Chapter Three

ABSORPTION AND MARGINALITY

[In 1914] Walter Lippmann [first] introduced us to the idea that the minds of men were distorted by unconscious suppressions . . . There were no warmer, quieter, more intensely thoughtful conversations at Mabel Dodge's [salon] than those on Freud and his implications.

—Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography

As personal life emerged out of the traditional family, it had an ambiguous relation to the rest of society. As the product of surplus labor—labor beyond what was necessary to simply reproduce the society—personal life pointed beyond political-economic necessity. While the economy called for active and cooperative strivings, personal life was the site of passive and regressive desires—to relax, to rest, to be cared for, to be loved “for oneself.” Idiosyncratic though it was, personal life nonetheless had a social meaning. It pointed toward the utopian but increasingly realistic possibility of a society that subordinated economic considerations to human wishes—a post-economic society.

The utopian character of personal life created a dilemma for those who struggled to realize its potential. Either they could remain true to the utopian impulse and risk becoming marginal, elitist, and sectarian; or they could adopt a pragmatic, outward-looking stance and risk being absorbed into a routinized, functionalist regime. Marginality and absorption seemed to represent the mutually exclusive poles of an inescapable choice. Psychoanalysis was not alone in facing this choice. Artistic modernism, the other main charismatic force of the second industrial revolution, also encoun-
Absorption and Marginality


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tered it. Beginning with romanticism, the artist had symbolized the free individual who brought to society not the performance of an assigned function but his or her own expressive and emotional self. During the second industrial revolution, however, the culture industries began to integrate artists into mass-production-based entertainment factories. Avant-garde artists resisted this absorption by defining themselves as unique individuals, “geniuses,” thereby encouraging elitism and obscurantism. Thus, artists were caught between absorption and marginality.

Psychoanalysis encountered this dilemma in a particularly sharp form. On the one hand, there was pressure to conform to the norms of the established professions, especially medicine, and to accept a constricted notion of science. (American ego psychology of the 1950s was one outcome of this pressure.) On the other hand, to resist absorption meant to emphasize the unconscious, sexuality, and the instincts, those dimensions of the psyche that were most removed from everyday reality. Absorption and marginality were two horns of the same impossible dilemma, as in the case of art. Either way, the critical dimension of psychoanalysis would be blunted.

In the early years of psychoanalysis, Freud and his followers had some awareness of this dilemma. As the products of a charismatic explosion, Freud’s ideas seemed to them to imply something more or other than a therapeutic practice, but there was no consensus as to what. Should psychoanalysis become part of a branch of medicine (psychiatry, neurology), a discipline within the university (psychology), a reform organization, an adjunct to revolutionary politics or avant-garde culture, a new profession, or some combination of the above? The pull toward absorption was reflected in the analysts’ search for respectability and scientific acceptance. The pull toward marginality, in contrast, was reflected in the terms that analysts would eventually use to describe the analytic enterprise: Bewegung, “movement,” and die Sache, “the cause.”

The dilemma of absorption versus marginality was heightened by the fact that the two main institutions through which psychoanalysis could gain legitimacy, namely, the new therapeutic professions and the research university, were both closely tied to the corporate reorganization that accompanied the second industrial revolution. New theories and disciplines of social reproduction such as eugenics, hygiene, mental health, psychotherapy, psychological testing, social work, and counseling developed in response to immigration and urbanization. Typically preoccupied with “degeneration,” racial stereotyping, the prevention of crime and insanity, and the maintenance of gender norms, these disciplines aimed at incorporating the masses into the new industrial order. By World War I, they had
assumed tasks of large-scale classification and sorting in the military, in the educational system, and in industry. For psychoanalysis to gain entry into this new array of disciplines and professions, it would have to give up its distinctive concern with personal autonomy and reorient its goals toward social control.

The other means by which psychoanalysis could have become a legitimate discipline was through the research university, especially its medical schools. This, too, posed enormous problems. Like the new disciplines of social reorganization, the research university was a response to the second industrial revolution. Its goal was not merely to advance knowledge but to organize it in a systematic, practical manner adapted to the corporate reorganization of society. In particular, it possessed the authority to certify the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Broadly speaking, empiricism is the basis for all scientific research, but the early-twentieth-century research university tended to define science in a narrowly positivist way. Aiming to separate knowledge into observable, quantifiable facts, and to formulate lawful relations between them, the positivist conception of science had difficulty dealing with many aspects of the study of the human mind, such as the place of motivation, language, and experience. Nor did it allow room for speculation, which is intrinsic to all scientific discovery. Even the most rigorous philosophers of the Enlightenment had a more open, flexible concept of reason, and a more sympathetic understanding of its relation to “sensibility” and “the passions,” than did the positivists of Freud’s day. As a result, Freud’s empirically based but interpretive and sometimes speculative psychology was largely excluded from the university, and from the mainstream of science at that time. The effect was to encourage its tendencies toward grandiosity, paranoia, and defensiveness.

The dialectic of absorption and marginality also reflected the uneven development of Europe and the United States. Late-nineteenth-century Europe was still primarily a continent of landlords and peasants clustered in rural settlements, hamlets, and farm villages. An older order dominated the church, the military, the upper reaches of the state, much of banking and commerce, the universities, the academies, and higher stations of law and medicine. In most countries, kings and emperors remained the centerpieces of authority. In Europe, consequently, psychoanalysis came by its critical stance more or less naturally; like everything “modern,” it emerged against an older, traditional, patriarchal order, one that persisted until the end of World War II.

In the United States, by contrast, traditional authority, with its feudal and Catholic roots, was weak. Interest in psychoanalysis reflected the ideals
of self-management and “empowerment” characteristic of a mass, democratic society. As a result, American analysis became a method of cure and a form of self-improvement rather than a critical stance. The effect was to give the overall history of psychoanalysis a geographical slant: absorption in the United States, marginality in Europe. This generalization should not be overstated: there were marginal and critical currents in the United States; and psychoanalysis gained legitimacy in parts of Europe before the 1960s. Nonetheless, in Europe analysis tended to find its greatest support among intellectuals and elites, while in the United States it became a mass phenomenon, but one that lacked a critical dimension.

Differences between Europe and the United States also shaped the psychiatric professions. In Europe the asylums had originally been connected to churches, and psychiatrists relinquished their connections to traditional authority only slowly. Even as they professionalized, they retained a deeply conservative bias. Influenced by the tradition of psychological healing that had begun with moral treatment, yet drawn to somatic explanations of “degeneration,” they were usually not impressed by Freud. Emil Kraepelin, professor of psychiatry at Heidelberg and at Munich and the leading European psychiatrist of Freud’s day, is an example. Kraepelin’s fame rested on his distinction between dementia praecox, which he deemed the result of external causes (traumas) and possibly treatable through psychological techniques, on the one hand, and hereditary and incurable diseases of the brain, on the other. Since psychoanalysis was removed from any biologically based research protocol, it remained marginal to the mainstream of European psychiatry, even though it offered a psychological approach.

In the United States a different set of circumstances prevailed. There psychoanalysis did not have to contend with an established psychiatric profession. Rather, the medical schools were still struggling to establish their monopoly against popular forms of healing and self-help such as mesmerism, “mind cure,” and homeopathy. As in England, professionals sought to distance themselves from the “female emotionalism” of popular therapeutics. Thus, the 1910 Flexner Commission insisted upon the priority of professionalization and credentialing. Open to European ideas, American psychiatrists saw psychoanalysis as a scientific alternative to popular forms of mental healing. For them, the key issue was that any new technique be practiced by M.D.s and not by uncredentialled “amateurs.” As a result, American psychoanalysis rode the wave of professionalization, scientism, and the growth of a mass culture characteristic of the second industrial revolution.

Where analysis won institutional acceptance, as in the United States, it
tended to become alien in spirit and content to its original insights. Where it remained marginal, as in Europe, it became cultish, grandiose, and schismatic. Thus, psychoanalysis was caught between Scylla and Charybdis. As with the conflicts that surrounded autonomy and gender dualism, it had to find a creative way through. Since absorption would have destroyed the identity of psychoanalysis, marginality seemed to many the better starting point.

By World War I, in any case, the core of analysis was a small, marginal group centered on Freud. Far from destroying psychoanalysis, the discipline’s inward-turned character shaped its preoccupation with authority, its self-awareness, its tolerance for speculation, and its intellectual courage. At the same time, marginality led to grandiosity, scapegoating, and division. Freud himself, however, never accepted the marginal status of analysis, and consistently sought to articulate the scientific dimensions of the analytic enterprise.

Much of the response to the first industrial revolution had been pessimistic and reactionary, based on idealization of the preindustrial order. Responses to the second industrial revolution, in contrast, tended toward a future-looking optimism. The years between the turn of the century and World War I saw a dramatic contrast between an older order in which emperors still pretended to rule and a newer one in which the motorcar and airplane were part of everyday life. The result was a terrific rejection of the past and a proliferation of prophetic and utopian thinking, of “arenas and agitation for the announced revolution,” of expressionists and futurists, Narodniki and Bolsheviks, sexual experimenters and communitarians, avant-gardes, manifestos, and sects. Psychoanalysis was born in this environment.

As we saw, its first expression, the Wednesday Psychological Society, was a Männerbund, a countercultural alternative to the conventional family, organized around a charismatic male. As such, psychoanalysis resembled other charismatic, male-centered circles in Vienna, including the Secession (Gustav Klimt), twelve-tone music (Arnold Schoenberg), literary modernism (Arthur Schnitzler), Zionism (Theodor Herzl), and the group centered around Karl Kraus’s satiric newspaper, Die Fackel. Edward Timms has described these circles as “a condensed system of micro-circuits.” Circuits overlapped: many of Freud’s early associates wrote for Die Fackel, and Hugo Heller, Freud’s publisher, organized the first exhibit of Schoenberg’s paintings. Most such circles met at the university or in cafés. Freud’s met in his
home, however, suggesting the early association of psychoanalysis with the private sphere.

The analytic circle began in 1902 when Freud sent out postcard invitations to four medical colleagues. Meetings were held weekly in Freud's nondescript, marginally middle-class home at Berggasse 19, a dull street that began at the Tandelmarkt, a Jewish flea market, and ended, on top of the hill, at the University of Vienna. By 1906, there were seventeen members, all male, including Paul Federn, Isidor Sadger, Max Graf, Viktor Tausk, David Bach, Eduard Hirschmann, Hugo Heller, and Fritz Wittels. Apart from Freud, the key figures were Alfred Adler, an eye doctor, born in 1870, Wilhelm Stekel, a publicist and doctor from Czernowitz in Bukovina (in today's Romania), and Otto Rank. Born Otto Rosenfeld in 1884, Rank was a machinist by day and a writer by night when his doctor, Alfred Adler, told him about Freud. Rank met Freud in 1905, became the group's salaried secretary, and attended the gymnasium and university at Freud's urging and expense.

The composition of Freud's circle reflected the shift in the makeup of the middle classes from state-dependent civil servants to self-employed professionals. In contrast to traditional intellectuals who identified with centers of authority such as the church, court, and university, these men were doctors and writers. Their prestige came from their intellect and expertise, not from their social standing. Largely unaffiliated with institutions, they resented the traditional centers of authority and the moneyed interests associated with them. Thus, Paul Federn, Freud's first secretary, described doctors as an "intellectual proletariat." Viennese Jews were in the vanguard of this shift from traditional to what Antonio Gramsci has called organic intellectuals—intellectuals integral to the emerging system of corporate production. By the 1890s, Jews were close to the majority in law, medicine, and journalism. Disproportionately represented in commerce, manufacturing, and industry, underrepresented in agriculture and primary-goods production, they were closely tied to the new arenas of personal life: urban development, the arts, and the professions.

As Schorske plausibly suggested, the traumatic disintegration of the nineteenth-century liberal tradition in the face of the second industrial revolution was one precondition for the rise of psychoanalysis. In Austria, after an economic crash in 1873, liberalism came under attack. Czech and Hungarian nationalisms challenged liberal principles, while anticapitalist and anti-Semitic feeling mounted. A minority in a multinational state, the liberals were dependent on the traditional power structure. Only the emperor prevented the seating of the populist and anti-Semitic Karl Lueger as mayor.
of Vienna, and that only until 1897.10 Freud responded to Lueger’s rise, as well as to the Dreyfus affair, by joining B’nai Brith. He stepped down the social ladder, from the medical and academic intelligentsia to a stratum of ordinary Jewish doctors and businessmen who, “if they could not assist or further his scientific pursuits, did not threaten or discourage him.”11 It was from this stratum that he recruited the Wednesday Psychological Society.

The fact that all of Freud’s early associates were Jewish guaranteed that psychoanalysis would remain marginal. The Jews were the racialized “other” in European life of the period. As the researches of Sander Gilman and others have shown, the Jewish nose, the Jewish foot, Jewish sexuality, the Jewish language, Jewish “greed,” and Jewish “disrespect” for community values were matters of obsessive concern for European doctors and social scientists. Even Charcot, who was breaking with racially based theories of neurology, associated Jews with the neuroses, and his student Henry Meige traced the “wandering” of the Jews to their incessant demand for attention.12 The Jewish male was also often feminized, as in Weininger’s ascription of the “W” factor to women, homosexuals, and Jews. Excluded from idealized correlations of masculinity with valor, supposedly imprisoned by the “hyper-trophy of the Jewish family,” Jewish men were more likely to be cognizant of the passive, vulnerable, and “homosexual” qualities that lay behind the masculine ideal. Under these conditions, the Jewish composition of psychoanalysis guaranteed that all analysts regarded the dominant culture as hypocritical—an assumption shared by all oppressed or marginalized groups for obvious reasons. As they saw it, much of Austrian politics was a façade behind which the emperor and the aristocracy ruled.

Social democracy offered one possible solution to the problematic social place of psychoanalysis. Austrian socialism opposed anti-Semitism and was less economistic and more oriented toward cultural questions than most socialist traditions.13 Many of the original figures in Freud’s circle were Social Democrats. Alfred Adler’s first book, Health Book for the Tailor Trade (1898), attacked medicine for ignoring “social illnesses.” Wittels met Freud out of a shared commitment to legalizing abortion, and made his name by attacking Jewish converts to Christianity as motivated by economic ambition.14 Another member, David Bach, organized Vienna’s workers’ symphonies, served as music critic for Arbeiter Zeitung, the socialist newspaper, and advocated a Wagnerian communal theater.15 Many analytic patients were also socialists. Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O.) translated Mary Wolstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman into German and founded the Jewish Women’s Union (Jüdischer Frauenbund).16 Emma Eckstein
(Irma) was an associate of Karl Kautsky, the leader of the German Social Democrats, and the sister of Therese Schlesinger, a Social Democrat who was one of the first female members of Parliament. These ties between social democracy and psychoanalysis reflected not only the politics of class but also an interest in maternalist feminism. In the long run, however, central European socialism was too closely tied to the defense of the traditional, working-class family and community to support the analytic focus on personal life.

In fact, autodidactism and countercultural pursuits were combined with a socialist sensibility in early psychoanalysis. Discussions at the Wednesday-night meetings ranged over such topics as Nietzsche’s *Ecce Homo*, the woman question, the psychology of Marxism, and the sexual enlightenment of children. As in his university course, Freud required every member to participate in discussion, the order determined by choosing slips from an urn. Ideas were deemed common property, to be used without citation. This they called “intellectual communism.”

Analytic marginality was socioeconomic as well as cultural. Vienna was a center of European psychiatry. The decriminalization and scientific study of the “perversions” and the first chemical treatments for mental illness both originated there. But Freud was outside the psychiatric establishment, and his only contact with the university was through a course he taught without pay. He had neither jobs to dispense nor patients to refer. The marginality of analysis converged with Freud’s oppositional persona and lifelong concerns about money. In 1899 he wrote Fliess: “Money is laughing gas for me. I know from my youth that once the wild horses of the pampas have been lassoed, they retain a certain anxiousness for life. Thus I came to know the helplessness of poverty and continually fear it.” In the last eight months of 1899 he had only one new case. In May 1900 he averaged three and a half hours’ paid work per day. That same year, one day after his forty-fourth birthday and a few months after publishing *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he would describe himself as “an old, somewhat shabby Jew.”

Though marginal in Vienna, Freud’s ideas were seriously studied at Burghölzli, the prestigious asylum connected to the University of Zurich. Founded in the 1860s, Burghölzli had among its early directors such well-known psychiatrists as Auguste Forel and Wilhelm Griesinger. Eugene Bleuler became director in 1898 and in a few years transformed it into the foremost psychiatric teaching hospital in the world, outstripping
Kraepelin's prestigious clinic at the University of Munich. Bleuler followed Kraepelin's view that dementia praecox was psychological in origin. His interest in Freud arose from this contention.

In 1904 Freud heard from Bleuler that his staff, influenced by Bleuler's assistant Carl Jung, had been studying Freud's writings for several years. From an elite family, Jung was brilliant and attractive, with an unusually forceful personality. Although a generation younger than Freud, he was Freud's social and professional superior. In 1902 he had achieved early fame with a series of experiments that demonstrated the existence of unconscious ideational "complexes." By 1905, he was clinical director of Burghölzli and privat dozent at the University of Zurich. By 1908, he was wealthy enough to build a large house of his own design. He also had a mystical side that attracted him to psychoanalysis. His father was a pastor who originally wanted to become a Hebraist. His mother was a spiritualist, who used to stand behind her husband as he wrote his sermons to make sure the Devil
did not visit him.\(^2\) In 1906 Freud and Jung began to correspond, and Jung visited Freud a year later. The two men were strongly drawn to each other.

In 1905 Freud published *Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Wit and the Unconscious, “Dora,”* and *Three Essays on Sexuality.* In response to this outpouring, other medical men contacted him. Ernest Jones, a Welsh doctor of rural, religious, and working-class background living in London, read the *Dora* case and was shocked to discover a doctor who “listened closely to every word his patient spoke.”\(^2^8\) He was attracted to Freud, he later wrote, out of his awareness of “the injustices, stupidities, and irrationalities of our social organization.”\(^2^9\) In 1906 Jones began an analytic discussion group in London, but clashes with the medical establishment and accusations of sexual involvement with a patient sent him into exile in Canada.\(^3^0\) Freud’s first impression of Jones was of a fanatic. “He denies all heredity,” Freud wrote to Jung; “to his mind even I am a reactionary.”\(^3^1\)

Aside from Jones, almost every doctor who came to Freud from outside Vienna came through Burghölzli. Karl Abraham, a stiff and formal Berlin Jew, Max Eitingon, a self-effacing Russian, and Sándor Ferenczi, an engaging Hungarian, encountered Freud’s writings as medical students there. Later Eitingon and Abraham joined Magnus Hirschfeld, Europe’s leading advocate of the decriminalization of homosexuality, and Iwan Bloch, whose massive study of sexual mores appeared in 1905, in an analytic discussion group in Berlin.\(^3^2\) “If my reputation in Germany grows,” Freud wrote Abraham in 1907, “it will be helpful to you, and if I may designate you directly as my pupil and follower—you don’t seem to be the man who would be ashamed of it—then I can energetically [back you professionally].”\(^3^3\) By 1910, psychoanalysis was well enough known in Berlin for a prominent neurologist to call for its boycott, and subscriptions to psychoanalytic journals were far more extensive than in Vienna.\(^3^4\)

In Hungary in 1906 Ferenczi had refused to review *The Interpretation of Dreams* for a local medical journal. “Not worth the effort,” he had remarked. Jung convinced him to take Freud seriously. Ferenczi was two years older than Jung, a member of a cultivated Budapest family, and a prolific writer of essays and poetry as well as a doctor.\(^3^5\) His father was a bookstore owner who had emigrated from Poland and “Magyarized” his Yiddish-sounding name (Fraenkel) out of enthusiasm for Hungary’s 1848 revolution. His mother was president of the Union of Jewish Women. A member of the *Nyugat* (Occident) circle, which included Georg Lukacs, the Hungarian poet Endre Ady, and composers Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály, Ferenczi had a long-standing interest in hypnotism, autosuggestion, and both male and female homosexuality. Before reading Freud, he had served as
the Budapest representative of Hirschfeld’s International Humanitarian Committee for the Defense of Homosexuals. Bilingual and later a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, he reproached himself in 1910 for creating “propaganda . . . but no trace of an organization” in Budapest.35

At Burghölzli, Freud was widely read. A. A. Brill, the key figure in early U.S. analysis, first encountered Freud’s writings there in 1908. A Jewish immigrant from Austria who arrived in New York penniless in 1889 at the age of fifteen, Brill worked his way through medical school by playing chess for money. A brilliant clinician, he loved medicine, worked with the American psychiatrist Adolf Meyer, and translated Kraepelin into English. Ludwig Binswanger, the nephew of Nietzsche’s psychiatrist and a founder of existential analysis, also encountered Freud’s writings at Burghölzli. Oskar Pfister, a Protestant minister and an associate of Jung’s in Zurich, felt upon reading Freud “as if old premonitions had become reality.” Freud in turn assured Pfister that “our eroticism includes what you call ‘love’ in your pastoral care.”37 Even Freud’s most radical early follower, Otto Gross, came to him through Burghölzli, where Jung treated him for drug addiction.

Charismatic sects are marked by founding moments and historical turning points that help them consolidate their identity and achieve recognition. For psychoanalysis, the first few years of the twentieth century constituted such a moment. On one hand, Freud gathered around him a group of followers who saw in his thought a breakthrough into a whole new level of civilization. On the other hand, a regressive sense of traumatic hurt, defeat, and exclusion was equally central to the consolidation of analytic identity. Both sentiments were based on identification with Freud and were sustained by the Männerbund character of psychoanalysis.

The cement holding the circle together was a shared view of Freud as a “father.” Max Graf wrote of the Wednesday Psychological Society that there was an “atmosphere of the foundation of a religion in that room . . . Freud’s pupils . . . were his apostles.”38 But this statement is misleading. Although Freud was clearly central, the minutes suggest a fractious environment with many strong personalities. As we saw, what was historically new about the emerging analytic circle was not Freud’s paternal role but the members’ attempt to be self-conscious about their relation to it. In fact, personal contact with a teacher was historically necessary to all education involving inward development (Bildung). Identification with Freud was a way to learn to think in a new way, “analytically” or self-reflectively, and much analytic theory was generated out of the no doubt flawed filiations
between fathers and sons, teachers and students. What also reflected identification with Freud was that ideas drove the movement. Hanns Sachs, a Viennese lawyer who joined the society in 1910, wrote that when he read *The Interpretation of Dreams* he found “the one thing worthwhile for me to live for; many years later I discovered it was the only thing I could live by.”

Jung transported himself “back to the time before the reformation of my psychological thinking, . . . My thinking in those days . . . now looks like an immense dishonesty towards myself.”

Identification with Freud also animated one of the deepest and most persistent passions of the analytic movement—the passion to write.

Freud was often uncomfortable with his paternal role. He was drawn to Ferenczi but had trouble with Ferenczi’s childlike relation to him. In 1909 Ferenczi complained to Freud: “I’d rather be the way I am. . . I’m at least happy, a happy child. You (Prof. Freud), however, are obviously (intellectually) so old, explaining everything, resolving all your own passions into thought, that you cannot be happy.”

The next summer the two men vacationed together. Freud wrote Jung: “My travelling companion is a dear fellow, but dreamy in a disturbing kind of way, and his attitude toward me is infantile. He never stops admiring me, which I don’t like, and is probably sharply critical of me in his unconscious when I am taking it easy.” After the trip Freud wrote that he was “not that [psychoanalytic] superman whom we have constructed. . . . I haven’t overcome the countertransference. I couldn’t do it, just as I can’t do it with my three sons because I like them and I feel sorry for them in the process.”

As an older, charismatic male, Freud attempted to play the role of the good father. In letters to his followers he discussed their ambitions, rivalries, and competitiveness in a straightforward way that must have been reassuring. When Abraham used the term “neuroticism,” Freud commented: “We all have these complexes, and we must guard against calling everyone neurotic.”

Jones viewed Freud as “a man, who in spite of his authority and rank, would understand and not blame.” He told his best friend that Freud was the only man of position he had ever met “who knew what it was to feel young in heart, meaning that [he] had the power of comprehending the trials and difficulties of youth.”

The bonds that held the group together also led to its conflicts. Adler told Freud that it gave him no pleasure to stand in his shadow. Jung, who had been abused as a child, described a feeling of inferiority that frequently overcame him. He called a request for Freud’s photograph “almost absurd” and, agreeing with Freud that he had a “self-preservation complex,” wrote: “Actually—and I confess this to you with a struggle—I have a boundless
admiration for you both as a man and a researcher...my veneration for you has something of the character of a 'religious' crush. [I] feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertones." Sándor Ferenczi, the eighth of eleven children, often alluded to his "brother complex," and Jones queried Freud as to who understood his theories best. As Hanns Sachs observed, rivalry for Freud's acclaim and approbation was the mainspring of the movement's wranglings.

Sometimes Freud verged on the seductive in exposing his vulnerability and loneliness. When Abraham visited him in Vienna, Freud not only gave the younger man gifts but paid for his hotel room. In 1914, smarting, as we shall see, from his break with Jung, Freud wrote gratefully to Abraham: "All my life I have been looking for friends who would not exploit and then betray me, and now, not far from its natural end, I hope I have found them." Part of Freud's attractiveness came from his ability to expose aspects of his weakness selectively. "My prevailing mood," he wrote Abraham during World War I, "is powerless embitterment, or embitterment at my powerlessness." Regularly, his letters were preoccupied with money and with aging. "I didn't answer your last letter," he mentioned on another occasion, because "I was too angry and too hungry." On his fiftieth birthday his closest admirers presented him with a medallion inscribed with a quote from Oedipus Rex: "He divined the famous riddle and was a most mighty man." They called him "Professor," though his real title, professor extraordinary, meant only adjunct instructor. An unspoken sense of Freud as a weak, aging, or wounded father, a sense propelled by Freud's own self-perceptions, permeated his inner circle and set in motion a desire to protect him that reinforced the circle's doomed search for recognition and legitimation.

If the circles centered on Freud constituted one pole in the history of psychoanalysis, professional acceptance and mass popularity constituted the other. As it turned out, the fate of the second pole would be decided five thousand miles from the origins of the discipline. Psychoanalysis remained marginal to European psychiatry until after World War II, when Americans brought it back to Europe, but it became central to American culture almost immediately. The reason was the weakness of traditional authority in the United States and the widespread belief in the power of the individual mind to overcome "external" difficulties. In that context, American psychoanalysis became intensely popular. As a result, it was caught up in a process that emphasized personal empowerment, self-regulation, and individual charisma. As we shall see, the actual practice of analysis was less
important than its cultural impact. Ultimately American analysis came to mean almost the opposite of the self-reflective exploration of internal limitations that characterized its European counterpart.

An expansive, antinomian sense of self had long been central to American culture. Ralph Waldo Emerson evoked its spirit when he described himself as “standing on the bare ground—my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space—all mean egotism vanishes.” The frontier and mass democracy sustained this sense of boundlessness, which coexisted with self-improvement, sexual prudery, and commercialism. By the middle of the nineteenth century, American receptivity to the idea of mental healing was unparalleled in the world. In 1869 the first purely psychological theory of a neurosis, neurasthenia, was put forth there.

While many factors converged in preparing the way for psychoanalysis, the American faith in mental healing received its greatest boost from the second Great Awakening, the great evangelical Protestant revivals of the nineteenth century that sought to revitalize America’s Calvinist or Puritan roots. Although aimed at temperance and the strengthening of the work ethic, the revivals were accompanied by the development of such sects as mesmerism and Swedenborgism, and by the thought of influential eccentrics like Phineas Quimby, who preached the power of words to heal regardless of their content. The result was a widespread American belief in the “subconscious,” the impersonal or superpersonal mind, which, as we saw, converged with pre-Freudian dynamic psychiatry. This belief was one-sidedly optimistic. In the 1890s, as many Europeans turned inward toward pessimism, subjectivity, and the world of the dream, Americans, inspired by the pouring in of immigrants, the growth of mass consumption, and the beginnings of America’s global hegemony, reaffirmed their conviction of the power of the transcendental mind.

By the time Freud’s writings appeared, the belief that the subconscious could cure depression as well as somatic illnesses had swept American society in the form of Christian Science and, more broadly, “mind cure.” Converging with American religiosity, mind cure had a special appeal to women. Indeed, the founder of Christian Science was a woman: Mary Baker Eddy. Eddy, like Clara Barton (a founder of the U.S. nursing profession), Dorothea Dix (a reformer of psychiatric asylums), and Jane Addams (a founder of the U.S. social work profession), had been sick when young but then discovered her vocation and went on to lead a rich, healthy, and productive life. By the 1890s, then, the American landscape was home to a vast variety of faith cures, “mental sciences,” and “divine healings,” which preached the power of surrender through meditation on such slogans as “I
am not body.” The goal was to become “perfectly passive” to facilitate “the
discovery and use of those inexhaustible subconscious powers which have
their roots in the Infinite.” What held all these currents together, wrote a
doctoral student at Clark University in 1899, was the idea of suggestion,
“the law that any idea possessing the mind tends to materialize itself in the
body.”

The mind-cure attitude went far beyond healing. The “New Thought”
movement, popular between 1895 and 1915, taught that financial reward
depends primarily on “the Personal Magnetism of the seeker after suc-
cess.” The same needs that drove the growth of mind cure drove the new
mass culture. Just as mind cure preached the mind’s ability to overcome
bodily ailments, so the new culture idealized the individual’s ability to rise
above circumstances through positive thinking, generally abetted by a con-
version experience. Dime novels, amusement parks, movies, and sports
reflected immigrant and working-class traditions with important democrat-
izing elements. But they also reflected the stress on mental solutions that
accompanied the revolution in mass production.

Again, it would be wrong to overstate the contrast between the United
States and Europe. American mass culture, like American business meth-
ods, was already beginning to permeate European cities, for example, in the
form of imported American cowboy and detective stories, penny periodi-
cals, gymnastics, cycling, and department stores. Nonetheless, in contrast
to the steel frame of paternal authority that still haunted the European
imagination, the individual—generally in the form of a business success,
sports hero, or other celebrity—was at the center of the democratic imagi-
nation. Mind cure, with its emphasis on psychic power, was ideally suited
for democracy. Whereas nineteenth-century psychiatry had functioned by
excluding and isolating those deemed “mad,” mind cure stressed the uni-
versality of the “subconscious.” In this way, mind cure’s language, codes,
and explanatory schemata helped create a consumer market, an audience,
and a body of spectators.

The widespread belief in mind cure did not go unnoticed by doctors
and other professionals. Large-scale immigration and uprooting had cre-
ated a need for new forms of classification, ordering, and the adaptation
of the individual to contexts beyond those of immediate, face-to-face rela-
tions. In the nineteenth century, individuals discussed their personal prob-
lems with doctors, lawyers, and clergymen as well as with family members
and friends. Psychiatrists managed mental hospitals. The growth of neuro-
logy encouraged psychiatrists to reinvent themselves. Turning from asylum
management, they emphasized prevention, social adjustment, and the
treatment of alcohol- and drug-related diseases with new therapeutic techniques. Warning that nervousness was a way station on the road to insanity, they claimed special expertise in regard to juvenile delinquency. In all these spheres, they worked systematically to co-opt mental healing while attacking its practitioners. As a New York physician declared in 1898, there was no reason to allow “an army of irregulars to carry away the best patients from our business.”

The spread of psychiatry was further abetted by the clergy in this period in which church attendance was declining. Just as the social-gospel movement sought to make religion relevant to poverty, crime, and alcoholism, so ministers learned the new medical terminology and combined it with religious advocacy. The two years preceding Freud’s Clark lectures were also the high point of the quasi-religious, Boston-based Emmanuel movement, which brought together doctors and ministers in common pursuit of the new therapeutics. Family doctors, too, began advocating that “psychotherapy,” as it would soon be called, be applied to the problems of everyday life.

A small group of Boston-based neurologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists had taken up the study of mental healing as early as the 1880s. Participants included important influences on American psychoanalysis such as James Jackson Putnam and G. Stanley Hall, leaders of non-Freudian psychiatry such as Morton Prince and Boris Sidis, and future critics of psychoanalysis such as the psychiatrist Adolf Meyer. William James, also a member, was in some ways the most important figure paving the way for the American reception of Freud. James attacked the attempts of doctors to monopolize mental healing, criticized the positivistic presuppositions of his fellow professionals (“old fogeyism,” he wrote, seems to begin at the age of twenty-five), and argued that the future of mental healing would depend on popular movements, especially women’s movements. His 1890 Principles of Psychology challenged mind-body dualism and thereby further legitimized mental healing. As we have seen, his 1901 Varieties of Religious Experience described mind cure approvingly as a break with Victorianism, arguing that relaxation should supplant intenntness.

With the support of such luminaries, psychiatry quickly absorbed mental healing. The first American advocates of “psychotherapy,” Morton Prince and Boris Sidis, were followers of Pierre Janet, Charcot’s most important French disciple. In 1906 Prince founded The Journal of Abnormal Psychology; that same year the word “psychotherapy” was first listed in the Index Medicus. Richard Cabot, a Boston neurologist, wrote: “Psychotherapy is a most terrifying word, but we are forced to use it because there is no other which serves to distinguish us from Christian Scientists,
the New Thought people, the faith healers, and the thousand and one other schools which have in common the disregard for medical science and the accumulated knowledge of the past. In 1909 the journal *Psychotherapy* appeared, calling for "sound psychology, sound medicine and sound religion." In the same year Paul DuBois’s *Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*, containing an influential attack on hypnosis as degrading to the patient’s dignity, was translated into English, further paving the way for the absorption of Freud into the psychotherapy movement.

As American professionals struggled to distinguish their work from the popular forms of mental healing, they betrayed their underlying affinity with them. Hugo Munsterberg’s 1909 book, *Psychotherapy*, offers an example. Munsterberg, a professor of philosophy at Harvard, wrote the book to combat mind-cure amateurism. Arguing that the “big marketplace of civilization” had weakened communal ties, he called for “a conscious social program of symbol-building and communal reintegration led by professionals.” By “a conscious social program,” Munsterberg meant the new forms of social control aimed at the immigrant working class. At the same time he defined psychotherapy’s purpose as the inhibition of pain, the suppression of emotion, and the substitution of pleasant ideas “until the normal equilibrium is restored.” Similarly, Boris Sidis believed that in every individual there is a suggestive “secondary self” or “hypnoidal state.” Upon attaining this state, the individual feels the flood of fresh energies as a marvelous transformation, a “new light,” a “new life.” What Max Weber called the “iron cage” of instrumental control coexisted easily with an incitement to dream. This was the context surrounding Freud’s reception in the United States.

Like the first skyscrapers, Charlie Chaplin’s movies, and Thomas Edison’s electric bulb, Freud’s 1909 lectures at Clark University deserve to be remembered among the signal moments announcing the advent of the second industrial revolution. Like those developments, Freud’s lectures marked an occasion that was qualitatively new and transformative. Nonetheless, Freud had mixed feelings when he first received the invitation from Clark’s president, G. Stanley Hall. Calling Hall “something of a kingmaker,” he complained that the time away would cut into his practice, adding: “America should bring money, not cost money.” Unbeknownst to Freud, Hall’s first choice had been Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of experimental psychology; Hall had turned to Freud at Jung’s urging only after Wundt had refused. Jung now counseled Freud to accept, pointing
out that prestige would repay sacrifice. Perhaps he would do as well as Kraepelin, who had just received fifty thousand marks for a single consultation in California.  

Freud was simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by the United States. Reflecting on the invitation, he wrote to Jung: "When I started my practice [in 1886] I was thinking only of a two-month trial period in Vienna; if it did not prove satisfactory, I was planning to go to America and found an existence that I would subsequently have asked my fiancée in Hamburg to share. . . . [N]ow, twenty-three years later, I am to go to America after all, not, to be sure, to make money, but in response to an honorable call." After the dates were rearranged and he had accepted, however, Freud wrote Jung: "There is a good deal to be said about America [but] once they discover the sexual core of our psychological theories they will drop us. Their prudery and their material dependence on the public are too great." With Ferenczi he was more direct. Once the Americans realize the sexual basis of our ideas, he wrote, we'll be "up shit creek."

The Clark lectures were the decisive moment in the eruption of Freud's charisma. Reflecting the close connection between professionalism and popular culture, the audience included a cross section of America's medical and academic elite: William James (philosophy), Edward Titchener (psychology), Franz Boas (anthropology), Adolf Meyer (psychiatry), and James Jackson Putnam (neurology). Jones advised Freud "to aim first at the recognised people, and not to popularise too soon. There is so much vulgarisation and exploitation of everything here, that one has a strong weapon in insisting on the exact scientific side." But, Jones continued, analysis faces problems "peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race." One must know their "currents and prejudices in order to combat them most successfully. . . . a man who writes always on the same subject is apt to be regarded [in America] as a crank. . . . if the subject is sexual he is simply tabooed. . . . hence I shall dilute my sex articles with articles on other subjects."

On the boat to America, Freud discovered his cabin boy reading The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. It occurred to him then that he was about to become a world figure. He had addressed the second edition of The Interpretation of Dreams to a "wider circle of educated and curious-minded readers." Now, against Jones's counsel, he aimed his lectures at a true mass audience. He stressed "the practicality, the optimism, the comparative simplicity of psychoanalysis," at times condensing his theories almost to the point of caricature.

The lectures not only constituted Freud's claim to scientific legitimacy; they brought Freudian analysis and the world of mass consumption into
their fateful juxtaposition. Within a few years the coverage of analysis eclipsed that of all other therapies in popular magazines, especially those aimed at women.73 In spite of Freud’s ambivalence about the United States, his reception satisfied his deepest wishes. Later he described it as “the realization of an incredible daydream”: “In Europe I felt like someone excommunicated; here I saw myself received by the best as an equal.” The lectures, he added, were “the first time I was permitted to speak publicly about psychoanalysis.”74

Of all the early analysts, Jones was the one who best appreciated the opportunities that psychoanalysis faced in the English-speaking world. Although he had been mistrustful of Freud when they first met, the lectures seem to have resolved his doubts. Freud also recalled them as a turning point. “When you left Worcester [Massachusetts] after a time of dark inconsistencies from your side... I had to face the idea that you were going away to become a stranger to us,” Freud wrote to Jones. “Then I felt it ought not to be so and I could not show it otherwise than by accompanying you to the train and shaking hands before you went away.”75 Earlier Jones had observed: “The originality-complex is not strong with me; my ambition is rather to know, to be ‘behind the scenes,’ and in the know, rather than to find out.”76

Meeting with the American Therapeutic Society, organized by Morton Prince in the summer of 1909, Jones portrayed free association as “in almost every respect the reverse of treatment by suggestion” or mind cure.77 All therapies, he held, can be ranged in terms of “the extent to which the patient himself is made actively to bring about changes in his mental functioning.”78 The Freudian version was, of course, the acme. Under Jones’s influence, two analytic societies formed in 1911: the New York Psychoanalytic Society, headed by A. A. Brill, and the American Psychoanalytic Society, headed by Adolf Meyer and James Jackson Putnam. From the very first, the U.S. societies were different from those of Europe. Technique-driven and with little interest in psychoanalytic theory, both were composed exclusively of medical doctors; both made a medical license a requirement of admittance.79

Alongside the societies, the first Freudian generation of hospital psychiatrists emerged. Younger doctors, such as Smith Ely Jelliffe and William Alanson White, discontented with somatic interpretations of mental illness, were its leaders. White and Jelliffe founded The Psychoanalytic Review in 1912, the first journal devoted to psychoanalysis in the United States. They viewed the theory of the neuroses as the “indispensable path to the [treatment of the] psychoses.”80 Successive editions of White’s Outlines of
Psychiatry, one of the most popular short texts in American psychiatric history, trace Freud's impact. In 1907 White described hysteria as a narrowing of the field of consciousness. In 1911 he denounced suggestion therapy and introduced Freud's theory alongside Janet's. In 1915, when the book was replaced by White and Jelliffe's Diseases of the Nervous System, White recommended analysis as the treatment of choice at "higher psychological levels." It could not cure psychotic patients, he conceded, but it could relieve their symptoms.

Psychiatrists particularly appreciated what they took to be Freud's environmental approach. Like the analysis of eugenics, White and Jelliffe stressed the ways in which it could help prevent delinquency and addiction. Largely rewritten in the language of behaviorism after the publication of J. B. Watson's Behaviorism in 1914, the American version of Freud was portrayed as a hard-boiled scientific psychology. As Watson explained, when teaching Freudian psychology he omitted "the crude vitalistic and psychological terminology" and stuck to biological factors; "Freud himself admits the possibility of this." Yet even as Freud's thought was incorporated into American psychiatry, psychiatrists remained skeptical of everything that transcended behaviorism. "The main thing," Adolf Meyer remarked, "is that your point of reference should always be life itself and not the imagined cesspool of the unconscious." Although American analysis remained marginal to European analysis, it was never far from the consciousness of Freud and his associates. By World War I, the United States had the largest number of analysts in the world. Freud sometimes tried to ignore this; Jones never did. In 1908 the two men met with Brill to discuss translating Freud's works into English. In 1909 Brill translated parts of Studies on Hysteria, in 1913 The Interpretation of Dreams, and in 1918 Three Essays. Though cavalier about copyrights, Freud supervised translations, suggested English terms such as "repression," and vetted all important decisions. Understanding that professional approval was the key to mass popularity, the translators were guided by the idea that English, like German, was a vernacular language that did not promote emotive distance. They therefore used a psychiatric terminology drawn from Latin and Greek. While Freud's German was almost colloquial, they encouraged neologisms and technical terms such as "anaclitic," "fixation," "epistemophilia," and "parapraxis." The everyday German Lust became "libido." Trieb (drive) became the hardwired "instinct." Schaulust, pleasure in looking, was translated "scopophilia." Angst, another everyday word, became the clinical "anxiety." Ich (I) became "ego." Besetzung, "taken" or "occupied," became "cathexed." To underline the professional legitimacy
of analysis, Brill's translation of *The Interpretation of Dreams* warned that sales were “limited to members of the Medical, Scholastic, Legal and Clerical professions.” As translations appeared, Jones produced glossaries that standardized a set of terms relied on by all subsequent translators, including James Strachey. As much as any other factor, these translations laid the basis for the later Anglo-American dominance over psychoanalysis.

After the Clark lectures, the conflict between the marginal identity of psychoanalysis and its inflated place in the popular imagination intensified. Public pride confounded private doubts. Freud, normally realistic, began to write: “We must conquer the whole field of mythology...we must also take hold of biography.” At the same time he recognized the pressing problem of finding an institutional form for analysis and urged that it be discussed at an analytic congress to be held at Nuremberg in 1910.

The obvious solution was for analysis to become part of medicine. Freud called medicine the motherland of psychoanalysis, the “sister” who informed all the sciences about the human organism. When Ferenczi asked him how to stimulate interest in psychoanalysis, Freud counseled him to advertise a course for physicians and others. At the same time, however, Freud believed that analysis should retain its independence from psychiatry. On this point he was more radical than his associates. Editing Freud’s preface to the Hungarian edition of Ferenczi’s essays in 1909, Ferenczi changed the description of the intended audience from “men of education” to “doctors and men of education.” “I don’t want the book to be described as ‘popular science’, ” he explained. After the International Psychoanalytic Association was founded in 1910, Jung urged that the Zurich rule that “only holders of academic degrees can be...members” be extended to all analytic societies. Freud, however, disagreed. “The statutes [of the International Association] leave us free,” he replied, “although their spirit does not tend toward such exclusiveness.” Such a “regressive measure would never be accepted in Vienna and is also displeasing to me personally.”

In fact, the horizons opened by Freud’s thought stretched far beyond medicine. As we shall see, Freud and his associates had subordinated psychiatric categories to a developmental sequence stretching from earliest childhood through what increasingly came to be called the “Oedipus complex.” These works situated the neuroses within a fundamentally philosophical, evolutionary, and anthropological conception centered on the individual’s relation to authority. Freud often alluded to their broad social
implications, but he was cautious about trying to spell them out. In 1907 he told the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society that from analytic case studies we learn "what is really going on in the world... analyses are cultural historical documents of tremendous importance."95 A few years later he characterized the neuroses as "asocial" structures that attempt "to achieve by private means what is effected in society by collective effort."96 Thought-provoking as such insights were, the problem of institutional form remained.

Reflecting the powerful thrust toward social reorganization that accompanied the second industrial revolution, many of Freud's associates sought a closer relation between psychoanalysis and social democracy. Alfred Adler was the most prominent. In preparation for the Nuremberg conference, Freud asked Adler to speak to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on the question of whether psychoanalysis is compatible with every viewpoint or whether it entailed adherence to a particular political viewpoint.97 Ferenczi also urged that the conference discuss the "sociological significance of our analyses."98 In the United States, James Jackson Putnam sought to join analysis with social and moral reform. In Switzerland, Auguste-Henri Forel tried to enlist Freud's support in a reform association devoted to the eradication of syphilis, alcoholism, and other social problems.99

Freud at first responded enthusiastically to Forel's proposal, writing to Jung that he was attracted by Forel's willingness "to combat the authority of State and Church directly where they commit palpable injustice."100 By the time of the congress, however, Freud had rejected this option. His ostensible motive was to protect analysis. In fact, Freudian thought was at odds with the politics of the day, both conservative and left-wing. Conservative parties were founded on the defense of the patriarchal, monarchical, and religious traditions that analysis described in terms of the "father complex." Yet the most important populist alternatives to conservatism were xenophobic and anti-Semitic. Freud's personal politics were liberal in the European sense, stressing secularism and freedom of speech, but his experiences in Vienna led him to be skeptical of this tradition. Meanwhile, social democracy valorized communal principles and tended to reduce injustice to the question of economic organization.

Freud's opposition to proposals to join psychoanalysis to a specific politics reflected its role as a theory and practice of personal life. In his view, for an analyst to affirm or challenge a patient's moral or political stance was not only an unwarranted abuse of authority but also an obstacle to analyzing the motives and meaning of the patient's stance. When Freud told the Viennese society that analytic case studies teach us what is really going on in the world, he meant at the level of motives and meanings, not of politics. In
his view, analysis aimed to support individual and cultural self-reflection; it did not imply any particular political practice. In fact, a new interpretation of the ideal of personal autonomy was implicit in the idea of the personal unconscious. Fidelity to that idea put analysis at a level once removed from ordinary political commitments. Instead of focusing directly on the forms of political and social domination in modern society, analysis focused on the internal, psychic preconditions for domination. In this sense, it sought to be metapolitical or "transcendental," a Kantian term then in use by analysts. In the long run, however, as we shall see, the apolitical stance of analysis proved impossible to maintain.

Alongside those who wanted analysis to join with the Social Democrats' efforts at reform, there were countervailing pulls toward the avant-garde, especially in those nations that had not yet established stable, mass democracies: Germany and Russia. One such effort was spearheaded by Otto Gross in Munich's Schwabing district, a center of avant-garde culture that also housed Thomas Mann, Frank Wedekind, Stefan George, and Richard Strauss. Gross was a charismatic bohemian and self-proclaimed analyst who propounded a philosophy of sexual liberation, opposition to patriarchy, and revolution. A forerunner of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse, he held that "the immense future of psychoanalysis [is] comprehensible as the soul of tomorrow's revolutionary movement."104

In 1907 Gross submitted an article on psychoanalysis to a scholarly German journal. Max Weber, an editor of the journal, rejected the article in a letter that illuminates the categorical break that had occurred between psychoanalysis and the tradition of utopian revolution. Weber began by distinguishing Freud from Gross. Gross asks of a theory only "Can one eat it?—that is, can one construct a practical 'world view' from it?" This was not true of Freud, whom Weber regarded as a scientist, albeit one whose formulations had not yet stood the test of time. Furthermore, according to Gross, "every suppression of emotion-laden desires and drives leads to 'repression,' " and therefore calls for revolution. But an ethical life invariably entails repression, Weber argued. The real problem, which Gross ignored, was to distinguish ethical from unethical repression. Gross essentially espoused a "psychiatric ethic": "admit to yourself what you are like and what you desire." This, Weber wrote, was the ideal of the "nerve-snobs." Behind the "specialist jargon," he added, "the whole article is absolutely bursting with noisy value-judgements."104

In Russia, too, a strong effort was made to integrate psychoanalysis into an avant-garde worldview. Translations of Dostoyevsky, the Paris premiere of Vaslav Nijinsky in Sergey Diaghilev's Ballets Russes, and Wassily
Kandinsky's *On the Spiritual in Art* had placed Russia at the forefront of early-twentieth-century modernism. Correspondingly, Russian intellectuals turned passionately toward the West. Hunggrily interrogating Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, they translated practically everything Freud wrote between 1909 and 1914, generally preceding any other foreign translations. Based on this interest, Moshe Wulff in Odessa (where Freud discerned a "local epidemic of psychoanalysis"), Tatiana Rosenthal in St. Petersburg, and Nikolai Osipov in Moscow founded analytic groups or societies.

Along with these groups, the symbolist poets and philosophers were the main Russian advocates of psychoanalysis. Supposedly like psychoanalysis, symbolism distinguished two planes of reality, the visible and the invisible. In addition, there were many other points of apparent contact. Committed to the idea of Russia's special mission, the symbolists sought the dissolution of the ego, and especially of gender distinction, in what the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov described as a "feminine" all-oneness and the symbolist poet Vyacheslav Ivanov called "the realm of bisexual, feminine-masculine Dionysius." In the same vein, Nikolai Berdyaev described sexuality as the painful search for a lost androgyne, apparent in Adam and Christ, while other symbolists espoused a Dionysian transcendence of the self through sexual practices. Christianity, the symbolist poet Sergei Solovyov told Alexander Blok, "at its very core is beyond gender" and can only be attained through sexual release. In fact, these ideals were as incompatible with psychoanalysis as political revolution was, but for a while the two movements occupied a common terrain.

Eschewing sectarian reinterpretations of psychoanalysis, whether political or aesthetic, Freud sought to reassure those analysts who struggled for professional acceptance that they were doing their duty to society: not only were they helping their patients, but they were contributing their "share to the enlightenment of the community from which we expect to achieve the most radical prophylaxis against neurotic disorders." Nonetheless, the desire to align psychoanalysis with social reform persisted. As late as February 1913, Freud would suggest to Ferenczi that the next round of analytic discussions at international meetings center on "the social role of neuroses." But when James Jackson Putnam argued that analysts needed to join with other social forces, Freud responded: "Your complaint that we are not able to compensate our neurotic patients for giving up their illness is quite justified. But... this is not the fault of therapy but rather of social institutions... the recognition of our therapeutic limitations reinforces our determination to change other social factors so that men and women..."
The fact that analysis was poised between an institutional integration that would destroy its unique contribution and a marginality that could destroy its effectiveness came to the fore at the Nuremberg congress. Whereas the first analytic congress, at Salzburg in 1908, had been an informal gathering, a Zusammenkunft, this one gave birth to an independent organization, the International Psychoanalytic Association. Although the aim was to win professional legitimacy, the result was long-term marginality.

Freud’s hopes for a permanent organization focused on Jung. Although only in his mid-fifties and in excellent health, Freud was obsessed with the idea of finding a successor. By mail, Freud and Ferenczi concurred that “the [psychoanalytic] worldview does not lead to democratic equalizing”: there should be an elite along the lines of Plato’s rule of philosophers. At the congress they fought to have Jung elected president for life, to give him the power to approve all articles or speeches before presentation or publication, and to have the association’s center moved to Zurich. When the Viennese responded to Freud and Ferenczi’s proposals by threatening to walk out, Freud offered a compromise: Jung would direct the association, Freud would edit the Jahrbuch, Adler would replace Freud as president of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, and a new periodical, the Zentralblatt, would be edited by Adler and Stekel in Vienna.

At the very moment at which Freud moved to win professional acceptance, he was forced to acknowledge the marginality of analysis. During the conference, he went to the hotel room where the Viennese were meeting without him. Speaking privately to his earliest followers, he explained what he saw as the dilemma: “Most of you are Jews, and therefore incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form ties in the world of great science.” Bitterly, he reminisced: “When I assured my patients that I knew how to relieve them permanently of their sufferings they looked round my modest abode, reflected on my lack of fame and title, and regarded me like the possessor of an infallible system at a gambling-resort, of whom people say that if he could do what he professes he would look very different himself. Nor was it really pleasant to carry out a psychical operation while the colleagues whose duty it should have been to assist took particular pleasure in spitting into the field of operation.”

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shall no longer be forced into hopeless situations. Out of our therapeutic impotence must come the prophylaxis of the neuroses.”
Dramatically throwing back his coat, he declared: “My enemies would be willing to see me starve; they would tear my very coat off my back.”

Caught between sectarian isolation with its attendant self-pity and mass popularity with its threatened loss of identity, the sectarian—and Jewish—character of the movement deepened. The year before the Nuremberg congress, while visiting America for the Clark lectures, Jung had developed a theory of an American “Negro complex.” Now he presented it at Nuremberg. The Negro’s example, he believed, posed a threat to the “laboriously subjugated instincts of the white races.”

Problematic as this was, it was soon adapted for another purpose. “The persecution of blacks in America,” Ferenczi wrote Freud, occurs because “blacks represent the ‘unconscious’ of the Americans. Thus the hate, the reaction formation against one’s own vices. Along with the circumcission/castration complex, this mechanism could also be the basis for anti-Semitism. The free, ‘fresh’ behavior of the Jew, his ‘shameless’ flaunting of his interest in money, evokes hatred as a reaction formation in Christians, who are ethical not for logical reasons but out of repression. It is only since my analysis that I have understood the widespread Hungarian saying: ‘I hate him like my sins.’”

Freud needed little convincing. After the Nuremberg conference, he exploded to Ferenczi about a journal attack that cited his theory of anal eroticism as an example of Viennese decadence: “Viennese sensuality can’t be found elsewhere!” Reading between the lines, Freud continued, “We Viennese are not only pigs but also Jews. But that wasn’t printed.”

The retreat to the predominantly Jewish character of the early analytic group also affected the Männerbund. Abraham and Jung had always disliked each other and, after the Nuremberg conference, began an open break.

Freud wrote to the “consanguineous” Abraham: “Racial relationship brings you closer to my intellectual constitution, whereas he, being a Christian and the son of a pastor, can only find his way to me against great inner resistances. His adherence is therefore all the more valuable.” In another letter he urged Abraham to “develop a little masochism and be prepared to endure a certain amount of injustice... You may be sure that if my name were Oberhuber my new ideas would... have met with far less resistance.”

The formation of an international organization, the appointment of Jung as its president, the appointment of Adler as the head of the Vienna branch: Freud experienced these primarily as hollow achievements. Returning from the congress, he was depressed. “No doubt, it was an extraordinary success,” he wrote Ferenczi, but there was something wrong at its core. “We
are both a little at fault.” His own aversion to the Viennese circle and Fer-
enci’s “brother complex,” Freud noted, “have had the combined effect of
making us shortsighted.”119 A few months later he wrote Jung, “When I
look at the situation objectively, I believe I went ahead too fast. I overesti-
imated the public’s understanding of the significance of E.A [psychoanaly-
sis]. I shouldn’t have been in such a hurry about founding the I.A. My
impatience to see you in the right place... also had something to do with it.
To tell the truth, we should have done nothing at all.”120

With the congress, Freud lost his last chance for integration into Euro-
pean psychiatry. At Nuremberg he clashed with an assistant from Krae-
pelin’s clinic in Munich, Max Isserlin. As a result, Kraepelin later attacked
Bleuler for his association with Freud.121 Bleuler, who had wavered for years,
told Jung he would not join the society. It was too narrow, too exclusive,
one cannot “sit down with everybody.” In subsequent letters to Freud,
Bleuler elaborated, saying he was “less tempted than you to sacrifice my
whole personality for the advancement of the cause” and insisting: “This
‘who is not for us is against us,’ this ‘all or nothing’ is in my opinion neces-
sary for religious sects and political parties... but for science I consider it
harmful.”122 Jung, like Freud, was downcast. “The break with Bleuler has
not left me unscathed,” he wrote Freud. “Once again I underestimated my
father complex.”123

In fact, the International Psychoanalytic Association had barely been
founded before it began to fall apart. Jung never wanted to play the part to
which Freud had assigned him, and their difficulties began immediately
after the congress. By 1910 the marginality of psychoanalysis was inscribed,
and it never lost the traces of its early years. Its classical period would be
dominated by three great schisms: one between Freud, Jung, and Adler in
the 1910s; a second involving Ferenczi and Rank in the 1920s; and a third
between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein in the 1930s and ’40s. Afterward, in
the period following World War II, its greatest popularity set the stage for
its most intense rejection.