existential qualities, the better to elude a binding theory of society. As a result, those subjective conditions are, in the last analysis, sceptically reduced to insubstantial, *merely* subjective motivations, as indeed was already the case in Freud's late essay *Civilization and its Discontents.*

Where any thought at all has been devoted to the relation between social theory and psychology, it has not gone beyond merely assigning the two disciplines their place within the total scheme of the sciences; the difficulties their relation involves have been treated as a matter of employing the right conceptual model. Whether social phenomena are to be derived from objective conditions or from the psyche of the socialized individuals, or from both; whether the two types of explanation complete or exclude one another, or whether their relationship itself requires further theoretical consideration—all this is reduced to mere methodology.

The Case of Talcott Parsons

In his study 'Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure',[1] Talcott Parsons, an exponent of this approach, rightly stresses the irreducible autonomy of the social system, which—and here he is in agreement with both the older German tradition and Durkheim—has to be understood on its own level and not as a 'composite resultant of the actions of the component individuals alone'[2]. But here too the distinction fastens on what the sociologist is 'interested' in—behaviour and attitudes relevant to the social system. Solely for this reason does he demand that sociological problems of motivation be formulated in terms of the 'frame of reference of the social system' and not of the 'personality'. The sociological models should, though, be 'compatible with established knowledge of personality'.[3] Without any concern for whether the difference is a question not of method but of objective reality, the choice of a sociological or a psychological approach is left to the arbitrary discretion of the respective departments.

Against the primitive notion of a single universal science, Parsons does not blind himself to the fact that 'the typical problems of the psychologist and the sociologist are different'. For this very reason, however, both 'need to use the same concepts at different levels of abstraction and in different combinations'.[4] This is possible only on the assumption that the divergence of sociology and psychology can be overcome independently of the real nature of their object. If at a higher stage of internal organization both sciences clarified the logical structure of their concepts, they could then, on this view, be smoothly synthesized. Were we in final possession of a wholly adequate dynamic theory of human motivations, the difference between the 'levels of abstraction' would, according to Parsons, probably disappear. The way social and individual, objective and psychic, moments relate to one another is supposedly dependent on the mere conceptual schematization imposed on them in the busy academic process; plus the usual reservation that a synthesis would at this stage be premature, that more facts have to be gathered and concepts more sharply defined.

While Parsons, as a pupil of Max Weber's, acutely discerns the inadequacy of many of the usual psychological explanations of societal phenomena, he does not suspect behind this incompatibility any real clash between the universal and the particular, any incommensurability between the objective life-process, the 'in itself' and the individual that is merely 'for himself'. The antagonism becomes, instead, a problem of academic organization that, with steady progress, would harmoniously solve itself.

An ideal of conceptual unification taken from the natural sciences cannot, however, be indiscriminately applied to a society whose unity resides in its not being unified. Sociology and psychology, in so far as they function in isolation from one another, often succumb to the temptation to project the intellectual division of labour on to the object of their study. The separation of society and psyche is false consciousness; it perpetuates conceptually the split between the living subject and the objectivity that governs the subjects and yet derives from them. But the basis of this false consciousness cannot be removed by a mere methodological dictum. People are incapable of recognizing themselves in society and society in themselves because they are alienated from each other and the totality.[5] Their reified social relations necessarily appear to them as an 'in itself'. What compartmentalized disciplines project on to reality merely reflects back what has taken place in reality. False consciousness is also true:

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[1] Talcott Parsons, 'Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure,' in *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, 1950, No. 3, p. 371 et seq.
[2] loc. cit., p. 372.
[3] loc. cit., p. 375.
[4] loc. cit., p. 376.
[5] Whence empirical sociology has derived the phenomenon of 'personalization', the tendency to explain social phenomena that are objectively motivated as the actions of the good or bad persons with whose names the public sources of information associate them. (See Theodor W. Adorno and others, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York 1950, p. 662 et seq.)

inner and outer life are torn apart. Only through the articulation of their difference, not by stretching concepts, can their relation be adequately expressed. The truth of the whole sides with one-sidedness, not pluralistic synthesis: a psychology that turns its back on society and idiosyncratically concentrates on the individual and his archaic heritage says more about the hapless state of society than one which seeks by its 'wholistic approach' or an inclusion of social 'factors' to join the ranks of a no longer existent *universitas literarum*.

The Price of Conceptual Harmony

To unify psychology and social science by employing the same concepts at different levels of abstraction necessarily amounts *in concreto* to a harmonization of actual conflict. According to Parsons, the integration of society, which he tacitly assumes to be in general a good thing, can be said to have succeeded when its functional needs—as an objective social moment—coincide with the schemata of the 'average superego'.[6] This dove-tailing of the individual and the social system is elevated to the status of a norm without any investigation of the place both these 'measures' occupy in the overall social process and, above all, of the origin of the 'average superego' and its claim to normative validity; it can also be the normative expression of bad, repressive conditions. Parsons has to pay a price for his conceptual harmony: his notion of integration, a positivist version of the (idealist) identity of subject and object, leaves room for an irrational society powerful enough to shape its subjects from the outset. The coincidence of the average superego and the functional needs of a social system, namely those of its own self-perpetuation, is triumphantly achieved in Huxley's *Brave New World*.

Such consequences are, needless to say, not intended by Parsons' theory. His empiricist stance does not allow him to imply that this identity has been actually realized. He emphasizes the divergence between men as psychological beings—'personality structure'—and the objective order—the 'institutional structure'—in the contemporary world.[7] In agreement with sociological tradition, Parsons, while remaining psychoanalytically oriented, takes into account the dimension of non-psychological motivations, the mechanisms that cause people to act in accordance with objective, institutional expectations even in opposition to what the psychologists call their personality structure.[8] On this argument, their general, socially mediated goals and the ways and means of achieving them would claim priority over their particular subjective inclinations. Parsons does not, it is true, stress as firmly as Max Weber did the decisive mediation here, the rationality of self-preservation[9]. Apparently he conceives the social norms as being themselves sedimented patterns of adaptation and could thus be said to approach them in ultimately psychological terms after all. But in

[6] cf. Parsons, loc. cit., p. 373.
[7] cf. Parsons, ibid.
[8] Ibid., p. 374.
[9] cf. Max Weber, 'Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie,' in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen 1922, p. 412.

opposition to the pervasive subjectivism of the economists, he at all events knows that economic motivations cannot be dissolved into such psychological entities as the 'profit motive'.[10]

Rationality and Fear

The individual's rational economic behaviour undoubtedly derives from something more than economic calculation and the profit motive. This explanation is much more likely to have been a retrospective construction which, while explaining very little, was supposed to make some kind of convenient sense of the rationality of average economic behaviour—a rationality which, from the individual's point of view, is by no means self-evident. *Fear* constitutes a more crucial subjective motive of objective rationality. It is mediated. Today anyone who fails to comply with the economic rules will seldom go under straight away. But the fate of the *déclassé* looms on the horizon. Ahead lies the road to an asocial, criminal existence: the refusal to play the game arouses suspicions and exposes offenders to the vengeance of society even though they may not yet be reduced to going hungry and sleeping under bridges. But the fear of being cast out, the social sanctions behind economic behaviour, have long been internalized along with other taboos, and have left their mark on the individual. In the course of history this fear has become second nature; it is not for nothing that the word 'existence' in usage uncontaminated by philosophy means equally the fact of being alive and the possibility of self-preservation in the economic process.

The superego, the locus of conscience, not merely represents what is socially tabooed as being intrinsically evil but also irrationally combines the ancient dread of physical annihilation with the much later fear of being expelled from the social community which has come to encircle us in the place of nature. This atavistic and often exaggerated social fear, which latterly, to be sure, can at any moment revert to real fear, has gathered such force that, however thoroughly one might see through its irrationality, it would nevertheless take a moral hero to cast it aside. Presumably people cling so desperately to the now highly problematic and largely absurd quest for material goods of civilization which economically rational behaviour is supposed to guarantee them because civilization is something it was once so unimaginably hard for them to bring themselves to undergo; and the communications media play their part in keeping them in line. The instinctual energy of the *homo oeconomicus* who lords it over the *homo psychologicus* is the compulsive love for what was once hated; it had to be hammered in.

Such 'psychology' marks the point at which rational exchange converges on violence, but it simultaneously sets limits on what individual psychology can achieve. A firm belief in the transparent rationality of the economy is, no less than the presumption that psychology is the sufficient ground of men's actions, a typical piece of bourgeois self-deception. This rationality is based on physical coercion, on bodily torment, a material moment that transcends both immanently econo-

[10] Parsons, ibid., p. 374.

mic 'material incentives' and the intrapsychic instinctual economy. In the face of the disproportion between institutional power and individual powerlessness this fear has become so pervasive in advanced exchange society that it would require superhuman powers to live outside it; and meanwhile the system ceaselessly erodes each individual's powers to withstand it.

The Irrationality of the System

But, despite the undeniable priority of economic over psychological moments in the sphere of individual behaviour, it remains as debatable as ever whether such rationality is at all rational and whether a psychologist could not at any moment unmask it as a massive feat of rationalization. As long as economic rationality remains partial and the rationality of the whole problematic, irrational forces will be harnessed to perpetuate it. The irrationality of the rational system emerges in the psychology of its trapped subjects. The doctrine of rational behaviour leads into contradictions. Just as the demands made on the individual by the rationality of the system are immanently irrational in so far as the totality of everyone's economically expedient actions furthers, together with the reproduction of society, its disintegration, so, conversely, the absolute *telos* of rationality, fulfilment, would transcend rationality itself. Rationality always involves a measure of futile sacrifice; it is thus as irrational as a world which, released from sacrifice, no longer had any cause for rationality.

Parsons gets as far as the alternative between a rationalistic psychology and a psychologistic sociology, the choice between two forms of false consciousness, each eternally in the right against the other; it could be abolished only through the critique of an antagonistic social order. Here, however, the argument is broken off. A concrete analysis of motive is replaced by the choice of 'frames of reference' which, like Max Weber's ideal type, is left to academic whim.[11] The postulate that the sociological theories of motivation must tally with established findings about personality structure substitutes a harmonious object for a contradictory one in the interests of the unity of scientific explanation; for, while remaining products of the social totality, individuals, as such products, no less necessarily enter into conflict with the totality.

Where Parsons rests content with tactful academic tactics, the incompatibility of the categories he seeks to unify points to the incompatibility between the system and the human beings it consists of. Sociology is resignedly accepted for what it, once and for all, is: 'The sociologist's problems are different'.[12] In which case, however, it is no longer apparent why psychologists should employ the same concepts at different levels of abstraction and in different combinations.[13] It is far from being a matter of mere levels of abstraction between which gaps

[11] cf. Max Weber, 'Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,' ibid., p. 190 et seq.
[12] Parsons, ibid., p. 376.
[13] Ibid.

supposedly yawn solely on account of the incompleteness of our present state of knowledge.[14] Objective contradictions are not provisional things of the mind that disappear with time. Tensions which in existing society can be reduced, but not abolished, for short periods of time and in limited sectors, are falsely projected onto a static scheme of more general (social) and more particular (psychological) concepts which, so the argument goes, only temporarily fail to form a continuum on account of the lack of sufficient quantitative data on which to base generalizations. But the difference between individual and society is not merely quantitative, and it is seen this way only from the blinkered perspective of a social process that from the outset moulds the individual into a mere agent of his function in the total process. No future synthesis of the social sciences can unite what is inherently at odds with itself.

Social Determinations of the Individual.

While social laws cannot be 'extrapolated' from psychological findings, the individual is, on the other hand, not simply individual, not merely the substratum of psychology, but, as long as he behaves with any vestige of rationality, simultaneously the agent of the social determinations that shape him. His 'psychology', the dimension of irrationality, points back, no less than instrumental rationality, to social moments. The specific differences between individuals are equally scars inflicted by society and emblems of human freedom. The opposition that exists between the two realms should not be evaded by the process of scientific generalization, but neither should it be hypostatized. For then one would be taking the individual's state of mind, itself the ephemeral product of an individualistic society, literally. The divergence of individual and society is essentially social in origin, it is socially perpetuated, and it is in social terms that its manifestations are primarily to be explained. Even the vulgar materialism that sees down-to-earth profit-motives at the bottom of individuals, responses is closer to the truth than the psychologist who derives the economic behaviour of adults from their childhood; for they are governed by objective economic laws into which the individuality of the contracting parties does not enter in the least except, possibly, as a mere appendage.

Even if Parsons' demand that psychological concepts be adapted to meet the precise needs of social theory were feasible, it would be of little help. For what characterizes the specifically social dimension is its emancipation from psychology through the interpolation of abstract determinations between people, principally the exchange of equivalents, and through the hegemony of a rational faculty modelled on such abstraction from human psychology. Hence the ideological nature of 'subjective' economics: the psychological moments it adduces in order to explain movements on the market are mere epiphenomena, and the shift of emphasis presents appearance as essence. Parsons' justified suspicion that the psychoanalytical experts are incapable of adequately relating analytical concepts to social problems is relevant not merely to the general tendency among specialists to extend their

[14] Ibid.

limited concepts to a totality beyond their scope but also to the impossibility of giving any psychological explanation for what does not derive from the individual psyche. The commensurability of individuals' modes of behaviour, the actual process of socialization, is based on the fact that as economic subjects they do not relate to one another at all immediately but act according to the dictates of exchange-value.

This defines the relation that should obtain between the sciences. Their departmentalization cannot be corrected by the ideal of the polymath equally at home in sociology and psychology. The cry for the integration of the disciplines is an expression of helplessness, not progress. There is more hope that concentration on the particular isolate will break through its monadic crust to disclose the universal mediation at its core than that the conceptual synthesis of real decomposition could actually stop the rot. The only totality the student of society can presume to know is the antagonistic whole, and if he is to attain to totality at all, then only in and through contradiction.

Insight and Systematization

That the gift of specifically psychological insight almost always goes hand in hand with an irrational or at least anti-systematic moment is itself no psychological accident but can be traced back to its object, the dimension of split-off irrationality that complements the prevailing rationality. Not the least among the strategic reasons for Freud's scientific success is that his capacity for psychological insight was combined with a systematic trait which was permeated by monolithic, authoritarian elements. While precisely this intention of forcing individual findings towards total theses gave rise to the untruths of psychoanalytic theory, it derives its suggestiveness from that self-same totalitarian impetus. It is hearkened to as if it were a magic formula able to solve everything. An element of manipulative violence can never be dissociated from the impact of big ideas; as Freud himself knew, it is precisely the narcissism and isolation of the leader that draws the collective.[15] The ideology of the great or strong man tends to make the virtue of human stature out of the vicious inhumanity that tramples on all differentiation. It belongs to the powerlessness of truth under existing circumstances that, to remain true, it must rid itself of precisely this coercive moment.

In an article written in response to Parsons' study, the psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann, while sharing the desire for a conceptual language common to both disciplines, concedes in tacit opposition to the psychologism that prevails among orthodox Freudians that the social sciences may make valid predictions without having to take individual personality structures into account.[16] He bases his argument on the psychoanalytic distinction between subconscious actions and those of the conscious or preconscious ego. Instead of following the revisionist tack of tracing the subconscious back to direct social influences in the interests of a social interpretation, he goes back to the Freudian distinction between id and ego. The ego's chief task is to 'test'[17] reality and adapt to it; split off from its original instinctual source, it detaches itself, according to the implicit logic of Hartmann's account, from the sphere of psychological motivation and, as reality-principle, comes to exercise the function of logical objectification.

Autonomy of the Psychological Sphere

Rigorous psychoanalytic theory, alive to the clash of psychic forces, can better drive home the objective character especially of economic laws as against subjective impulses, than theories which, in order at all costs to establish a continuum between society and psyche, deny the fundamental axiom of analytic theory, the conflict between id and ego.[18] Hartmann does not abandon the notion of a psychological dimension that exists in its own right. There is no denying that the behaviour of a psychotic or indeed of a character-neurotic who, despite the outwardly 'normal' functioning of his intelligence, ceaselessly does himself harm in his public dealings is incomparably more 'psychological' than that of the businessman who may or may not actually possess the character-traits of the role he acts but who, having once accepted it, could hardly from one situation to the next deviate from it as long as he does not qualify as a neurotic. True, even the totally narcissistic behaviour of the psychotic is not without its social aspect. Certain types of metal sickness can indeed be construed on the model of a sick society. Already 30 years ago Lukács considered schizophrenia as the most extreme consequence of the subject's alienation from the objective social order. But if this autistic insulation of the psychological sphere is itself social in origin, once constituted it develops into a relatively self-consistent and closed motivational structure.

The ego that does not lose self-control, on the other hand, relates to reality in a readily intelligible manner; its psychology appears for the most part as no more than an interference and is repeatedly being overruled by the far more powerful imperatives of the rational faculty, the embodiment of objective social interests. The aims of the ego are no longer identical with those of the primary instincts, can no longer be translated back into them, and frequently contradict them. It is no mere terminological issue if the term psychology is extended to include the 'logification' of psychic energy. Only as one side of the antithesis between psychological irrationality and extra-psychological rationality does the term retain its full meaning. It is no accident that

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[15] 'Even today the members of a group stand in need of the illusion that they are equally and justly loved by their leader; but the leader himself need love no-one else, he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent.' (Sigmund Freud, *Complete Works*, Standard Edition, London 1952, Vol. 18, 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,' p. 123–4.)

[16] Heinz Hartmann 'The Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts in Social Science', in *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1950, p. 385.

[17] 'We shall place reality-testing among the major *institutions of the ego*, alongside the *censorships* which we have come to recognize between the psychical systems, and we shall expect that the analysis of the narcissistic disorders will help to bring other similar institutions to light.' (Freud, *Works*, Vol. 14, 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams,' p. 233.)

[18] cf. Theodor W. Adorno, 'Zum Verhältnis von Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftstheorie,' in *Psyche*, Vol. 6, 1952, No. 1, p. 17 et seq.

psychoanalysis was first conceived in the context of private life, of family conflicts, economically speaking in the sphere of consumption: this is its proper domain, because the specifically psychological play of forces is restricted to the private sphere and has little impact on the public sector of material production.

The separation of the social acts which reproduce men's lives from their human agents prevents them from seeing through the workings of the system and surrenders them to the cliché that it's people that count—a formula that was hardly ever so widely consumed as in the age of the conveyor-belt. That social tendencies assert themselves behind the backs of individuals and that they do not know these tendencies to be their own—this is the ideological smokescreen with which society surrounds itself. Especially those whose labour keeps them and the system alive, and whose lives nevertheless remain obscurely dependent on the system, are unable to recognize that society is both their essence and their antithesis. The opaqueness of the objective order from which they are estranged throws them back on their limited selves and misleads them into taking their isolated self-consciousness, that of the monadic subject and his psychology, to be what matters.

Psychotherapy and Sickness

The cult of psychology that mankind is being talked into and that in America has meanwhile made of Freud an insipid item of the staple diet is the necessary accompaniment to a process of dehumanization, the illusion of the helpless that their fate lies in their own hands. Thereby, ironically enough, precisely the science in which they hope to encounter themselves as subjects tends immanently to turn them back into objects, on behalf of a totality that no longer tolerates any hiding-places in which an in any way autonomous subjectivity that has not been already processed by society could conceal itself. As an inner dimension relatively independent of the outer world, psychology has, in the eyes of a society that ceaselessly calls on its services, become at bottom a form of sickness: hence its successor, psychotherapy. The subject whose psychology was largely unaffected by societal rationality was always looked on as an anomaly, a crank; in the totalitarian era his proper place is in the work or concentration camp where he is 'dealt with' and successfully integrated. The psychological left-overs, the people that allegedly count, retire to the top of the totalitarian hierarchies. It is within easy reach of idiots or mental defectives because their kink, the specifically psychological component, exactly matches the irrational ends, the top-level decisions, as means to which ends all the rationality of the systems (which, but for their empty rhetoric, are indistinguishable from one another) is then summoned. Even this last intact preserve of psychology which permits or directs dictators to roll on the floor, weep convulsively or uncover imaginary conspiracies is the mere mask of societal madness.[19]

[19] 'Madness is rare in individuals—but in groups, parties, peoples, ages, the rule' (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aphorism 156.)

It is not merely that the psychological dimension shrinks the more it comes to be ideologically substituted for insight into the objective order, but that what remains of it degenerates into caricature and grimace. That psychology should have become sickness expresses not merely the false consciousness society has of itself but at the same time what has actually become of people in society. For the stuff of psychology, the individual, reflects a form of socialization that has by now been superseded. Just as, in philosophy, the pure *tode ti*, the locus of conceptual concreteness, is, in its indeterminateness, wholly abstract, so, too, is the allegedly social concretum, the individual, in his capacity as contractual partner, for he is determined only through the abstract, thing-like act of exchange, itself divorced from his determinate specificity.

This act was the core about which individuality crystallized, and psychology that reifies it uses its own yardstick. The isolated individual, the pure subject of self-preservation, embodies in absolute opposition to society its innermost principle. The jarring elements that make up the individual, his 'properties', are invariably also moments of the social totality. He is, in the strict sense, a monad, representing the whole and its contradictions, without, however, being at any time conscious of the whole. But as such a contradictory microcosm he does not constantly and continuously communicate with the whole, and does not derive directly from the experience of the whole. Society has imposed separate isolation on the individual, and it is, as a social relation, part of his fate. 'Psychodynamics' is the name given to the reproduction of social conflicts in the individual, but it is not a mere mirror-image of existing social tensions. Its development in isolation from society reproduces from within the pathogenesis of a social totality over which the curse of lonely individuation hovers.

The Ideology of Psychologism

All varieties of psychologism that simply take the individual as their point of departure are ideological. They transform an individualistic form of socialization into an extra-social, natural attribute of the individual. With the emergence of changed conceptions of enlightenment the function of psychologism has also changed radically. As soon as processes which, being enacted between abstract subjects, are in fact far removed from the realm of individual spontaneity, are explained in psychic terms, the comforting humanization of reification has begun. But the self-alienated subjects remain human beings nevertheless, the historical trends come to pass not merely against them but also through and with them, and their average psychological qualities enter into even their average social behaviour. They and their motivations are not exhausted by objective rationality, and at times they act against it. They nevertheless remain its agents. Even the circumstances under which they fall back into psychology are socially induced by the intolerable demands reality makes on the individual.

For the rest, the manifest or repressed instinctual moment finds expression only in the form of needs, which have today become wholly a function of profit interests. Subjective reason and its *raison d'être*

diverge. Even the man whose calculating rationality yields all the advantages it promises cannot attain to real happiness through them but must, as another consumer, knuckle under once again and take what those who control production offer. Needs have always been socially mediated, but today people and their needs are becoming increasingly divorced and their gratification is developing into the observance of rules laid down by advertising. The rationality of self-preservation is ultimately doomed to remain irrational because the development of a rational collective subject, of a unified humanity, failed to materialize—a situation with which, in turn, each individual has to contend.

The Freudian injunction 'Where id was, there ego shall be',[20] leaves an impression of stoical emptiness and hollowness. The 'healthy', well-adjusted individual is as little immune against crisis as the rational husbanding of one's resources is economic. Consequences irrational for the society also prove irrational for the individual. To this extent, certainly, the forms neurosis takes would be derivable from the structure of a society in which they cannot be abolished. Even the successful cure bears the stigma of pathologically exaggerated, self-defeating adjustment. The triumph of the ego is a particularist delusion. This is why all psychotherapy is prompted to become objectively untrue and therapists are frauds. In adjusting to the mad whole the cured patient becomes really sick—which is not to imply that the uncured are any healthier.

The Objectivity of Sociology

The separation of sociology and psychology is both correct and false. False because it encourages the specialists to relinquish the attempt to know the totality which even the separation of the two demands; and correct in so far as it registers more intransigently the split that has actually taken place in reality than does the premature unification at the level of theory. Sociology in the strict sense, despite constant tendencies to subjectivize it (also on the part of Max Weber), never loses sight of the objective moment of the social process. But the more rigidly it disregards the subject and his spontaneous impulses, the more exclusively it comes to be dealing with a reified, quasi-scientific *caput mortuum*. Hence the tendency to imitate scientific ideals and approaches, which are, however, forever incapable of accounting for specifically social phenomena. While priding themselves on their strict objectivity, they have to settle for the already mediated end-products of the scientific procedure, with sectors and factors, as if they were the real, unmediated object.

The upshot is sociology minus society, the replica of a situation in which people have lost contact with themselves. The accumulation of particulars which would begin to disclose their meaning only in the total social context blocks that context from view. Psychology, on the other hand, looks to the individual's interests, but after an equally isolated, 'abstract' fashion. Ignoring the social process of production,

[20] Freud, *Works*, Vol. 22, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Lecture 31, 'The dissection of the psychical personality,' p.80.

it in its turn makes a first principle out of a mediated product, the bourgeois individual. Both disciplines recognize their inadequacies, but without being able to transcend them. Their unavoidable dualism cannot, however, be kept up all the way. Sociology seeks to accommodate the 'subjective factor' and thereby thinks to have gained in profundity *vis-à-vis* the superficial, merely circumstantial survey. But this invariably involves it in further dilemmas. Because its concept of objectivity is modelled on the end-result not the constitutive process (which *qua* totality cannot be defined in so many words), it lets itself be misled into likewise assuming the individual and the content of his consciousness to be equally unambiguous data on which to base statistical findings. Whereupon the danger of psychologism immediately arises: in order to shed light on people's actions, sociology has to invoke their own self-image, their 'opinion', however deceptive it may be, when in fact their actions are objectively determined and their opinions themselves in need of enlightenment, or else it has to seek out those unconscious drives which react to the social totality but do not motivate it. National Socialism was perhaps able to exploit the death-drives of its followers, but it undoubtedly originated in the very palpable will to live of the most powerful social groups.

Manipulation and the Unconscious

Psychology, conversely, finds itself confronted with the fact that the mechanisms it uncovers do not account for socially relevant behaviour. However sound its hypotheses at the individual level, they often look absurd and crazy next to politics and the economy. For this reason the self-critical depth-psychologist feels impelled to adjust his sights in order to cover social psychology. But this merely makes matters worse. For one thing, psychological truths, above all the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, get diluted, and for another social energies are mistranslated into psychological terms and, worse still, into superficial ego-psychology. The rationality operative in individual behaviour is, in fact, far from being lucidly self-aware; it is largely the blind product of heteronomous forces and has, to be capable of functioning at all, to join forces with the unconscious. Hardly anyone plots out his whole life in advance or even the full consequences of his own actions, although in the most advanced countries people doubtless do more calculating than it ever occurs to academic psychology to imagine.

In a highly socialized and rationalized society most situations in which decisions are made are pre-determined, and the rationality of the individual ego is restricted to choosing between minute options. It is invariably a question of no more than minimal alternatives, of assessing the lesser evil, and 'realism' amounts to being good at making this kind of decision. Individual irrationalities do not, in comparison, count for much. Then again, the possibilities of choice available to the unconscious are so limited and perhaps constitutionally so meagre that the foremost interest-groups have no trouble in diverting them into a few chosen channels, with the help of well-tried psychological techniques that have long been in use in totalitarian and non-totalitarian countries alike. Manipulated away from the scrutiny of the ego, the

crude, undifferentiated unconscious happily co-operates with the organized standardization without. The totalitarian propagandists are, therefore, by no means the geniuses their sub-propagandists make them out to be. They conspire not merely with the strongest social forces, not merely with numerous individuals' short-term interests, but also with those psychological tendencies that best harmonize with the most ruthless reality-principle. To give way to one's instincts, while it abstractly appears the easier option, is, when put to the concrete social test, the more difficult, because it is punished by society and today presupposes precisely that resilience that irrational behaviour lacks.

The Dialectic of Adaptation

What takes place is that merger between id and superego that psychoanalytic theory already focused on, and it is precisely where the masses act instinctively that they have been preformed by censorship and enjoy the blessing of the powers that be. The thesis that in the totalitarian era the masses act against their own interests is thus hardly the whole truth, and in any case comes true only *ex post facto*. The individual actions of the henchmen of the system, bordering, in extreme cases, on insanity, initially always provide satisfactions on the never-never. It is only when the bill is presented that disappointment sets in. At the time totalitarian deeds look just as reasonable to their doers as they appear unreasonable to their competitors. They succumb to the dialectic only through reason itself.

This dialectic affects not merely the individual's relation to the outer world but also the individual as such. The mechanism of adaptation to hardening realities simultaneously engenders a hardening within the individual: the more realistic he becomes, the more he feels reduced to a thing, the more deadened he becomes, and the more senseless his whole 'realism': it destroys everything, including, as an ultimate consequence, naked existence itself, that it was the function of his self-preserving rationality to preserve. The subject is separated into the inner continuation of the machinery of social reproduction and an undissolved remainder which, as a mere preserve powerless in the face of the wildly expansionist 'rational' component, degenerates into a mere curiosity. In the end, not merely the repressed drive but precisely the original, unsuppressed urge to self-fulfilment appears as sick—love itself as neurosis. Psychoanalytic practice, which claims on paper to heal even neurosis, collaborates with the universal and long-standing practice of depriving men of love and happiness in favour of hard work and a healthy sex life. Happiness turns into something infantile and the cathartic method into an evil, hostile, inhuman thing.

(To be continued)

discussion

Japan—Asian Capitalism (NLR 44)

Hide Ishiguro writes: There are two or three things in Jon Halliday's interesting article on Japan which require comment.

(1) He writes that the efficiency of the Japanese economy 'depends massively on exploitation'. I have no wish to defend exploitation in Japan or anywhere else, but it may be important to remind your readers how the situation in Japan compares with that in Britain. I make the point because when the Left writes of exploitation in Britain it is going against the widespread view that the workers have 'never had it so good', whereas when the Left makes the same criticism of Japan, it is supporting the traditional right-wing view in Europe that it is only economic exploitation and cheap labour which makes Japan competitive. For instance: (a) There is much *less* concentration in private hands of industrial wealth in Japan than in Britain, and the problem of growing monopoly in Japan has nothing to do with that of concentrated private ownership. For example in the biggest of the Zaibatsu—the Mitsui group, which ranges from banks, shipbuilding and oil, to chemicals, etc—the shares owned by the Mitsui family are negligible, accounting for less than 1 per cent. Even in Matsushita Electric Equipments, the family firm *par excellence*, Matsushita holds no more than 5 per cent of the shares. (b) Disparity between the earnings of high and low income groups is not, it would seem, greater in Japan than in Britain. In an average big industry the basic salary of a director would be about three times the wage of an office clerk or skilled worker in his thirties in the same firm; that of a University Professor who is head of a department about twice that of a lecturer of thirty. (There are, of course, enormous privileges in the form of expense accounts for business.) (c) The growth rate of the Japanese economy in the post-war years is surely related to some extent to its level of defence expenditure, which is one of the lowest in the world? In 1965, Japan spent only 1·39 per cent of its GNP on defence (7·9 per cent of the national budget, which in turn was 17·3 per cent of GNP).

The Literary Corps, as we agreed above, is an excellent idea, and was first proposed in a resolution by the Iranian Students Society in Britain nearly seven years ago. According to its original form, not only all the educated young men of the country would spend their national service doing some constructive work—instead of the usual marching up and down barracks, shouting: 'Long live the King of Kings, the Aryan Sun', but a part of the enormous defence budget, varying between 47 and 55 per cent of the total budget, would also be directed toward education. What has happened, however, is the exact opposite of this. For not only is the Literary Corps financed by the Ministry of Education, thus cutting down other education projects, but also only a tiny minority of the eligible young men are sent into the Corps, and these act more as the representatives of the secret police, SAVAK, than teachers, threatening villagers into total obedience and indoctrinating them about the supremacy of the 'holy Aryan Race'!

Even when some of these well-meaning young men of the Literary Corps decide to start a useful project, for example building a school, the local District Clerks, or Bakhshdars, are often the first obstacle in the way, demanding part of the funds as a bribe for allowing the projects to be started. Once, the whole of a village Council were imprisoned for alleged embezzlement, but in fact because they would not pay up half of their Bath Fund to the local Bakhshdar!

This corruption of the Government officials, together with the insincerity of the Régime itself, has made a disaster of the Land Reform Programme also. Whole villages, often without ever having seen a tractor, are written off as 'mechanized' and thus exempted from reform, just because the landowner has previously seen the local Land Reform official with a bribe of often only £100. The peasants who used to work on the land are thus formally denied ever having worked there, and are therefore forced to migrate to towns where, for the lack of employment, they are scattered and their women may have to go into brothels. An alternative way would be to go to the landowner and beg of him to let them continue as before, as serfs. He would, of course, demand a written declaration that the peasants are employed only as labourers, thus having no rights to the land, but this way, at least, their families would be held together.

From what was said above, we can see that, although calm on the surface, Iran is sustaining and growing conflict inside her. The revolt of the Ghashghai people in the south has more or less been put down now, but the next one, in some other corner of the country, may grow into a major revolution. The present peace may thus be a short pause, a false calm before a devastating storm.

M. Raheen

Theodor Adorno

Sociology and Psychology—II

Social developments thus affect even the most recent trends in psychology. Despite the ever-widening rift between society and psychology, society reaches repressively into all psychology in the form of censorship and superego. As part of the progressive integration of society, socially rational behaviour gets melted together with the psychological residues. But the revisionists who perceive this give an oversimplified account of the interaction of the mutually alienated institutions id and ego. They posit a direct connection between the instinctual sphere and social experience. The latter, however, takes place, according to Freudian topology, only at the outer layer of the ego which has been allotted

the task of testing reality. But inside the instinctual dynamic, reality is 'translated' into the language of the id. If there is any truth in Freud's notion of the archaic and indeed possibly 'timeless' nature of the unconscious, then concrete social circumstances and motivations cannot enter it without being altered and 'reduced'.

The time-lag between consciousness and the unconscious is itself the stigma of the contradictory development of society. Everything that got left behind is sedimented in the unconscious and has to foot the bill for progress and enlightenment. Its backwardness becomes Freud's 'timelessness'. Today it harbours even the demand for happiness, which does indeed begin to look 'archaic' as soon as it aims not at fulfilment but at some purely somatic, fragmented, local gratification, which increasingly turns into 'having some fun' the more diligently consciousness aspires to the condition of adultness. Psychology insulates itself against society, like society against psychology, and regresses. Under the pressure of society the psychological sector responds in the end only to sameness and proves incapable of experiencing the specific. The traumatic is the abstract. The unconscious therein resembles the abstract society it knows nothing about, and can be used to weld it together.

Freud should not be reproached for having neglected the concrete social dimension, but for being all too untroubled by the social origin of this abstractness, the rigidity of the unconscious, which he registers with the undeviating objectivity of the natural scientist. The impoverishment that has resulted from an unending tradition of the negative is hypostatized into an ontological property. The historical dimension becomes changeless; the psychic, in return, is made into an historical event. In making the leap from psychological images to historical reality, he forgets what he himself discovered—that all reality undergoes modification upon entering the unconscious—and is thus misled into positing such factual events as the murder of the father by the primal horde. It is this short-circuit between reality and the unconscious which lends psychoanalysis its apocryphal features. Such ideas as the crudely literal conception of the Moses legend have served to buttress the resistances of the official sciences that have no trouble in disproving them.

Freud's Myths

What Kardiner has called Freud's 'myths'—the translation of the intrapsychic into the dubiously factual—recurs wherever Freud too perpetrates ego-psychology, in his case an ego-psychology of the id, and treats the id as if it possessed the consummate rationality of the Viennese banker it at times really does resemble. In his all too refutable striving to gain a foothold in irrefutable facts, Freud unwittingly sanctions society's belief in the usual criteria of the very science that he

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Note. The first part of Adorno's essay was published in N.L.R. 46. The original article first appeared as 'Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie' in the first volume of the Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie—a Festchrift for Max Horkheimer—published by Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

challenged. For the sake of these criteria, the Freudian child is a little man and his world that of a man. Thus, no less than its sociologically well-versed counterpart, a psychology that turns in on itself is aped by the society it refuses to heed.

The psyche that has been extracted from the social dialectic and investigated as an abstract 'for itself' under the microscope has become an object of scientific inquiry all too consistent with a society that hires and fires people as so many units of abstract labour-power. Freud's critics have seized on his mechanistic bias. Both his determinism and also such implicit categories as the preservation of energy, the transformation of one form of energy into another and the subsumption of successive events under general laws, are reminiscent of scientific procedure. The concrete upshot of his 'naturalist' posture is the consistent exclusion of the new, the reduction of psychic life to a repetition of what happened in the past.

But all this has a highly progressive meaning. Freud was the first to register the full implications of the Kantian critique of an ontology of the soul, of 'rational psychology': the soul of Freudian psychology, as part of the already constituted world, falls within the province of the constitutive categories of empirical analysis. Freud put an end to the ideological transfiguration of the soul as a residual form of animism. It is no doubt the theory of childhood sexuality that most thoroughly undermines all metaphysical humbug about the soul. The psychoanalytic denunciation of man's unfreedom and degradation in an unfree society resembles the materialist critique of a society blindly dominated by its economy. But under its deadly medical gaze unfreedom becomes petrified into an anthropological constant, and the quasi-scientific conceptual apparatus thereby overlooks everything in its object that is not merely object—namely, its potential for spontaneity. The more strictly the psychological realm is conceived as an autonomous, self-enclosed play of forces, the more completely the subject is drained of his subjectivity. The objectless subject that is thrown back on himself freezes into an object. It cannot break out of its immanence and amounts to no more than equations of libidinal energy. The soul that is broken down into its own laws is a soul no longer: only the groping for what it itself is not would merit the name. This is no mere epistemological matter but extends even as far as the therapeutic outcome, those desperately realistic people who have literally transformed themselves into machines in order to get on all the more successfully within their limited sphere of interests, their 'subjectivism'.

The Concept of Rationalization

As soon as psychological concepts are as rigorously developed as Freud's, the neglected divergence of psychology and society takes its revenge. This can be demonstrated in the case of the concept of rationalization which was originally introduced by Jones[21] and then found its place in standard analytic theory. It designates all those state-

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[21] cf. Ernest Jones, 'Rationalization in Every-Day Life,' in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1908.

ments which, quite apart from their truth content, fulfil certain functions within the psychic economy of the speaker, the commonest being defence against unconscious tendencies. Such utterances are invariably the object of a psychoanalytic critique analogous, as has often been noted, to the Marxist doctrine of ideology: their objective function is to conceal, and the analyst is out to establish both their falsehood and their necessity and to bring what was hidden to light. But there exists no pre-established harmony between the immanent psychological critique of rationalization and its real content. The same statement can be true or false, depending on whether it is judged according to reality or its psycho-dynamic context; indeed, this dual aspect is crucial to rationalizations, because the unconscious takes the line of least resistance and therefore latches on to whatever pretexts reality offers; and, what is more, the sounder their basis in reality, the more unassailably they can operate.

In its rationalizations, which involve both rationality and irrationality, the psychological subject ceases to be merely psychological. The analyst who takes pride in his realism thus becomes an out-and-out dogmatist the moment he disregards the real, objective aspects of rationalization in favour of its closed, immanently psychological context. But a sociology which, conversely, took rationalizations at face-value would be no less questionable. Private rationalization, the self-deception of the subject, is not identical with the objective untruth of public ideology. The individual's defence-mechanisms will, however, constantly seek support from their already well-established and widely endorsed counterparts in society at large. The phenomenon of rationalization, that is, the mechanism whereby objective truth can be made to enter the service of subjective untruth (a mechanism that can be amply documented in the social psychology of typical contemporary defence-mechanisms), betrays not merely neurosis but a false society. Objective truth itself is necessarily also untruth as long as it is not the whole truth of the subject, and serves both by its function and its indifference to its subjective genesis to camouflage merely particular interests. Rationalizations are the scars of reason in a state of unreason.

Ferenczi, perhaps the most unfaltering and liberated of the psychoanalysts, focused precisely on the rationalizations of the superego, the collective norms of individual behaviour that psychologically unsophisticated morality calls conscience. It is here more than anywhere else that the historical transformation in the function of psychoanalysis from a radical medium of enlightenment to practical adjustment to existing conditions is most strikingly apparent. Once it was the compulsive features of the superego that were stressed and analysis was required to do away with them. Such progressive intentions tolerate no unconscious controls even for the purpose of controlling the unconscious. Hardly any of this impetus still remains in today's psychoanalytic literature. Once his difficulties with the original conscious, preconscious and unconscious 'systems' had led Freud to reorganize the analytic topology under the categories id, ego and superego, it was all too easy to predicate the psychoanalytical picture of the good life on their mutual harmony. In particular, psychopaths—today a tabooed concept—are interpreted as lacking a well-developed superego, which, within reasonable limits, is thus held to be a necessity after all. But it is a mockery of the analytic principle to tolerate irrationalities merely because they stem from society and because an organized society is supposedly unthinkable without them.

Kant and Freedom

The distinction popular these days between a 'neurotic', that is, compulsive, and a 'healthy', that is, conscious superego betrays all the signs of the patchwork job. Along with its opaqueness a 'conscious' superego would lose precisely the authority for the sake of which its apologists cling to it. Kantian ethics, which centres round a quite unpsychologically conceived notion of conscience residing in the intelligible realm, is not to be confused with an updated psychoanalysis which arrests the process of enlightenment for fear that otherwise the conscience will be in trouble. Kant knew full well why he contrasted psychology and the idea of freedom: the play of forces with which psychoanalysis is concerned belongs in his system to the 'phenomenal' realm of causality. The crux of his doctrine of freedom is a conception incompatible with any empiricism—that moral objectivity, and the just social order it implies, cannot be measured by the way things and men happen at any given time to be. The psychologist's attitude of tactful permissiveness towards conscience detroys precisely that objectivity by utilizing it as a mere tool. The goal of the 'well-integrated personality' is objectionable because it expects the individual to establish an equilibrium between conflicting forces which does not obtain in existing society—nor should it, because those forces are not of equal moral merit. People are taught to forget the objective conflicts which necessarily repeat themselves in every individual, instead of being helped to grapple with them.

The well-balanced person who no longer sensed the inner conflict of psychological forces, the irreconcilable claims of id and ego, would not thereby have achieved an inner resolution of social conflicts. He would be confusing his psychic state—his personal good fortune—with objective reality. His integration would be a false reconciliation with an unreconciled world, and would presumably amount in the last analysis to an 'identification with the aggressor', a mere character-mask of subordination. The concept of integration which is today becoming increasingly dominant, especially in therapy, denies the genetic principle and immediately hypostatizes supposedly constitutional psychic forces such as consciousness and instinct, between which some balance is to be struck, instead of recognizing them as moments of a self-division which cannot be resolved within the confines of the psyche.

Freud's incisive polemic against the idea of psychosynthesis,[22] a fancy

[22] 'But I cannot think . . . that any new task is set us by this psychosynthesis. If I allowed myself to be frank and uncivil I should say it was nothing but an empty phrase. I will limit myself to remarking that it is merely pushing a comparison so far that it ceases to have any meaning, or . . . that it is an unjustifiable exploitation of a name . . . What is psychical is something so unique and peculiar to itself that no one

expression invented by hard-headed academics out to smear analysis as mechanistic, if not destructive, and to claim to be sole suppliers of the constructive approach, should be extended to include the ideal of integration, a threadbare version of the bad old notion of 'personality'. Whether the complete, all-round development of the whole man is, in fact, worth emulating may be questioned. A 'blond Siegfried' is the phrase with which Benjamin characterized the ideal of the genital character that was in vogue about 20 years ago among psychoanalysts; in the meantime they have come to prefer well-balanced people with a well-developed superego instead. The 'good' Freudian uninhibited by repressions would, in the existing acquisitive society, be almost indistinguishable from the hungry beast of prey and an eloquent embodiment of the abstract utopia of the subject, or, in today's jargon, the 'image of man', whose autonomous development was unimpeded by society. The psychologists' attack on their scapegoat, the herd animal, can be paid back with interest by a social critique of the superman whose freedom remains false, neurotically greedy, 'oral', as long as it presupposes unfreedom. Every 'image of man' is ideology except the negative one.

Conformity as an Ideal

If, for instance, the appeal goes out today for the all-round personality as opposed to the specialization inseparable from the division of labour, this merely sets a premium on the undifferentiated, the crude and the primitive, and ultimately exalts the extroversion of the go-getters, those who are atrocious enough to adapt to an atrocious life. Whatever qualities at present genuinely anticipate a more human existence are always simultaneously, in the eyes of the existing order, damaged rather than harmonious things. Mandeville's thesis that private vices are public virtues can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the relation between psychology and society: what is characterologically dubious often represents what is objectively better: it is not the normal man but rather the unswerving specialist that is productive. Already at the beginning of the bourgeois era only the internalization of repression made possible that increase in human productivity which could here and now enable people to live in luxury; and, likewise, psychological defects signify something radically different in the context of the tangled whole than within the psychic household of the individual.

It would not be difficult for psychology to diagnose the behaviour of, say, the now obsolete figure of the collector as neurotic, and relate it to the anal syndrome; but without libidinal fixation on things, tradition and indeed humanity itself would scarcely be possible. A society that rids itself of that syndrome only to throw everything away like empty tins hardly deals any differently with human beings. We know too, to what an extent the libidinal cathexis of technology is today a regressive symptom, but without such regressions the technical inventions that may yet one day banish hunger and senseless suffering would hardly have been made. Psychologists can loftily belittle nonconformist politicians by showing how they have not solved their Oedipus complex, but without their spontaneity society would remain eternally doomed to reproduced that self-same Oedipus complex in every one of its members. Whatever rises above the existent is threatened with disintegration, and is thus mostly more than ever at the mercy of the existent.

'Character,' the opposite of the boundlessly elastic, subjectless subject, is, without doubt, archaic. In the end it proves to be not freedom but a superseded phase of unfreedom: when the Americans say 'He's quite a character', they mean he's a figure of fun, an oddity, a poor fellow. As late as in Nietzsche's time the psychological ideals were still the proper target for criticism, but today it is even more the psychological ideal as such, in all its various forms, that should come under attack. No longer is individual man the key to humanity. The kindly, established sages of today, moreover, are mere variants of führer propaganda.

Function of the Superego

The cultivation of the superego arbitrarily breaks off the process of psychoanalytic enlightenment. But to make a public profession of conscience-lessness is to sanction atrocity. So heavily weighs the conflict of social and psychological insight. It was ineffectual comfort to claim, as already Kant implied, that what has hitherto been achieved at such unspeakable cost by an irrational conscience can be accomplished by conscious insight into social necessities without the havoc that Nietzsche's philosophy never ceases to denounce. The resolution of the antinomy of universal and particular remains mere ideology as long as the instinctual renunciation society expects of the individual neither can be objectively justified as true and necessary nor later provides him with the delayed gratification. This kind of irrationality is stifled by conscience. The goals of the psychic economy and the life-process of society simply cannot be reduced to a common formula. What society, for the sake of its survival, justly demands of each individual is at the same time also unjust for each individual and, ultimately, for society itself; what psychology takes to be mere rationalization is often socially necessary. In an antagonistic society each individual is non-identical with himself, both social and psychological character[23] at once, and, because of the split, maimed from the outset. It is no accident that the irreconcilability of an undiminished, unmutilated existence with bourgeois society has remained the fundamental theme of bourgeois realist art from *Don Quixote* via Fielding's *Tom Jones* up to Ibsen and the moderns. Right becomes wrong, foolishness or guilt.

comparison can reflect its nature. . . The comparison with chemical analysis has its limitation: for in mental life we have to deal with trends that are under a compulsion towards unification and combination. . . In actual fact, indeed, the neurotic patient presents us with a torn mind, divided by resistances. As we analyse it and remove the resistances, it grows together; the great unity which we call his ego fits into itself all the instinctual impulses which before had been split off and held apart from it. The psychosynthesis is thus achieved during analytic treatment without our intervention, automatically and inevitably . . . It is not true that something in the patient has been divided into its components and is now quietly waiting for us to put it somehow together again.' (Freud, *Works*, Vol. 17, 'Lines of advance in psychoanalytic therapy,' p. 160–1.)

[23] cf. Walter Benjamin, 'Standort der französischen Schriftsteller,' in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 3rd Vol., 1934, p. 66.

What appears to the subject as his own essence, what over against the estranged social necessities he takes to be his very own, is a mere illusion when measured against those necessities. This invests all psychology with an element of futility. In disparaging the sphere we today call psychology as contingent and irrelevant beside the transcendental, objective sphere of spirit (Geist), the great idealist tradition, as represented by Kant and Hegel, sees more deeply into society than an empiricism that, while thinking itself sceptical, clings to the individualist facade. It could almost be said that the better one understands a person's psychology the further one removes oneself from an understanding of his social fate and of society itself and thereby—without the psychological insight being any the less valid—of the person as he really is. But it is another aspect of the 'totalitarian' nature of present society that, perhaps more completely than in the past, people as such reinforce with the energy of their ego the assimilation society imposes on them; and that they blindly pursue their self-alienation to the point of an illusory identity between what they are in themselves and what they are for themselves. Because, given objective possibilities, adjustment to society should no longer be a necessity, it takes more than simple adjustment to stick it out in existing society. Self-preservation succeeds only to the extent that, as a result of self-imposed regression, self-development fails.

As the co-ordinator of all psychic impulses and the principle which constitutes individual identity in the first place, the ego also falls within the province of psychology. But the 'reality-testing' ego not merely borders on the non-psychological, outer world to which it adjusts, but constitutes itself through objective moments beyond the immanence of the psyche, through the adequacy of its judgments to states of affairs. Although itself psychic in origin it is supposed to arrest the play of inner forces and check it against reality: this is one of the chief criteria for determining its 'health'. The concept of the ego is dialectical, both psychic and extrapsychic, a quantum of libido and the representative of outside reality.

Positive and Negative Ego-functions

Freud did not investigate this dialectic. As a result, his immanently psychological statements about the ego involuntarily contradict one another and disrupt the closed system he strives to establish. The most flagrant of the contradictions is that the ego, while encompassing the activities of consciousness, is itself conceived to be essentially unconscious. This is only very inadequately conveyed by Freud's external and oversimplified topology, in which consciousness is situated at the far rim of the ego, the area directly bordering on reality.[24] The upshot is that the ego is supposed to be both, *qua* consciousness, the opposite of repression, and, *qua* unconscious, the repressive agency itself. The introduction of the superego may be attributed to the intention of bringing some kind of order into this intricate state of affairs In the Freudian system there is a total lack of any adequate criteria for distinguishing 'positive' from 'negative' ego-functions, above all,

[24] Freud, *Works*, Vol. 22, p. 58 and p. 75.

sublimation from repression. Instead, the concept of what is socially useful or productive is rather innocently dragged in. But in an irrational society the ego cannot perform at all adequately the function allotted to it by that society. The ego is necessarily burdened with psychic tasks that are irreconcilable with the psychoanalytic conception of the ego. To be able to assert itself in reality, the ego has to understand reality and operate consciously. But to enable the individual to effect the often senseless renunciations imposed on him, the ego has to set up unconscious prohibitions and to remain largely confined to the unconscious.

Freud did not fail to point out that the instinctual renunciation demanded of the individual is not rewarded by such compensations as would on conscious grounds alone justify it.[25] But since instinctual life does not obey the stoical philosophy of its learned analyst—no-one knew this better than Freud himself—the rational ego, judged by the principle of psychic economy Freud himself stipulated, is clearly unequal to its task. It has itself to become unconscious, part of the instinctual dynamic it is still, however, supposed to transcend. The ego's cognitive activity, performed in the interests of self-preservation, has to be constantly reversed, and self-awareness forgone, in the interests of self-preservation. The conceptual contradiction that Freud can be so elegantly shown to be guilty of is thus not the fault of loose thinking but of life and death.

Ego and Non-ego

But the ego, which, as reality-principle, is always also non-ego, is predisposed for its dual role by its own make-up. In so far as it has to see to the irreconcilable claims both of the libido and of actual self-preservation, it is constantly taxed beyond its powers. It by no means commands that firmness and sureness it flaunts in the direction of the id. Great psychologists of the ego such as Marcel Proust have, on the contrary, established the precariousness of all ego-identity. The reason for this is, to be sure, less the flow of time than the actual dynamic of the psyche. Where the ego fails to develop its intrinsic potential for self-differentiation, it will regress, especially towards what Freud called ego-libido[26], to which it is most closely related, or will at least mingle its conscious functions with unconscious ones. What actually wanted to get beyond the unconscious then re-enters the service of the unconscious and may thus even strengthen its force. This is the psychodynamic scheme of 'rationalizations'.

Analytic ego-psychology has hitherto not devoted sufficient attention to the feed-back of ego into id because it simply took over from the Freudian taxonomy the concepts ego and id as fixed entities. The ego that withdraws back into the unconscious does not simply cancel itself out but retains several of the features it had acquired as a societal agent. But it subordinates them to the dictates of the unconscious. In this way an illusory harmony between reality-principle and pleasure-

[25] cf. Freud, *Works*, Vol. 9, 'Civilised' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness.
[26] cf. Freud, *Works*, Vol. 19, 'A Short Outline of Psycho-Analysis.'

principle is brought about. With the transposition of the ego into the unconscious the quality of the drives is modified in turn; they are diverted towards characteristic ego-goals which contradict those of the primary libido. The kind of instinctual energy on which the ego draws in advancing towards its supreme sacrifice, that of consciousness, is of the anaclitic type Freud called narcissism. This is the irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the body of social-psychological findings about the currently prevalent forms of regression,[27] in which the ego is both negated and falsely, irrationally, rigidified. The socialized narcissism characteristic of the most recent mass movements and dispositions invariably combines the ruthlessly partial rationality of self-interest with a destructive, self-destructive, misshapen irrationality, in analysing which Freud carried on where MacDougall and Le Bon had left off.

The Role of Narcissism

The introduction of the concept of narcissism counts among Freud's most magnificent discoveries, although psychoanalytic theory has still not proved quite equal to it. In narcissism the self-preserving function of the ego is, on the surface at least, retained, but, at the same time, split off from that of consciousness and thus lost to rationality. All defence-mechanisms bear the imprint of narcissism: the ego experiences its frailty in relation to the instincts as well as its powerlessness in the world as 'narcissistic injury'. The work of the defence-mechanisms however, is not registered by consciousness, and is indeed hardly carried out by the ego itself but rather by a psychodynamic derivative, a hybrid, ego-oriented and yet unsublimated, undifferentiated form of libido. It is even questionable whether it is the ego that performs the function of repression, the chief of all the so-called defence-mechanisms. Perhaps the repressive agency itself should be regarded as ego-oriented, narcissistic libido which has ricocheted back from its real goals and then fused with moments specific to the ego. In which case, 'social psychology' would not be, as people today would like to think, essentially ego-psychology, but libido psychology.

Freud considered repression and sublimation to be equally precarious. He held the id's libido quantum to be so much larger than that of the ego that in case of conflict the id is always bound to regain the upper hand. Not merely is the spirit willing but the flesh weak, as theologians have always taught, but the mechanisms of ego-formation are themselves fragile. This is why it so readily allies itself with those very regressions inflicted on the instincts by their repression. Hence the partial legitimacy of the revisionists' complaint that Freud underestimated those social moments which are mediated through the ego but remain psychologically relevant. Karen Horney, for example, claims against Freud that it is illegitimate to derive the feeling of helplessness from early childhood and the oedipus situation; it stems, in her view, from real social helplessness, which may already have been experienced in childhood (for which Horney shows little interest). Now it would certainly be dogmatic if one wanted to separate the ubiquitous feeling of helplessness, of which precisely the revisionists have given very subtle descriptions,[28] from its present social causes. But experiences of real helplessness are anything but irrational—and they are actually hardly psychological. On their own they might be expected to prompt resistance to the social system rather than further assimilation to it. What people know about their helplessness in society belongs to their ego—understood not merely as the fully conscious faculty of judgement but as the whole web of its social relations. But as soon as the experience is turned into the 'feeling of helplessness' the specifically psychological element has entered in, the fact that individuals, precisely, *cannot* experience or confront their helplessness.

Internalization of Social Sanctions

This repression of their powerlessness points not merely to the disproportion between the individual and his powers within the whole but still more to injured narcissism and the fear of realizing that they themselves go to make up the false forces of domination before which they have every reason to cringe. They have to convert the experience of helplessness into a 'feeling' and let it settle psychologically in order not to think beyond it. It is the age-old pattern of the internalization of social sanctions. Id-psychology is mobilized by ego-psychology with the help of demagogy and mass culture. The latter merely process the raw material supplied to them by the psychodynamics of those they weld into masses. The ego hardly has any other choice than either to change reality or to withdraw back to the id. In interpreting this as a simple fact of ego-psychology, the revisionists mistake it for a mere epiphenomenon.

What in fact happens is that those infantile defence-mechanisms are selectively mobilized which, in a given historical situation, best dovetail into the pattern of the ego's social conflicts. It is this, and not that stand-by, wish-fulfilment, which explains the hold mass culture exerts over people. There is no 'neurotic personality of our time'—the name alone is a diversionary tactic—rather the objective situation does determine the course regressions will take. While conversion hysteria is today on the decrease, conflicts in the area of narcissism are more noticeable than 60 years ago, and manifestations of paranoid tendencies, too, are increasingly apparent. Whether there really exist more paranoiacs than previously can be left unanswered; there are no comparative figures even for the recent past. But a situation that threatens everyone, and in some of its achievements outdoes paranoid fantasies, particularly invites paranoia, perhaps, indeed, this can be said in general of dialectical nodal points in history. Against the superficial historicism of the revisionists Hartmann acknowledges that a given social structure selects but does not 'express', specific psychological tendencies.[29]

[27] cf. William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other*, Urbana 1953, p. 57.

[28] cf. Erich Fromm, 'Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht,' in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Vol. 6, 1937, p. 95 et seq.

[29] cf. Heinz Hartmann, loc. cit., p. 388.

No doubt concrete historical components already enter early childhood experience, thereby disproving Freud's crude doctrine of the timeless quality of the unconscious. But the mimetic responses of small children on perceiving that their father does not guarantee them the protection they hanker after are not the work of the ego. It is precisely here that even Freud's psychology is all too ego-oriented. His magnificent discovery of infantile sexuality will cease to do violence only when we learn to understand the infinitely subtle and yet utterly sexual impulses of children. In their perceptive world, poles apart from that of the grown-ups, a fleeting smell or a gesture take on dimensions that the analyst, faithful to adult criteria, would like to attribute solely to their observation of their parents' coitus.

'Defence-mechanisms'

The difficulties with which the ego confronts psychology are nowhere more apparent than in Anna Freud's theory of the so-called defence-mechanisms. Her point of departure is what analysis initially terms resistance to the making conscious of the id. 'Since it is the aim of the analytic method to enable ideational representatives of the repressed instincts to enter consciousness, i.e. to encourage these inroads by the id, the ego's defensive operations against such representatives automatically assume the character of active resistance to analysis.'[30] The concept of defence already stressed by Freud in the 'Studies in Hysteria'[31] is now applied to the whole realm of ego-psychology and a list is assembled of nine defence-mechanisms familiar from psychoanalytic practice which all supposedly represent measures taken by the ego against the id: 'regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal'.[32] To these 'we must add a tenth, which pertains rather to the study of the normal than to that of neurosis: sublimation, or displacement of instinctual aims'.[33]

A closer consideration confirms the doubts raised by the enumerability of these nicely pigeon-holed mechanisms. Already Sigmund Freud had made out of the originally central concept of repression a mere 'special method of defence'.[34] But repression and regression, which he wisely never strictly differentiated from one another, unquestionably play their part in all the ego-activities listed by Anna Freud; whereas other activities such as 'undoing' or the 'identification with the aggressor'[35] which Anna Freud so convincingly describes, as special cases of the mechanisms of repression and regression, hardly belong on the same logical plane. In this juxtaposition of highly disparate mechanisms a certain faltering of rigorous theory in the face of the empirically observed material is to be detected. In subsuming both repression and sublimation under the rubric of defence, his daughter refuses still more

[30] Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, New York, 1946, p. 32.
[31] cf. Sigmund Freud, *Works*, Vol. 2, p.269.
[32] Anna Freud. ibid., p. 47.
[33] Ibid.
[34] cf. Sigmund Freud, *Works*, Vol. 20, 'Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety' p. 164, and Anna Freud, ibid., p. 45.
[35] Anna Freud, ibid., p. 117.

categorically than Freud himself to make a clear distinction between the two. Such psychic activities as do not directly further instinctual gratification or self-preservation—in Freud they still pass for 'cultural achievements'—are, for her, and by no means for her alone, at bottom pathological. Similarly, contemporary psychoanalytic theory believes on the basis of clinical observation that in accounting for music as a defence against paranoia it has exhausted the topic; if it only pursed its thesis to its logical conclusion, it would have to ban all music.[36] From here it is no longer very far to those biographical psychoanalyses that think they are saying something important about Beethoven in pointing to his personal paranoia, and then wonder how such a man could have written music whose fame impresses them more than a truth their system prevents them from apprehending.

Authoritarianism and Anna Freud

Such filiations between the theory of defences and the reduction of psychoanalysis to a conformist interpretation of the reality-principle are not wholly lacking even in Anna Freud's book. She devotes a chapter to the relation of ego and id during puberty. Puberty is, in her eyes, essentially a conflict between the 'influx of libido'[37] into the psychic sphere and the ego's defence against the id. It is to this that 'intellectualization at puberty'[38] is attributed. 'There is a type of young person whose sudden spurt in intellectual development is no less noticeable and surprising than his rapid development in other directions. . . When the pre-pubertal period begins, a tendency for the concrete interests of the latency-period to give place to abstractions becomes more and more marked. In particular, adolescents of the type whom Bernfeld describes as characterized by 'prolonged puberty' have an insatiable desire to think about abstract subjects, to turn them over in their minds, and to talk about them. Many of the friendships of youth are based on and maintained by this desire to meditate upon and discuss such subjects together. The range of these abstract interests and of the problems which these young people try to solve is very wide. They will argue the case for free love or marriage and family life, a free-lance existence or the adoption of a profession, roving or settling down, or discuss philosophical problems such as religion or free thought, or different political theories, such as revolution *versus* submission to authority, or friendship itself in all its forms. If, as sometimes happens in analysis, we receive a faithful report of the conversations of young people or if—as has been done by many of those who make a study of puberty—we examine the diaries and jottings of adolescents, we are not only amazed at the wide and unfettered sweep of their thought but impressed by the degree of empathy and understanding manifested, by their apparent superiority to more mature thinkers and sometimes even by the wisdom which they display in the handling of the most difficult problems.'[39]

[36] On the psychoanalytic controversy about music cf. especially Heinrich Racker, 'Contribution to Psychoanalysis of Music,' in *American Imago*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 June 1951, p. 129 et seq., especially p. 157.
[37] Anna Freud, ibid., p. 158.
[38] Ibid., p. 172.
[39] Ibid., p. 174–5.

But this respect rapidly vanishes: 'We revise our opinion when we turn from the examination of the adolescent's intellectual processes themselves to consider how they fit into the general picture of his life. We are surprised to discover that this fine intellectual performance makes little or no difference to his actual behaviour. His empathy with the mental processes of other people does not prevent him from displaying the most outrageous lack of consideration towards those nearest to him. His lofty view of love and of the obligations of a lover does not mitigate the infidelity and callousness of which he is repeatedly guilty in his various love-affairs. The fact that his understanding of and interest in the structure of society often far exceeds those of later years does not assist him in the least to find his true place in social life, nor does the many-sidedness of his interests deter him from concentrating entirely upon a single point—his preoccupation with his own personality'[40]. With such judgments psychoanalysis, which once set out to break the power of the father image, firmly takes the side of the fathers, who either smile at the children's high-faluting ideas with a droop at the corner of their mouth or else rely on life to teach them what's what, and who consider it more important to earn money than get silly ideas into one's head. The attitude of mind that distances itself from the realm of immediate ends and means, and is given the chance to do so during the brief years in which it is its own master before being absorbed and dulled by the necessity to earn a living, is slandered as mere narcissism. The powerlessness and fallibility of those who still believe in other possibilities is made out to be their own vain fault; what is blamed on their own inadequacies is much more the fault of a social order that constantly denies them the possible and breaks what potential people possess. The psychological theory of defence-mechanisms places itself squarely in an old anti-intellectual bourgeois tradition.

From this arsenal, too, is fetched the stereotype argument that attacks not the conditions that stifle a powerless ideal but the ideal itself and those that cherish it. However much what Anna Freud calls 'these young people's, behaviour differs, for real no less than psychological reasons, from their state of mind, this very disparity holds more promise than the norm of unmediated identity between consciousness and reality whereby a person may think only what his existence can cash. As if adults lacked the inconsiderateness, infidelity and callousness that Anna Freud blames on 'young people'—the only difference between them being that the brutality later loses the ambivalence that still characterizes it at least while it is in conflict with an awareness of possible better things, and can even oppose what it later identifies with. 'We recognize', says Anna Freud, 'that we have here something quite different from intellectuality in the ordinary sense of the term'.[41] The psychologist holds up before imaginary adolescents intellectuality 'in the ordinary sense of the term', however ordinary it may be, without considering that even 'ordinary' derives from less ordinary intellectuality and that, as schoolboys or young students, few intellectuals are as mean as when they then barter their minds on the competitive market. The young person Anna Freud reproaches for 'evidently deriving gratification from the mere process of thinking, speculating or discussing'[42] has every reason to feel gratified: he will have to wean himself quickly enough to the privilege, instead of having to 'think out the right line of behaviour'[43] as the philistine does.

'Their ideals of friendship and undying loyalty are simply a reflection of the disquietude of the ego when it perceives the evanescence of all its new and passionate object-relations'[44], we read a little further on, and Margit Dubowitz of Budapest is thanked for the suggestion that 'the tendency of adolescents to brood on the meaning of life and death reflects the destructive activities in their own psyche'[45]. It is a moot point whether the spiritual breathing-space that bourgeois existence grants at least its better-placed members who serve as psychoanalytic material is, in fact, as futile and ineffectual as it appears in the patient free-associating on the couch; but there would certainly exist neither friendship and loyalty nor any significant thought without this breathing-space which, in the spirit and with the help of a well-integrated psychoanalysis, present society is preparing to reduce.

Genesis and Truth

The balance-sheet of the psychic economy necessarily registers as defence, illusion and neurosis anything the ego does to attack the conditions that drive it to defence, illusion and neurosis; in substituting the genesis of a thought for its truth, a thorough-going psychologism becomes the subversion of all truth and lends support to the status quo while simultaneously condemning its mirror-images in the subject. The bourgeoisie in its late phase is incapable of thinking genesis and validity in their simultaneous unity and difference. The wall of congealed labour, the objectified result, has come to seem impenetrable and timeless, and the dynamic, which, as human labour, is in fact an objective moment, is subtracted from that objective dimension and shifted into the isolated subject. Thereby, however, the part played by the subjective dynamic is reduced to mere illusoriness and simultaneously opposed to any insight into objective conditions: any such insight is suspected of being a futile self-reflection of the subject.

Husserl's campaign against psychologism—which coincides in time exactly with the early beginnings of psychoanalysis—the doctrine of logical absolutism which at all levels separates the validity of intellectual constructs from their genesis and fetishizes the former, is only the obverse side of an approach that sees nothing but the genesis, not its relation to objectivity, and ultimately abolishes the very notion of truth in favour of the reproduction of the existent. The two extreme opposites, both conceived, significantly, amidst the apologetics of an obsoletely semi-feudal Austria, ultimately converge. The status quo is either hypostatized as the content of 'intentions' or protected against all criticism by the further subordination of such criticism to psychology.

[40] Ibid., p. 175.
[41] Ibid., p. 175.
[42] Ibid., p. 176.
[43] Ibid., p. 176 et seq.
[44] Ibid., p. 177.
[45] Ibid., p. 177, footnote.

The ego-functions psychoanalysis takes such pains to separate from one another are inextricably intertwined. The difference is in reality that between the claims of society and those of the individual. For this reason the sheep cannot be separated from the goats in ego-psychology. The original cathartic method demands that the unconscious become conscious. But since Freudian theory also defined the ego, which must indeed cope with contradictory tasks, as the agent of repression, analysis should, pursued to its logical conclusion, simultaneously dismantle the ego—namely, its resistances, the work of the defence-mechanisms, without which, however, the ego could not conceivably retain its identity against the multiplicity of impulses pressing in on it. This leads to the absurd conclusion that in therapeutic practice the defence mechanisms are to be sometimes broken through and sometimes strengthened—a view which Anna Freud explicitly supports.[46]

The Continuum between Neurosis and Psychosis

Psychotics' defences are thus supposed to be built up and neurotics' defences broken down. The psychotic's ego-defences are to prevent instinctual chaos and disintegration, and treatment is confined to 'supportive therapy'. In the case of neuroses the traditional cathartic technique is adhered to because here the ego can allegedly cope with the instincts. This nonsensically dualistic practice disregards the basic affinity that, according to psychoanalytic doctrine, exists between neurosis and psychosis. If a continuum is actually imagined to exist between compulsive neurosis and schizophrenia, there can be no justification for insisting on more consciousness for one patient while trying to keep another 'capable of functioning' and protecting him against the acute danger that is at the same time invoked as the first patient's salvation. Since ego-weakness has latterly been numbered among the most crucial neurotic structures,[47] any treatment that still further curtails the ego appears problematic.

The societal antagonism reappears in the goal of analysis, which no longer knows, and cannot know, where it wants to get the patient, to the happiness of freedom or to happiness in unfreedom. It dodges the issue by giving the well-to-do who can afford it protracted cathartic treatment and the poor patient, who has soon to be back at his job, mere therapeutic support—a division that makes neurotics of the rich and psychotics of the poor. This tallies with statistics that demonstrate correlations between schizophrenia and low social status.[48] It is an open question, however, whether depth-analysis is ultimately preferable to more superficial therapy, and whether those patients do not come off better who at least remain able to work and do not have to surrender themselves body and mind to the analyst with the vague prospect that the transference which is growing stronger with each passing year will one day dissolve.

Psychological therapy, too, is warped by the contradiction of sociology and psychology: whatever course it opts for is the wrong one. If analysis dissolves resistances, it weakens the ego, and fixation on the analyst is more than a mere transitory phase; it is, rather, the replacement for the ego the patient is being deprived of. If it strengthens the ego, then, according to orthodox theory, analysis to a large extent also strengthens the forces whereby it keeps the unconscious down, the defence-mechanisms that allow the unconscious to continue its destructive activities.

The Need for Differentiation

Psychology is no preserve of the particular, sheltered against exposure to the universal. With the intensification of social antagonisms, clearly, the thoroughly liberal and individualistic concept of psychology tends increasingly to forfeit its meaning. The pre-bourgeois order does not yet know psychology, the over-socialized society knows it no longer. Analytic revisionism is the counterpart of such a society. It is commensurate with the shifting relation between society and the individual. The social power-structure hardly needs the mediating agencies of ego and individuality any longer. An outward sign of this is, precisely, the spread of so-called ego-psychology, whereas in reality the individual psychological dynamic is replaced by the partly conscious and partly regressive adjustment of the individual to society. The remnants of irrationality function merely as so much oil to be squirted into the works. The truly contemporary types are those whose actions are motivated neither by an ego nor, strictly speaking, unconsciously, but mirror objective trends like an automaton. Together they enact a senseless ritual to the beat of a compulsively repetitive rhythm and become emotionally impoverished: with the destruction of the ego, narcissism, or its collectivistic derivatives, is heightened. A brutal, total, standardizing society arrests all differentiation, and to this end it exploits the primitive core of the unconscious. Both conspire to annihilate the mediating ego; the triumphant archaic impulses, the victory of id over ego, harmonize with the triumph of society over the individual.

Psychoanalysis in its most authentic and by now already obsolete form comes into its own as a report on the forces of destruction rampant in the individual amidst a destructive society. What remains untrue about

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[46] 'The only situation in which this promise [e.g. that once id-impulses are made conscious they are less dangerous and more amenable to control than when unconscious] may prove illusory is that in which the defence has been undertaken because the patient dreads the strength of his instincts. This most deadly struggle of the ego to prevent itself from being submerged by the id, as, for instance, when psychosis is taking one of its periodic turns for the worse, is essentially a matter of quantitative relations. All that the ego asks for in such a conflict is to be reinforced. In so far as analysis can strengthen it by bringing the unconscious id-contents into consciousness, it has a therapeutic effect here also. But, in so far as the bringing of the unconscious activities of the ego into consciousness has the effect of disclosing the defensive processes and rendering them inoperative, the result of analysis is to weaken the ego still further and to advance the pathological process'. (Anna Freud, ibid., p. 70 et seq.) But according to analytic theory this 'only situation', the fear of the strength of the instincts, would be the reason for all defence.

[47] Herrmann Nunberg, 'Ichstärke und Ichschwäche, in *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. XXIV, 1939.

[48] cf. August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich. 'Social Stratification and Schizophrenia', in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 302 et seq.

psychoanalysis is its claim to totality, its own over-identification with the momentum of history; starting out with Freud's early assertions that analysis seeks merely to add something more to existing knowledge, it culminates in his late dictum that 'sociology too, dealing as it does with the behaviour of people in society, cannot be anything but applied psychology.'[49]

On what is, or used to be, its home ground, psychoanalysis carries specific conviction; the further it removes itself from that sphere, the more its theses are threatened alternately with shallowness or wild over-systematization. If someone makes a slip of the tongue and a sexually loaded word comes out, if someone suffers from agoraphobia or if a girl walks in her sleep, psychoanalysis not merely has its best chances of therapeutic success but also its proper province, the relatively autonomous, monadological individual as arena of the unconscious conflict between instinctual drive and prohibition. The further it departs from this area, the more tyrannically it has to proceed and the more it has to drag what belongs to the dimension of outer reality into the shades of psychic immanence. Its delusion in so doing is not dissimilar from that 'omnipotence of thought' which it itself criticized as infantile.

It is not that the ego constitutes an autonomous second source of psychic life in addition to the id, which psychoanalysis rightly concentrated on as long as it had its own specific province, but that, for better or for worse, the ego has separated off from the pure immediacy of the instinctual impulses—a process whereby the area of conflict that is the actual domain of psychoanalysis first came into being. The ego, as the result of a genetic process, is both so much instinct and something else. Psychoanalytic logic, being incapable of thinking this contradiction, has to reduce everything to the same first principle, to what the ego once was. In cancelling out the differentiation synonymous with the emergence of the ego, it becomes the ally of regression, its own worst enemy. For the essence is not abstract repetition but the differentiated universal. That large sensitivity to difference which is the hallmark of the truly humane develops out of the most powerful experience of difference, that of the sexes. In reducing everything it calls unconscious, and ultimately all individuality, to the same thing, psychoanalysis seems to be the victim of a familiar homosexual mechanism, the inability to perceive differences. Homosexuals exhibit a certain experiential colour-blindness, an incapacity to apprehend individuality; women are, in the double sense, 'all the same' to them.

This scheme, the inability to love—for love intends, inextricably, the universal in the particular—is the basis of that analytic coldness which has been much too superficially attacked by the revisionists; it combines with aggressive tendencies which serves to conceal the real instinctual drives. From the outset, psychoanalysis is, well before its commercialization, attuned to prevailing reification. When a famous analytic teacher lays down the principle that asocial and schizoid children should be assured how much one likes them, the demand that one should love a repulsively aggressive child makes a mockery of everything analysis stood for; it was precisely Freud who once rejected the commandment that one should without distinction love all mankind.[50] Such indiscriminate love goes along with contempt for mankind: this is why it befits professional counsellors of soul-guidance. Its inherent tendency is to check and arrest the spontaneous impulses it releases: the undifferentiated concept under which it subsumes deviations is invariably another instrument of domination. A technique intended to cure the instincts of their bourgeois distortions further subjects them to the distortions of emancipation. It trains those it encourages to champion their drives to become useful members of the destructive whole.

(*translated by Irving N. Wohlfarth*).

[49] Sigmund Freud, *Works*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,' p. 179.

[50] 'A love that does not discriminate seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object . . . not all men are worthy of love.' (Freud, *Works*, Vol. 21, 'Civilization and its Discontents,' p. 102.)

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