Chapter Seven

AUTONOMY AND RESISTANCE

The greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom, the peculiar possession of the mind whereby it is at home with itself, is recognized.

—G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of History (1837)

In 1783 Immanuel Kant responded to the question “What is Enlightenment?” by answering “autonomy” or “emancipation from self-imposed immaturity.” By autonomy Kant meant *intellectual* and *moral* autonomy. On the one hand, he wanted individuals to get out from under the tutelage of priests and lords, and to think for themselves. On the other hand, he wanted them to rise above their desires and act in accord with moral norms that they themselves formulated by exercising their reason. For Kant, moreover, norms formulated in this way would be universally applicable. Thus, from the Kantian point of view, one’s race, gender, and social situation, to say nothing of the particularities of one’s personal life, were irrelevant. Bringing such specificity to bear on moral decisions could only derail the pursuit of autonomy.

In the nineteenth century, however, thinkers such as John Stuart Mill envisioned an alternative conception—that of *personal* autonomy. From their point of view, an autonomous individual was one who lived a life of his or her own devising, took responsibility for that life, and regarded it as a life worth living. Central to modernity, the ideal of personal autonomy was frequently linked to the idea that a person’s life could be viewed as a self-
authored narrative or work of art. Moral issues did not disappear from this perspective, but they were restricted to matters that were appropriately governed by universal norms. Beyond them lay the realm of personal choices. Such choices could not be dictated by moral reflection but required self-scrutiny of another, more personal kind.

The sea change wrought by the second industrial revolution made personal autonomy something more than a philosophical question. Moral autonomy was closely linked to the nineteenth-century property system and to the liberal assumption that certain individuals (Western, white, male, property-owning) could turn aside their own interests to think in terms of the common good. World War I brought the older liberal order to an end. Modernism was, at root, the search for a new ideal of civilization to replace that of nineteenth-century liberalism. In the course of that search, autonomy was redefined so that it no longer rested on property and family position. Instead, it came to be understood as a new, inward relation to oneself. The result was a profound interrogation of the meaning of autonomy during the interwar years, one in which psychoanalysis played a major role.

There were three areas in which this interrogation unfolded. First, autonomy was considered one of the psychological prerequisites of democracy. As we saw, the weakening of the liberal order did not result in stable democratic regimes. Rather, nineteenth-century liberalism was succeeded by Fordist and communist attempts to mold human nature; by authoritarian regimes based upon traditional conservative values, for example, in Hungary; by organic and corporatist models of society, such as those the Catholic church sponsored in Portugal, Spain, and Austria; and by fascism, which used the techniques of mass democracy for authoritarian ends. In that context, many believed that the future of democracy depended on autonomous citizens socialized to oppose authoritarianism. Freud’s writings addressed this concern. As World War II approached, his thinking inspired an enormous literature on family, education, culture, and politics, all aiming to specify the psychological prerequisites of a democratic citizenry.

Second, psychoanalysis proved relevant for understanding the new type of society that accompanied mass democracy. Consumer society—or, as it was then beginning to be called, mass society—equated personal autonomy with market choice. Psychoanalysis, in contrast, probed beneath the level of choice to its roots in unconscious instincts and wishes. Much of the interest in analysis came from those, such as Walter Lippmann and the Frankfurt School theorists, who rejected consumerism and mass culture as the moral basis of modern civilization, seeking either to return to nineteenth-
century ideas of autonomy or to redefine those ideas in the context of mass democracy.

Finally, analysis influenced efforts to extend the practice of self-reflection to the entire realm of individual choices that were not dictated by morality. As ties to place, kin, and ritual weakened; as freely chosen, extra-familial lifeworlds proliferated; as men and women gained a new, secular access to their inner lives, there was a need for institutions, practices, and ideas that helped individuals reflect upon and evaluate their immediate wants and impulses in light of deeper values and long-term goals. The growth of psychotherapy mirrored the felt need for such practices. But psychotherapy could become a servant of consumer society, which is systematically organized to appeal to unreflective wants. Psychoanalysis, in contrast, seemed to offer a kind of reflection that could not be so easily recuperated.

Freud’s revised or structural theory, even more than his theory of the unconscious, was at the center of the interest in autonomy. Freud expounded this theory in a series of brief volumes—Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1921), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Égo (1921), and The Égo and the Id (1923)—and was still working out its implications in his subsequent essays on female sexuality. Written during a few explosive years after World War I, these works described the psyche in terms of agencies (id, ego, superego) rather than regions (conscious, preconscious, unconscious). They also elaborated the new instinct theory, which revolved around the conflict between the drive to reduce tension, the “death instinct,” and the drive to synthesize or create higher and more complex levels of organization, the “life instinct,” or eros. Addressed not only to analysts but also to “the wider circle of educated people . . . able to appreciate the science of the human mind,” these works reflected the new interest in personal autonomy.

A theory of the ego or “I,” the successor to Freud’s theory of narcissism, was at the center of Freud’s revised theory. The ego, as Freud conceived it, arose where the instincts encountered the external world. Associated with perception or consciousness, as well as with preconscious thought and memory, its main effort was devoted to quieting or regulating tension. Reflecting the origins of the theory in the shell shock episode, Freud maintained that the greatest danger the ego faced was “an experience of helplessness . . . in the face of an accumulation of excitation.”

The ego developed the capacity to sustain tension, and thus to promote autonomy, in several different ways. At the most primitive level, it defended itself against excess excitement through projection, treating urges, impulses, or other messages arising from within as if they were external. Later, it mod-
eled itself on somatic processes such as ingestion or expulsion as a way of mastering those processes. Next, it induced the id to give up its earliest attachment to parents and siblings by identifying with them; through identification, the ego developed influence over the id, deepening its relations with it while also appeasing it: "Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object." Finally, the ego relied on the external world, beginning with the parents, to gain influence over peremptory internal demands.

The crucial moment in the ego's development was the Oedipal crisis: the uniquely human encounter with authority. In earliest childhood, behavior was motivated by fear of the loss of love or the loss of protection. During the Oedipal crisis, however, the individual gained control over his or her wishes by diverting them, through identification with the parents' superegos, into an internal agency that oversees the ego, a superego or Über-Ich. The superego had the character of the id. Unlike the ego, it was neither shaped by external influences nor responsive to external intervention. It was the result, rather, of the turning of the sadistic wishes of infancy against the ego, a process Freud chillingly depicted in his 1919 "A Child Is Being Beaten." The theory of the superego reflected the disjuncture between intrapsychic and sociocultural reality. After the Oedipal crisis, not only acts but thoughts and wishes were censored; the renunciation of forbidden acts did not lessen guilt but tended instead to increase it.

This portrait of the ego had profound implications for personal autonomy. For Kant, as we saw, autonomy meant distancing oneself from one's inclinations as well as from one's social context in order to act from duty alone. For Freud, in contrast, the ego was not only the agency of rational thought; it was also the precipitate of inclinations, drives, love objects, and identifications. Thus, reason could not finally be separated from contingent experiences but rather was a kind of "soft" but "persistent" voice that could be heard along with them. Likewise, attaining critical distance from desires, identifications, and object cathexes did not mean attaining a universal viewpoint. Rather, it entailed a hermeneutic process of introspection that in principle could never be completed.

In addition, the kind of reasoning that Kant advocated to attain moral autonomy was formal and logical: the test of a moral maxim was its capacity to be universalized without contradiction. For Freud, in contrast, introspection required concrete self-reflection. To attain autonomy in personal life meant working through the specific, idiosyncratic, contingent features of the individual's life history and narratively constructed identity. By showing that the ego disappears into, and draws resources from, the id, Freud's theory reflected the widespread modernist questioning of ratio-
nalization, planning, and control. As R. P. Blackmur wrote: “Reason had above all . . . the labour of associating the elements of a sensibility believed to be dissociated empirically.” The modernist project involved “reason in madness, operating and drawing from madness; it was reason controlling madness.”

Freud’s distinction between the ego and the superego, and his arguments concerning the irrational roots of the superego, also dovetailed with the general loosening of morality that accompanied mass consumption. By linking the superego to the id, Freud highlighted the rigid, compulsive, and punitive character of much that passed for morality. Weber had already traced not only Benjamin Franklin’s utilitarianism but Kant’s pietism to their Calvinist roots. Now Freud, theorizing the superego as the heir to the castration complex, equated Kant’s “categorical imperative”—his universal moral principle—with the superego: “what seems to us so grandiose about ethics, so mysterious and, in a mystical fashion, so self-evident, owes these characteristics to its connection with religion, its origins from the will of the father.” The morality that came from the superego, in Freud’s view, needed to be tempered by the identifications that reside near the id and by the ego’s realism, consultative capacities, and propensity for judgment.

Freud’s revised theory reflected the emergence of a new social terrain that lay beyond both the traditional community, which had no room for autonomy, and classical liberalism, with its decontextualized and impersonal idea of moral autonomy. In this new terrain, individuals moved among different types and levels of obligations. Autonomy no longer meant
control over the self, as in Kant; rather, it meant reflective equilibrium among different and conflicting demands. To be sure, some demands could be universal and moral, thus trumping others. Nonetheless, an autonomous life was one that looked in many directions simultaneously: toward personal life, the sphere of personal autonomy per se, as well as toward family, the community, religion, and science. The ego’s task was to mediate among different psychical environments, dealing at once with cravings and internal demands, self-criticisms, and representations of the social world. These environments were not only different; they were irreconcilable because they were different in kind. Some were close to reflexes, others were interpersonal, still others were the products of culture and collective action.

In line with this conception, Freud began to formulate an increasingly complex psychology. He portrayed the mind as “a hierarchy of superordinated and subordinated agencies, a labyrinth of impulses striving independently of one another towards action, corresponding with the multiplicity of instincts and of relations with the external world, many of which are antagonistic to one another and incompatible.” He compared the regions of the psyche to areas of color in modern painting that are not bounded but “melt into one another.” The new conception was unfamiliar, perhaps even more unfamiliar than the unconscious. As Anna Freud wrote, it took her a long time to think of the psyche in terms of “aims and functions, id, ego, and superego each pursuing their aim in life to the best of their possibility,” but eventually it “gave [her] a real sense for the purpose of life, or rather for the conflicting purposes in human life which are inevitable once a higher development of the personality is attempted and reached.” Such a theory was necessary, she continued, if we are to explain why “the parts of the mind” were often in “such a muddle—as if they were not only at cross-purposes with each other but also speaking different languages and acting out their intentions in a totally different medium.”

Before the war, psychoanalysis had been mixed up with many other forms of psychotherapy, such as mind cure, Jungianism, Adlerianism, and mental hygiene, as psychiatry was increasingly called. Freud’s revised theory led to a sharp distinction between psychoanalysis and the rest. While there were many ways to characterize this distinction, Freud drew the line with his assertion that the ego was the locus of resistance. Deeply rooted in his thought, this idea became central to the modernist redefinition of autonomy, as well as to the practice of psychoanalysis itself.
Freud's starting point had been the riddle of the neurosis, a force that he viewed as "inexpedient, and running counter to the flow of life." From the beginning, Freud believed that patients did not come to analysis to get well; they came, rather, to serve neurotic ends. For this reason he insisted on "abstinence." Through the analyst's refusal to palliate the patient's situation, the neurotic need would be frustrated, intensified, and brought into sharper focus. Frustration brought the transference into sharper focus, but it was especially in the negative transference that the underlying neurosis emerged. In 1915 Freud asked why this was so. His answer was that as the neurotic conflict came increasingly into focus, a two-sided imperative intensified: the patient sought to satisfy simultaneously both the underlying wish and the resistance against that wish. Nonanalytic therapies relied on the positive transference, which served them as the vehicle of cure. But only psychoanalysis brought to light the negative transference or resistance, the obstacle to cure. The negative transference had to be turned into insight or self-understanding before one could speak of analysis proper.

The observation of the war neuroses deepened this line of thought. The predominant fact in the war neuroses was the repetition of frustrating or unsatisfying behaviors. But this was exactly what occurred in the analytic situation when patients repeated frustrating infantile scenarios that they supposedly came to analysis to end. Freud attempted to explain this phenomenon by recourse to the death instinct. Allied with the superego, the death instinct set up a vicious circle in defense of the neurosis. As the patient got better, the superego attacked the improvement because infantile satisfactions, not the wish to be relieved of guilt, drove the analysis.8 Freud's earlier view, that the basic conflict in the mind was between consciousness and the repressed unconscious, had implied that the repressed was "afraid to be discovered." But the fact of repetition suggested that the repressed was constantly trying to break through to consciousness. It was not the repressed but the ego that prevented it from doing so. The result was a paradox: resistance to gaining knowledge of the unconscious came from the ego, and yet the ego was also the locus of reason and self-reflection, the "one beacon-light in the darkness of depth-psychology."9

It is often said today that psychoanalysis is "pluralistic" or "polycentric," that it has no agreed-upon core theory. Perhaps. But until the end of the sixties, it did have a core theory: the analysis of the resistance. All the classical theories, such as object relations, North American ego psychology, and Lacan's theory of narcissism, were devoted to this goal. Over time theoretical languages changed, but in practice all analysts concentrated on analyz-
ing the negative transference or resistance. No other therapy did this, at least not in a systematic fashion. This was why there was psychoanalysis at all, and not just psychotherapy.

Freud sought to distinguish psychoanalysis in this way at a time of enormous ferment in the analytic world. The number of analysts had increased sharply, as did the number and length of analyses, the demand for technical guides and procedures, and the increasing awareness that many analyses failed to reach any resolution. Rejecting the earlier idea that the analyst’s job was to interpret the unconscious, Freud argued that it was to analyze the resistance. In a typical contemporary response, Max Eitingon wrote to Melanie Klein: “This is putting dynamite to the house.” Nevertheless, the effect of Freud’s structural theory was to open a host of new clinical possibilities expressed in a series of new terms: “resistance analysis,” “character analysis,” the “metapsychological” approach, “defense analysis,” and “ego psychology.”

Ego psychology, with its focus on the resistance, was the outcome of Freud’s earlier dispute with Adler and the formulation of the theory of narcissism. Karl Abraham noted this in 1919 when he observed the “narcissistic inaccessibility” of patients mired in long, frustrating, and unproductive analyses. The “pretended compliance” of these patients was a defense, Abraham wrote, because analysis was “an attack on the patient’s narcissism . . . that instinctual force upon which our therapeutic endeavours are most easily wrecked.” In setting ego psychology apart from other therapies of the time, psychoanalysis gave a name to its alternatives: “mind cure.” Mind cure was any therapy that suppressed the negative transference and, in that sense, denied internal conflict. In the most basic sense, mind cure was positive thinking, as exemplified by Annie Payson Call’s 1918 Nerves and the War, which called shell shock “the product of negative thinking,” and urged soldiers not to “take the war into your mind” and to “rouse the will to direct the brain into wholesome channels.”

In a 1924 paper Abraham cited the ideas of Émile Coué, a French radio therapist whose Self Mastery Through Conscious Auto-Suggestion was a runaway bestseller in the United States, as an example of mind cure. Coué had given his followers a formula, the mantra “Every day, in every way, I’m getting better and better.” In Abraham’s view, Coué had successfully mass-marketed Adler’s masculine protest. The key to Coué’s effectiveness, Abraham argued, was his followers’ belief that he gave each of them the same “gift,” the ritual formula. In other words, Coué was a good father: he didn’t favor any of his children; he treated them all equally. This encouraged their identification with one another and flattered their narcissism or
"self-mastery," as Coué called it, with its "optimistic denial . . . of inferiority, real or imaginary." Psychoanalysis, by contrast, did not flatter its patients. Rather, it sharpened their sense of inferiority, challenged their narcissism, and made them aware of their envy and resentment of others.

The most anguished of all psychoanalytic ideas, the idea that the self-reflecting ego was also the seat of resistance, transformed both the self-understanding and the public perception of the analyst. It changed the analyst from a "helper" into someone who, in his or her daily work, served as the target of the deepest paranoia, defensiveness, and rage. Some analyses disintegrated into sadomasochistic double binds, prompting demands for a return to a time when the analyst was a simple doctor. Freud even admitted in the 1930s that analysis could precipitate a psychosis. The focus on resistance also sanctioned analysts' "know-it-all" attitudes and their "deprecation of patients' self-perceptions," giving popular portrayals of analysis a hostile edge. In the long run, the effects unleashed by the issue of resistance proved at least as important in determining the ultimate standing of psychoanalysis as its epistemological status or Freud's personality. Yet, there was no question that the focus on resistance was at the heart of the analytic contribution to modernity.

The subtlety of Freud's conception lay in the idea that the ego, the part of the mind devoted to self-reflection, was also the locus of the resistance. Almost immediately, two alternative approaches appeared. One, originated by Wilhelm Reich, saw the ego solely as the sphere of the resistance and aimed, by confronting the patient, to turn the ego into a "symptom" and analyze it away. The other approach, associated with Otto Rank and Sándor Ferenczi, sought to bypass the "intellectualizations" of the ego and address the "real" person—the id—directly. Both approaches abandoned the characteristic Freudian stress on the two-sidedness of the ego, but they led in different directions. Reich's was revised to become mainstream ego psychology, while Rank and Ferenczi's became a persistent alternative to classical psychoanalysis, eventually largely supplanting it.

Wilhelm Reich, the founder of "character analysis," was born in Galicia in 1897 to an assimilated Jewish family, and in the early twenties was the youngest instructor at the Vienna Institute in spite of Freud's personal dislike of him. Reich's experiences working in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Polyclinic, which had a predominantly working-class clientele, convinced him that the neuroses arose from poverty and the accompanying lack of privacy, health care, and birth control. They had to be addressed through
political change and not by individual therapy alone. How could one justify individual therapy, he asked, when “in a city like Berlin there are millions of people who are neurotically ruined in their psychic structure”?  

Reich viewed analysis as a method that would “break through” socially necessitated repressions. To describe how, his lectures at the Vienna Institute, first published as *The Impulsive Character* in 1923 and later expanded into *Character Analysis*, distinguished symptoms from “character.” Symptoms, Reich argued, such as a tic or a nervous cough, emanate from the id. Patients experienced symptoms as alien and welcomed help against them. By contrast, character traits, such as irony, stiffness, or an attitude of superiority, were part of the ego. Patients experienced them as part of themselves, and therefore resisted having them analyzed. The problem of the resistance, of the “negative therapeutic reaction,” was for Reich the problem of analyzing character, that is, of turning it into a “symptom.” When Freud read Reich’s manuscript, he was enthusiastic: Reich’s book, he wrote its author, reinforced the idea that “the relations between the ego and superego will be a realm of research for us similar to that hitherto studied . . . between the person (ego and superego) and the object.”  

Reich’s idea of character anticipated his later attempts to link psychoanalysis and Marxism, but it also made an independent contribution to psychoanalysis. Viewing character as a system of safeguards against the breakthrough of instinctual drives, Reich described the “character armor” or “character resistance” in which the underlying conflict was “frozen.” *Character Analysis* supplied the first technical rule of what first became known as defense or character analysis and then ego psychology: “Make the first approach to any material from the side of the ego. . . . In other words, the defense or resistance has to be dealt with before the unconscious content is told to the patient.”  

Reich’s formulations constituted a breakthrough in understanding resistance. When viewed from the Freudian perspective, however, they appeared one-sided. In Freud’s perspective, the ego was the source not only of resistance but also of reason, self-knowledge, and instinctual modification. For Reich, in contrast, the ego was solely the locus of resistance; the instincts, by contrast, were wholly benign. Nonetheless, in revised forms, character analysis became the basis of the first systematic, clinically based analytic theory. Worked out and revised at the Berlin Kinderseminar, the theory was codified by linking the forms of resistance to the stages of infantile sexuality. Character analysis also became the subject of the first “international symposium on the theory of technique and therapy,” held at Salzburg in 1924. Later, Hanns Sachs sought to integrate character analysis into a
“metapsychological” approach, emphasizing the contribution of all three psychical agencies to the resistance.\textsuperscript{24} That Freud was not wholly comfortable with these changes is suggested by a 1922 letter to Abraham, in which he stated that he found “character analysis . . . more difficult” than the older techniques.\textsuperscript{35}

The other alternative to Freud’s structural theory emerged from Budapest and Vienna, where Ferenczi and Rank objected to what they saw as the “cold” and “intellectual” theories coming out of Berlin. Their opposition centered on two points. First, in their jointly authored \textit{Development of Psychoanalysis} (1923), they argued that the resistance could be bypassed through an “active therapy” in which the analyst facilitated the repetition of a trauma through a “language of gesture.”\textsuperscript{26} After all, by definition, they pointed out, a trauma had not been experienced consciously and therefore could never be remembered. Rather, as Ferenczi elaborated, the analyst must take an \textit{active} role, prohibiting activities such as masturbation and daydreaming, or else enjoining patients to fantasize, even suggesting the content of their fantasies.\textsuperscript{27} “Active therapy,” based on the cooperation of patient and analyst, differed from the insight gained through remembering. Knowledge, after all, “is something entirely different from the healing factor.” Active therapy, Rank added, would promote rapid cures. “We see the process of sublimation, which in ordinary life requires years of education, take place before our eyes.”\textsuperscript{28}

The proponents of “active therapy” also emphasized the significance of the mother in early development. In a 1918 remark that anticipated his later orientation toward touch and holding, Ferenczi explained the Moro reflex, the clapping of the fist in infants under the age of three months, as the evolutionary outcome of the “little shock (or traumatic) neurosis” that originated when the young monkey was “compelled . . . to hold fast with the fingers to the mother’s fur while she climbs about trees.”\textsuperscript{29} In 1919, moved by his wife’s pregnancy, Rank remarked to Ernest Jones that “men were of no importance . . . the essence of life [is] the relation between mother and child.”\textsuperscript{30} In 1923 Rank’s \textit{Trauma of Birth} linked the mother to the resistance or, more specifically, to the single traumatic childhood experience from which all resistance arose, namely, birth. All neuroses, Rank held, were attempts to master that “primal castration,” the prototype for all later anxiety. There is only one fixation point, he continued—the maternal body. Therefore, “there is . . . no need to ascertain the ‘pathogenic traumatia’ . . . by the lengthy way of analytic investigation . . . Analysis is now in a position to free itself to an extensive degree from the work of investigation, since we know from the outset . . . the whole content of the Unconscious.”\textsuperscript{31}
Freud's revised theory sought to give the individual some freedom from impulses, from social pressures, and from impersonal representations of internalized authority. His critics both advanced and retarded this program. On the one hand, they set in motion long-term developments: in the case of Reich, the theory of the defenses; in the case of Rank and Ferenczi, the view that the therapeutic relationship, not insight, was the healing factor in analysis. At the same time, Reich's view of the ego as merely defensive threatened to short-circuit self-reflection, while Rank and Ferenczi risked bypassing the negative transference, turning analysis into a variant of mind cure.

In April 1923 Freud was diagnosed with cancer. Although he survived for another sixteen years, fears that his death was imminent helped precipitate the disintegration of the earlier circle. In a process that one analyst described as fraught with "outbursts of id forces and reaction-formations against them," the transformation of psychoanalysis from a Männerbünd into a profession became entwined with debates over the ego. In April 1923 Freud was diagnosed with cancer. Although he survived for another sixteen years, fears that his death was imminent helped precipitate the disintegration of the earlier circle. In a process that one analyst described as fraught with "outbursts of id forces and reaction-formations against them," the transformation of psychoanalysis from a Männerbünd into a profession became entwined with debates over the ego.

When Freud first heard Rank's ideas about the birth trauma, he called them "the most important progress since the discovery of psychoanalysis." "Anyone else would have used such a discovery to make himself independent," he told Jones. But in February 1924, in response to criticism from Berlin, Freud wrote a long circular letter, explaining his agreements and disagreements. Praising Rank's stress on the strength of passive or "regressive" longings, complimenting him for raising the question of "the biological background of the Oedipus complex," Freud nevertheless insisted that Rank had not explained how the ambivalence directed at the mother was transferred to the father and other objects. Rank's emphasis on birth, Freud complained, made sexuality "a priori, i.e., biologically, ambivalent." For himself, in contrast, the main causes for ambivalence lay in the conditions of early childhood, especially the incest taboo. Although the taboo's origins lay in "the primordial history of the human family," it had to be re-created anew in every individual. Thus, for Freud, "the actual father [is] the real obstacle that recreates the incest barrier in each new individual."

In the same letter Freud questioned innovations aimed at speeding up analysis. Having learned while ill that his beard took six weeks to grow back, he doubted that the "deeper layers of the unconscious" could be changed in six months. He could not understand, he wrote Rank, "how the magic formula of leading back all libido to the mother should produce a therapeutic effect." Later he called The Birth Trauma and The Development of Psychoanalysis children of their time, "conceived under the stress of the
contrast between the postwar misery of Europe and the ‘prosperity’ of America, and designed to adapt the tempo of analytic therapy to the haste of American life.”36 Having urged that analysts “renounce any short-sighted therapeutic ambition,” Freud envisioned an analytic subject able to tolerate frustration and postpone gratification.37 Rank and Ferenczi, by contrast, were beginning to imagine the typical recipient of therapy in the emerging world of mass consumption.

Freud’s increasingly critical reaction to Ferenczi’s work, and Ferenczi’s growing unhappiness over what he felt was the failure of Freud’s analysis of him, led Ferenczi to withdraw. For a while he thought of emigrating to America, at least for long enough to build up a cash reserve. When he lectured at the New School in 1926, Harry Stack Sullivan dubbed him the “genius of the psychoanalytic movement.”38 In the end, however, Ferenczi elected to remain in Budapest, where he became increasingly critical of Freud.

Like Ferenczi, Rank also had enormous difficulty breaking away from the enchanted circle of Freudian charisma. For several years after publishing *The Birth Trauma*, he went back and forth between Paris and New York, alternating between breaking with Freud and returning to the fold. Buoyed by adulation on a 1924 trip in America, he exclaimed, “Im Gegenteil, die Mutter! On ze contrary, ze mozer!”39 Yet as late as 1926 he was apologizing to Freud, “From a state which I now recognize as neurotic, I have suddenly returned to myself.”40 Meanwhile, Abraham died unexpectedly in 1925, Eitingon turned slowly toward Palestine, eventually emigrating, and Sachs became increasingly marginal.

Through it all, Freud hoped the Committee would replace him. “Only try,” he wrote to Abraham in 1920, and “you will see that you will manage without me.”41 After the discovery of his cancer, he proposed that the Committee “learn to achieve harmony without him.” He called himself “unfit to function as a despotic, ever watchful censor.” For half a dozen men of different characters to agree on all matters of detail was neither possible nor desirable, he had pointed out in his *Rundbriefe*. And because for him, Freud, it was so difficult to feel his way into new lines of thought, if they waited for his approval they “would run the risk of growing very old first.”42

Despite these appeals, the *Männerbund* disintegrated. Ever since the war, Jones and Rank had struggled over control of the *Verlag*. Rank feared that Jones sought to “unite the Anglo-Saxon world under [his] sceptre.” Jones complained to Abraham that Freud lacked any objectivity in regard to Rank.43 In 1924, after the birth-trauma controversy, Anna Freud wrote Eitingon “that the question of whether Rank can be checked is the question
What replaced the Männerbund was the “psychoanalytic movement,” a diverse collection of national societies, all seeking to turn the circle around Freud into a discipline or profession. The size and diversity of the movement is suggested by the first postwar congress, held in The Hague in September 1920, a meeting with the character of a reunion. One hundred twelve individuals participated: sixty-two from Austria and Hungary, sixteen from Holland, fifteen from Britain, eleven from Germany, seven from Switzerland, and one from Poland. Four years later, the International Psychoanalytic Association had a total membership of 263. Until World War II its membership was small enough to be printed with individuals’ addresses at the back of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Although the Americans were absent from the 1920 congress, psychoanalysis’s center of gravity had already shifted toward England and the United States. In 1919 the largest single analytic society (over forty members) was in London and the largest national membership (fifty-three) was in the United States. Freud, sarcastically quoting the chancellor of defeated Germany, spoke of “our new orientation towards the West.”

The task faced by the analytic movement was to routinize Freud’s charisma, that is, to move from Freud’s personal authority to open, rational, collegial forms of self-governance. In the interwar years, many attempted to accomplish this by establishing psychoanalysis in the university, including Sándor Ferenczi at the University of Budapest, Karl Abraham at the University of Berlin, Franz Alexander at the University of Chicago, and Max Eitingon at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Freud supported these efforts but sought to guard the autonomy of psychoanalysis, which, he insisted, was subject to the general protocols of science but not reducible to existing paradigms such as organic psychiatry or experimental psychology. He need not have worried. All attempts to gain a foothold in the university failed.
Strymed in their efforts to win legitimacy from the university, and capitalizing on the popularity of analytic practice, analysts created a separate profession, developing a core curriculum, standardized forms of practice, and regularized mechanisms of succession to replace the Committee. To this end, they established “institutes,” all-purpose centers that combined a society, a clinic, and formal training through course work, supervised clinical practice, and didactic or “training” analyses. Ego psychology, because it lent itself to systematization and to teaching, was central to the process of professionalization.

After the disintegration of the Männerbund, an inner circle centered on Vienna, Berlin, and London—which is to say on Freud—persisted but became increasingly peripheral to the main thrust toward professionalization. From this circle substantial control passed to a new generation distinguished from the Männerbund in terms of age, gender, sexuality, and political orientation.

The age differences were dramatic. Whereas Freud had been born in 1856, Melanie Klein was born in 1882, Otto Rank and Helene Deutsch in 1884, Karen Horney in 1885, Franz Alexander in 1891, and Wilhelm Reich, a prodigy, in 1897. They were all still young in the 1920s and recognizably “modern” in their sensibilities and values. Freud, by contrast, had negative feelings about such exemplary products of modernity as the radio, the telephone, film, feminism, abstract art, and U.S. culture. When he saw Secrets of the Soul advertised as “a psychoanalysis picture . . . soon to be made in Vienna, supervised by Professor Freud and explaining his system,” he told Ferenczi that he could no more avoid the film than he could bobbed hair, but in neither case would he participate. The distinction between old and young inflected many debates of the period, including those over brief therapy, female sexuality, and the place of the United States in the analytic movement.

The gender composition also shifted dramatically. The number of female analysts rose from two before World War I to approximately fifty in the immediate postwar period. By 1929 the majority of new trainees were women. Many had been teachers, and many were mothers. As we shall see, the changing gender composition of the movement encouraged a dramatic shift in its preoccupations to the mother/infant relationship, the mother/daughter relationship, and female sexuality.

The shift concerning sexuality is more difficult to trace, but two incidents of the immediate postwar period are revealing. In 1920 an openly homosexual doctor applied for membership in the Dutch Psychoanalytic Association. Its members turned to Jones for advice, and he counseled
Letter from Sigmund Freud to the mother of a homosexual 
(1936), later donated to the Kinsey Institute
against admittance. Sachs, Abraham, and Eitingon urged from Berlin that this was a matter for the individual society to determine, although, they added, there should be a presumption that any homosexual was neurotic, unless analysis demonstrated otherwise.\textsuperscript{31} Even Ferenczi, long a champion of the legalization of homosexuality, insisted that “these people are too abnormal” to be analysts.\textsuperscript{32} Freud, in contrast, recommended acceptance but conceded that the matter was ultimately to be determined by the local analytic society. In 1921, in another incident, Ernest Jones wrote Freud informing him that he was refusing psychoanalytic training to a homosexual. Freud again disagreed: “We cannot exclude such persons without other sufficient reasons, as we cannot agree with their legal persecution. . . . a decision in such cases should depend upon a thorough examination of the other qualities of the candidate.”\textsuperscript{33}

Politically, the ethos of the analytic movement became more democratic. Whereas in 1910 Freud had argued for an elite “along the lines of Plato’s republic,” by the twenties he advocated local autonomy, as just noted. When Ferenczi welcomed Eitingon to the Committee in 1919, he told him that the idea was “to keep Freud’s work unchanged as much as possible. . . . Everything must be cared for with a kind of dogmatism. . . . The ability to give up one’s own idea in favor of a central idea [was the] chief qualification for membership.”\textsuperscript{34} But such views were not held by younger analysts and were soon abandoned by Ferenczi himself. After World War I, moreover, disagreements did not necessarily provoke schisms. Rank and Ferenczi left the analytic movement voluntarily, albeit amid turmoil; they were not excluded. In 1927 when the International Training Commission tried to impose lay analysis on the New York Psychoanalytic Society, Anna Freud led the opposition, calling it an obvious injustice.

In the postwar period, however, there were important antidemocratic exceptions. One was Freud’s tragic attempt to impose Horace Frink on American analysis, which Freud regarded as “leaderless.” Frink was a handsome, non-Jewish patient of Freud’s. In the course of his analysis, Freud urged Frink to leave his wife and children and marry a wealthy married woman whom Frink believed he loved. In 1921 Freud told Frink: “Your complaint that you cannot grasp your homosexuality implies that you are not yet aware of your phantasy of making me a rich man. If matters turn out all right let us change this imaginary gift into a real contribution to the Psychoanalytic Funds.” While Freud’s meaning may not be wholly clear, he was certainly exploiting his patient’s vulnerability. Frink had episodes of insanity for the rest of his life and blamed Freud for not realizing that analysis had to be restricted to the neuroses.\textsuperscript{35} This was the case that led Freud to
admit to Abram Kardiner that analysis could precipitate a psychosis. All American analysts knew this story, and it deepened their alienation from the man they sometimes called “the Pope in Vienna.” Another antidemocratic incident, described in a later chapter, was the exclusion of Wilhelm Reich from the analytic movement in 1934, an event that shows the power of anticommunism to corrupt liberal values.

The task that the analytic societies faced in the 1920s was to establish stable, legitimate, professional institutions. The 1918 Budapest resolutions specified the means: mass therapy and the didactic or training analysis. Ego psychology—the analysis of the resistance—provided a practice-oriented theory that facilitated training and certification. The first analytic institute to implement the Budapest resolutions was also the center of postwar theorizing: the Berlin Institute.

Supported by government funds and recognized by the medical community, the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute was the flagship for the entire movement. Run by Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon, and Ernst Simmel, benefiting both from proximity to and distance from Vienna, sponsoring the influential Kinderseminar—the discussion group of younger analysts such as Otto Fenichel, Käthe Friedländer, Edith Jacobson, and George Gerö—the institute pioneered in ego psychology. Others trained there include Erich Fromm, Franz Alexander, Karen Horney, Sándor Rédo, Melanie Klein, Theodor Reik, Therese Benedek, Helene Deutsch, and Edward and James Strachey. By the fall of 1928, sixty-six analysts had graduated and thirty-four were in training. Berlin also housed the Verlag and the Internationale Zeitschrift, edited by Rédo. Spurred by its example, societies were developing in Dresden, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and southwest Germany when the ascent of the Nazis to power effectively destroyed German psychoanalysis.

International analytic politics took shape around the London and Vienna societies along with Berlin. The London Psychoanalytic Society, with about fifty-five members, counted among its members Ernest Jones, a central figure in the IPA who maintained close relations not only with Sigmund and Anna Freud, but also with the far-flung parts of the former British empire, especially the United States. It benefited from a relatively democratic and woman-friendly environment and was also associated with a substantial publishing effort: Leonard and Virginia Woolf’s Hogarth Press, which published the English edition of the International Journal of
Autonomy and Resistance

Psychoanalysis, the English translations of Freud, and the International Psychoanalytical Library. Like Berlin and London, the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society was a hub of training. By the early thirties, the number of candidates had grown to thirty-five. Freud signed diplomas, until stopped by protests from other societies.

Reflecting its inaugural place in the history of psychoanalysis, Vienna also produced ego psychology’s definitive formulation. Written as an eightieth-birthday present to her father, Anna Freud’s 1936 *Ego Psychology and the Mechanisms of Defense* recast Reich’s idea of character as a theory of the defenses. While a one-sided concentration on the id characterized “the now obsolete situation of hypnosis,” Anna Freud concluded, it is only when analysts move back and forth between the ego’s defenses and the free associations that arise from the id “that we can speak of psychoanalysis.” After the rise of the Nazis, this modified version of ego psychology spread to England and, especially, the United States.

Alongside mainstream ego psychology, three important variations emerged in London, Paris, and Budapest. In each case, the idea of personal autonomy underwent a revision. The first variation was associated with Melanie Klein, who proposed an *object-relational* view of the ego. According to Klein, one incurred obligations not by virtue of being generically human, as in Kant and Freud, but because one was inseparably connected to others by the peculiar circumstances of one’s life. The most important of these connections, the one that shaped all future relations, was with the mother. Developing an ethic of responsibility rather than an ethic of justice, providing what some have called a feminine alternative to Freud, Klein’s thought resonated with a new, middle-class orientation to the problem of building up and sustaining personal relations, as opposed to the problem of autonomy implicit in the theory of the Oedipus complex. Klein emigrated to London in 1926 and delivered her inaugural lecture in the home of Virginia Woolf’s brother. Her thought reflected the influence of the philosopher G. E. Moore, who argued that immediate situated relations—for example, to friends, family, and community—took precedence over abstract ideals.

In 1936 Jacques Lacan developed a second alternative to ego psychology in his famous “mirror stage” article. According to Lacan, the ego or “I” was a defensive response to the traumatic discovery of emptiness, an imaginary “crystallization or sedimentation of images of an individual’s own body and of self-images reflected back to him or her by others.” Having no basis in what Freud had called the instincts, the ego was better thought of as an
object than an agent. According to Freud, the statement "Where id was there shall be ego" defined analysis, but Lacan insisted that the purpose of analysis was not to strengthen the ego but to relax it, wear down its defenses, and encourage it to adopt a detached attitude toward its own narcissism. If Klein contrasted responsibility to autonomy, Lacan encouraged an ironic acceptance of one's divided nature, one that in many ways went back to the original idea of the unconscious. Emerging from the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, founded in 1926 with twenty members and two journals (L'Évolution psychiatrique and Revue française de psychanalyse), Lacan's alternative reflected the distinctness of French psychoanalysis, which drew upon earlier traditions of French moral thought, Heideggerian philosophy, and surrealism.

Finally, in Budapest, Ferenczi became the favored doctor and central figure in a freelance, café-based intellectual circle. In contrast to Freud's emphasis on the difficulty of achieving autonomy, Ferenczi argued that the original state of the newborn was one of expecting to receive without having to give anything in return. Passive receptivity, not agency, was the driving force of development. However implausible, his argument had ethical force. Whatever the original psychological state of human beings, they deserve to start life with their fundamental needs met. Because nearly all the Hungarian analysts eventually emigrated, Ferenczi's deeply felt rejection of Freud's insistence on abstinence had profound long-term effects. Those inspired by Ferenczi include Istvan Hollós and Imre Hermann, who drew on primatology to theorize the need to cling, and Alice and Michael Balint, early researchers into the mother/child relationship. Ultimately, Ferenczi's thought lies behind Heinz Kohut's theory of narcissism. Those in Ferenczi's debt believed that analysis should provide a "corrective emotional experience," not insight per se.

In its emphasis on the ego's vulnerability, in the way the ego was formed out of its own love relations, and, above all, in viewing the ego as the site of resistance and defensiveness, Freud's structural theory was at the center of the rethinking concerning autonomy that occurred in the 1920s. The variations that developed—object relations, the mirror stage, and passive object love—variations to which we will return in subsequent chapters, further contributed to this modernist redefinition. Klein complicated the ideal of autonomy by linking it to responsibility to concrete others. Lacan questioned whether the wish for autonomy was not simply a defense against the unconscious. Ferenczi insisted that autonomy, responsibility, and subjectivity all rested on a fundamental, quasi-innate demand for what would soon
be called recognition. The result was a profound interrogation of one of modernity’s central ideals.

Meanwhile, the psychoanalytic movement grew. In 1935 Freud boasted of its range: “In addition to the older local groups (in Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, London, Holland, Switzerland, and Russia),” he stated, “societies have since been formed in Paris and Calcutta, two in Japan, several in the United States, and quite recently one each in Jerusalem and South Africa and two in Scandinavia.” Yet, as psychoanalysis spread, it encountered new difficulties. “Resistance” was a psychological concept: it described something “inside” individuals. But resistance was also embodied in social institutions, cultural prejudices, and the organization of knowledge. During the interwar period, attacks on psychoanalysis came from conservatives, fascists, and Bolsheviks, but also from liberal defenders of scientific orthodoxy.

The unremitting opposition of the Catholic church, which effectively postponed the large-scale entry of analysis into France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Latin America, and parts of eastern Europe until after World War II, was especially important. Even in Vienna, analysts lived in fear of the church. High church officials, such as Father Agostino Gemelli, a Milanese architect of Catholic/fascist cooperation, and Father Wilhelm Schmidt, director of the Lateran Ethnological Museum in Rome, were passionate anti-Freudians. Schmidt was prominent in Viennese academic life. Much of the embittered opposition to Wilhelm Reich came from the conviction that by entering politics Reich risked drawing the wrath of the church. Freud postponed publishing Moses and Monotheism out of the same fear. The church’s shadow helps explain the “hierarchical, correct and courteous” aura of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. French antagonism to a theory “applicable only to Jews, [Freud’s] racial brothers, predisposed to libidinal pansexualism,” stemmed in part from the same source. Catholicism and anti-Semitism also retarded the efforts of Ludwig Jekels to establish a society in Poland. In Ireland the church had psychoanalysis banned. Catholic opposition, however, could also give analysis an edge. The first collected works of Freud in any language began publication in Madrid in 1922 as a result of José Ortega y Gasset’s initiative. The paintings, films, and assemblages of Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel reflect Freud’s influence in Spain. Analytic reading groups began in Mexico, Brazil, and Peru in the late twenties. Angel Garma, who trained in Berlin and emigrated to Argentina, sparked a belated but explosive post–World War II expansion.
After Edoardo Weiss's lectures were published in Trieste in 1931, Italian analysis also began to take off. In England, meanwhile, Samuel Beckett drew on Jesuit metaphysics to influence his analyst, Wilfred Bion. Nonetheless, overall, the church's opposition to the project of personal autonomy, as well as to nonmarital sexuality, retarded analysis.

Institutionalized Marxism was a second center of resistance to psychoanalysis. As we saw, even those Bolsheviks who embraced analysis rejected the idea of personal autonomy. Stalin's defeat of Trotsky in the late twenties ended the clandestine support Trotsky had funneled to Vera Schmidt and other analysts. Stalinism portrayed itself as an alternative to "bourgeois" psychology: "For Freud, man exists entirely in the past... For Freud, the conscious is subordinate to the unconscious. For Freud, man is a pawn of internal, elemental forces." The last translation of Freud into Russian appeared in 1930. Freud wrote Nikolai Osipov, his Prague-based Russian translator: "From somewhere the Bolsheviks have caught the opinion that psychoanalysis is hostile to their system. You know the truth that our science is not able to be put into the service of any party, but that it needs a certain liberal-mindedness [Freiheitlichkeit]."

Yet another source of resistance was the increasing rationalization of science and medicine. Before World War I there were alternatives to Newtonian notions of causality, quantification, and prediction. Physics had broken down and been reconstructed to incorporate relativity, uncertainty, the subatomic, and the cosmological. Biology had become a full-fledged science by incorporating contingency and particularity. Positivism was in retreat, despite efforts to rebuild it in Vienna and Cambridge. In that context, Freud's insistence on the scientific character of psychoanalysis had been widely accepted. Albert Einstein himself had engaged in a well-publicized correspondence with the founder of psychoanalysis.

The second industrial revolution, however, encouraged the rise of foundation-sponsored "big science," which placed a premium on prediction and control. Behaviorism swept the social sciences, including psychology. The Rockefeller Foundation financed behaviorist child-study research in several European capitals, including London and Vienna. At first psychoanalysis benefited from the new boom in empirical research. For example, Charlotte Bühler directed a Rockefeller-funded research center at the University of Vienna. Although Bühler despised psychoanalysis and banned discussion of it in her classroom, many prominent analysts, among them René Spitz, Else Fraenkel, Marie Jahoda, Rudolf Ekstein, Bruno Bettelheim, and Edith Weisskopf, began their careers by studying with her. Analysts also benefited from the institutionalization of empirical child
Autonomy and Resistance

study in Geneva. There they founded two analytic societies, including one at the Institut Rousseau of the University of Geneva, one of the leading pedagogical laboratories in the world. Jean Piaget, a member of one Geneva society, sought to add a cognitive theory to psychoanalysis. But the two worlds were also in tension. Undergoing a didactic analysis with Sabina Spielrein, Piaget abruptly realized what transference was, announced “J’ai compris,” and walked out.

“Big science” meant that psychoanalysis had to be translated into measurable variables and testable hypotheses. The Viennese logical positivist Richard von Mises conceded that analysis was grounded in “incontestable observations” but suggested that its regularities might better be described in statistical terms. In the United States, John Dollard’s 1939 Frustration and Aggression used laboratory experiments on rats to demonstrate that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration.” Even sympathetic behaviorists could not conceal their condescension. Clark Hull never tired of reiterating “that there was something of importance in [psychoanalytic] theory.” Lewis Madison Terman considered the Freudian concepts “even . . . discounted . . . ninety percent . . . one of the two most important contributions to modern psychology, mental tests being the other.” Analysts responded to such “compliments” ambivalently. When Saul Rosenzweig sent Freud data purporting to confirm his theories, Freud responded that analysis did not lend itself to experimental testing, but he added, “Still, it can do no harm.” As we shall see, Freud was wrong. Medicine, too, was transformed after World War I, becoming professionalized, more dependent on laboratories and hospitals, and far more prestigious. Holistic, theory-based treatment went into decline in favor of demonstrable, measurable alteration of the statistically probable course of a specific disease. Bacteriology supplied the model. Family intervention, sexual policy, and pronatalism (the encouragement of childbearing) proliferated in new “Ministries of Health” aimed at serving the Volksgemeinschaft, the national or racial community. These changes put increasing pressure on analysts to be doctors and to coordinate their theories with those of the laboratory-based sciences.

As a result, European psychoanalysis became increasingly medicalized. The Dutch Psychoanalytic Society, founded with twelve members in 1917 by Johann H. W. van Ophuijsen and Westerman Holstijn, was restricted to M.D.s. The major obstacle the Soviets faced in gaining acceptance by the IPA in the early twenties came from the fact that few of its leaders were doctors. IPA analysts had special difficulty accepting that Otto Schmidt, vice president of the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society, was a mathematician.
course, medical domination was contested. Conflicts over lay analysis led to the founding of a second Dutch society in Leyden, as well as to a split in the Belgian society. But the tendency toward medicalization was consistent and was vastly intensified by the weight the United States had in the analytic world.

Nowhere else had doctors achieved the status and financial benefits that they enjoyed in the United States. By using licensing to limit the supply of doctors, as recommended in the Flexner Report, they had revolutionized their position. American psychoanalysts followed suit. In 1925 the American Psychoanalytic Association passed a regulation requiring a medical degree for every analyst. Freud protested immediately, describing medicalization as “the last mask of resistance against psychoanalysis, and the most dangerous of all,” and predicting a “gloomy future [for] analysis if it does not succeed in creating an abode for itself outside of medicine.”

The effects of medicalization were exacerbated by the financial dependence of European analysis on the United States. By 1919, 60 percent of Freud’s personal caseload consisted of Americans, and he often conducted his analyses in English. Keeping a safe in his office for dollars, he urged Rank to charge the “savages” high fees. In 1920 he insisted that Abraham defer to the American refusal to hold an analytic congress in Berlin, noting that without American support “we shall not be able to keep the German journals alive for more than a year.” As late as 1932, the Verlag was so dependent on American subscriptions that its managers opposed the formation of the English-language Psychoanalytic Quarterly. Commenting on the American insistence on medicalization, the analyst Hermann Nunberg remarked, “In our ranks, as elsewhere, the economic struggle finds its ideology.”

In spite of Freud’s opposition, analysis moved inexorably toward requiring a medical degree. In 1927, when the International Journal of Psychoanalysis published a one-hundred-page symposium on lay analysis, the majority of analysts opposed Freud. Ferenczi, Freud’s most loyal ally, organized a group of lay analysts in the United States and applied to the International as a test case, but the group dissolved. In 1929 Jones got the British Medical Association to define the Freudian version of psychoanalysis as the only legitimate one, thus further sanctioning the principle of medical regulation. Freud called himself a “Commander-in-Chief without an army” and hoped the conflict over lay analysis would bring about what he called “a friendly separation with the Americans.”

In fact, the reverse occurred. In 1930 a phalanx of younger, American-born analysts seeking a more “professional” approach led a revolt against the older generation of eastern European Jews, especially Brill. Taking the
Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute as their model, this “tough-minded American elite” courted Franz Alexander, known as a revisionist ego psychologist with a “modern” approach.97 The next year Hanns Sachs moved to Boston and Hermann Nunberg to Philadelphia. In 1932, after Alexander became head of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, Karen Horney became his assistant. Sándor Rádio came to New York to organize an institute on the Berlin model. The amount of money raised for Rádio’s venture—forty thousand dollars—was unheard-of in European analytic circles.98 Even before the triumph of the Nazis, then, the homeland of the second industrial revolution began reclaiming its prodigal offspring.

Observing the growth of American power in the psychoanalytic world, Freud vented common strains of anti-Americanism intensified by his own neurotic fear of poverty, but also containing an element of truth. Sneering at “dollar country,” “Dollaria,” and that “crazy anal Adlerian,” he told Rank that analysis “suits Americans as a white shirt suits a raven.”99 His fullest discussion of the relation of analysis to U.S. culture was excised from *The Question of Lay Analysis*, the 1925 work he wrote to defend his position, because Jones and Sachs feared it would provoke the Americans to secede from the International. Recently published, the excised passages equate America with Calvinism, mind cure, and, although Freud does not use the word, Fordism.

Freud was skeptical, he wrote, of a nation whose highest ideal was “efficiency, fitness for life,” especially when it omitted to take “precautions when appointing a helper for their psychic troubles.” “Time is indeed money,” he continued, “but it is not entirely clear why it has to be transformed into money in such a hurry.... In our Alpine lands, a common salutation when two acquaintances meet or part is: Take your time. We have poured much scorn on this formula, but in view of American haste, we have come to realize how much worldly wisdom it contains. Yet the American has no time. He has a passion for large numbers, for the magnification of all dimensions, but also for cutting the investment of time to an absolute minimum. I believe the word for this is ‘record.’” At the end he added: “The American superego seems greatly to mitigate its severity toward the ego where the interests of earning money are concerned. But perhaps my readers will find that I have now had enough wicked things to say about that country, before which we have learned to bow down in the last decade.”100

After the entry of women, the most consequential event in the history of psychoanalysis was the debate over medicalization, a debate that ultimately involved the scientific status of psychoanalysis. While it is often said today...
that the claims of psychoanalysis to scientific standing have been disproven, the deeper question is what is meant by science. Reflecting Kantian as opposed to Baconian thinking, Freud did not regard science as a problem-solving enterprise aimed at meeting human desires. Rather, he believed the development of science would bring about a change in human nature itself, namely, the modification of desire by reason. In this sense, the reduction of science to behaviorist parameters and of psychoanalysis to psychiatry implied the shrinking of autonomy to choice, losing the element of self-reflection. Observing this process in his own time, Freud complained that men and women were “ready to accept the results of scientific thinking, but without the change having taken place in them which scientific thinking brings about in people.”

Finally, as psychoanalysis spread, many rejected it as a Western theory with little relevance to the vast masses of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This resistance reflected the fact that psychoanalysis, like Christianity, first penetrated beyond the West as part of imperialism. In the Philippines, analytically influenced colonial doctors taught soldiers and administrators who earlier had been “unnerved” by “tropical neurasthenia,” “Philippinitis,” and “brain-fag” that “nervousness indicated not an over-permeable outer membrane but a rotten core.” The New Zealand psychoanalyst Claud Dangar Daly’s “Psychology of Revolutionary Tendencies” counseled colonial administrators that the anti-British movement was motivated by no less infantile emotions than the Irish or suffragist rebellions had been. Géza Róheim’s ethnographic expeditions, which introduced psychoanalysis to Australia, were also made possible by imperialism. As a result, colonial subjects who pioneered in introducing analysis to the non-Western world had understandably mixed feelings about it.

T. Girindrasekhar Bose, born in 1886, the son of a maharajah and by his own description “the second self-analyzed analyst in the history of psychoanalysis,” is an example. Bose founded the Indian Psychoanalytic Society in Calcutta in 1922. Of fifteen original members, nine were academics and five were doctors. Bose conducted his analyses in Bengali and wore traditional clothes. Autonomy, as understood in Europe, was not a high value for Bose. Rather, he drew on Hindu introspective techniques, as well as on yogic and tantric visualizations, to prescribe an actively didactic stance for the analyst. Basing his technique more on the model of the guru than on that of the analyst, he considered even Ferenczi too nondirective. The reason for his stance, as he explained in the International Journal of Psycho-
analysis and in his correspondence with Freud, was that psyche, body, and community were not invariant across cultures. In nations that had not experienced the West’s psychological revolution, and in which individuals believed that psychic disturbances were caused by black magic, karma, or disturbed humoral equilibrium, external direction was the necessary prelude to an inward orientation.105

Bose also countered imperialist uses of psychoanalysis. Owen Berkeley-Hill was a psychiatrist and member of the Calcutta society who had been analyzed by Ernest Jones. Partly responsible for the quick recognition of the Calcutta society by the IPA, Berkeley-Hill, a student of yogic sphincter control, traced the supposed dislike inspired by Hindus to their anal fixations. Bose contemptuously rejected this theory, stressing instead the mother over the father, object relations over sexuality, and a positive approach to Indian culture over a condescending one. To do so he drew upon India’s “core fantasy of the split mother” to argue that an intense but interrupted period of maternal fusion predisposed Hindu men to be more accepting of their “maternal feminine component,” less prone to castration anxiety, and more likely to accept a negative/submissive solution to the Oedipal crisis.106

Each non-Western nation followed its own path to analysis. Whereas Bose was self-taught, Heisaku Kosawa, the main figure in Japanese analysis, studied at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute from 1929 to 1933 and was analyzed by Freud. And whereas Bose was often reacting against English medicine, Japanese psychoanalysis was relatively self-directed. Kosawa taught at the University of Tohoku in Sendai in the northeast, where the first Japanese analytic society started. Yaekichi Yabe, a psychologist, and Kenji Otsuki, a writer, founded a second society at Tokyo in 1932, along with the first Freudian review in Japanese, Seishin-Bunseki. The two societies were the center of East Asian analysis, their translations studied at Seoul Imperial University in Korea as well as in the Chinese coastal cities. As we shall see, Kosawa, like Bose, developed an alternative to the Oedipal theory, the “Ajae complex,” focused on the boy’s relation to the mother.107

China, where Western psychiatry had been introduced by missionary societies, presented a third variation. Here there were few if any attempts to synthesize indigenous and Freudian thought. Instead, analysis entered China as part of the Western-imported modernity of the May Fourth movement. After 1919, in the so-called New Period, Zhang Shenfu translated Freud to counter behaviorism in New Tide, one of the most important journals of the Chinese Enlightenment.108 “Freud” also served as a code word for sexuality to advertise such novels as Diary of a Young Girl.109 Most
important, psychoanalysis was linked to the need for revolution. A 1936
newspaper letter explained: “In modern times, the main obstacle to human
instincts is the social system itself. Social property is in the hands of a hand-
ful of people.” To preserve their privileges, these people institute “religious
doctrines and moral rules.” Meanwhile, “the instincts cry out for satisfac-
tion. . . . Such a situation is particularly common among us women.”

In the Islamic world, psychoanalysis remained largely undeveloped. The
main exception was Atatürk’s Turkey, to which, in the late thirties, psy-
choanalyst Edith Vowinckel-Wei gert accompanied her labor-economist
husband. Vowinckel-Weigert’s first patients were Jewish refugees from
Germany, but Turkey soon developed an indigenous analytic tradition. The
first translation, Hans Zulliger’s From the Unconscious Life of Our School
Youth, influenced educational reform. In addition, French psychiatrists
worked in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Senegal, eventually establishing a
society in Lebanon. Moustapha Safouan, a follower of Lacan, produced the
first Arabic translation of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1958: Taṣfīr al-
ahlam.” The French tradition of African and Middle Eastern psychol-
sis, however, was the one that Frantz Fanon attacked in his writings on the Algerian revolution, arguing that only violence could remediate the psychological damage done by colonialism.

The attitude of Western psychoanalysts toward non-Western psychoanalysis was complex. The *ur-text* on this question, Wulf Sachs's 1937 *Black Hamlet*, an intimate account of the exchange between a Jewish émigré psychoanalyst and a Rhodesian healer who has lost faith in his father's methods of traditional healing, was at root an attack on colonial psychiatry's distinction between black and white psyches.12 Freud took his Asian interlocutors seriously. He urged Zhang Shizhao, a government official seeking to introduce psychoanalysis into China, to "test our hunches concerning archaic forms of expression against the material of your language."13 He boasted to Andreas-Salomé that his Indian followers were "learned Hindus," not white expatriates, colonial administrators, or native dilettantes. And he responded to Bose's objections to psychoanalysis at length, conceding that psychoanalysis had neglected the coexistence of opposite wishes from three sources—bisexuality (male/female), ambivalence (love/hate), and activity/passivity.14 On the other hand, he told Romain Rolland that "Hellenic love of proportion, Jewish sobriety, and philistine anxiety" kept him away from Asian thought. And when a Calcutta professor of philosophy asked to visit him in 1926, he commented: "My need of Indians is for the present fully satisfied."15

Freud's suspicion of Asian thought was not due to an aversion to cultural pluralism. On the contrary, he criticized Marxism because it lacked an understanding of how "racial variations and . . . cultural transformations" interacted with economics.16 Freud's attitude reflected the priority he assigned to the ideal of personal autonomy, an ideal that would have to be reformulated and reconceptualized outside the Western context. Symptomatically, although his 1930 *Civilization and Its Discontents* mentions the loss of ego consciousness in yoga as one route to happiness, Freud told Romain Rolland that he was unable to experience the "oceanic" feeling—the "feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world"—that Rolland associated with Indian mysticism and called "the true source of religious sentiments." The oceanic sentiment, Freud suggested, may simply be a remnant of primary narcissism.17

The breadth and diversity of the analytic societies of the 1920s and '30s suggest the extent to which the psychoanalytically influenced ideas of autonomy and resistance were important to the first mass, self-conscious experience of modernity. Wherever analysis penetrated, an analytic milieu developed, if not at odds with, then at least distinct from, the dominant
culture. In these milieus, the relatively small number of people who went into analysis, seeking either a profession or a “cure,” made honesty in relation to oneself their most strongly held group value. In 1920, when Anton von Freud, the greatest financial donor to psychoanalysis in his time, was dying of cancer at the age of forty, Freud visited him daily, writing at the end to Eitingon that Freud “bore his hopelessness with heroic clarity, did not disgrace analysis.” Thus, in spite of professionalization, psychoanalysis still possessed the character of a sect, with a distinctive identity, overlapping identifications, and core values, such as stoicism and truthfulness. In what D.W. Winnicott later called a “facilitating environment,” such values contributed to much larger processes of social change. Where the environment was less facilitating, as increasingly in Germany and eastern Europe, psychoanalysts supplied a dark, pessimistic counter- or ultramodernism that lowered the register of the music of the Jazz Age, almost as if its practitioners sensed the coming catastrophe.