Reflections on the History of Psychoanalysis

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ABSTRACT

The proliferation of psychoanalytic schools demands the reexamination of the history of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis emerged at the intersection between the rational heritage of the enlightenment and the interest in the morbid that was the hallmark of romanticism. This paper focuses on moments when psychoanalysis was poised at a crossroads where various routes could have been taken. Differentiation is made among the heretics, modifiers, and extenders of psychoanalysis. Discussed within a historical frame of reference are the contributions of leading modifiers—Melanie Klein, Hartmann, Winnicott, Kohut, and others—as well as their extenders. The paper concludes with a discussion of some current urgent problems facing psychoanalysis.

I HAVE CHOSEN THE HISTORY OF psychoanalysis as my topic in order to address a point of urgency in current psychoanalysis: the danger of becoming a latter-day Tower of Babel. That famous tower was intended to reach Heaven, but the project was abandoned when God confounded its builders' languages as a punishment for their pride. In my view the fact that different schools of psychoanalytic thought and practice compete, calls for a reevaluation of the history of psychoanalysis.

Historical Survey

The question I am posing is: what was there in the structure and history of psychoanalysis that led to the establishment of different schools within psychoanalysis? I will not in this presentation take a stand on the relative merits of the various psychoanalytic schools, but will examine psychoanalysis as a study in the history of ideas.

In studying the psychoanalytic past, I found it useful to differentiate three types of contributors: heretics, modifiers, and extenders. The heretics, rare in recent years but prevalent in Freud's lifetime, were typically close to Freud for some time, made important contributions, and then bolted to start their own schools. They include Adler, Stekel, Jung, Rank, and Wilhelm Reich. During Freud's lifetime there were only heretics and extenders. Modifiers appeared after Freud's death when no one, not even Anna Freud, could lay claim to being the only heir to Freud's legacy.

Modifiers recast psychoanalytic theory or modified psychoanalytic practice, but did not leave the psychoanalytic field. A typical strategy for a modifier is to claim that his or her modification is implicit in Freud's writings or flows directly out of Freud's idea. While modifiers create controversy in psychoanalysis, they also keep it alive and protect it from stagnation. Early modifiers were Ferenczi and Federn; later ones were Hartmann, Melanie Klein, Winnicott, Lacan, and Kohut. Many modifiers are influenced by movements that take place outside psychoanalysis and attempt a synthesis between
psychoanalysis and another discipline. Bowlby (1960) attempted to coordinate psychoanalysis with ethology; Lacan's modifications can be seen as an attempt to recast psychoanalysis in the language of structural linguistics.

Extenders, the third group, usually extend psychoanalysis into areas as yet unexplored, but their findings do not demand modification. Unlike modifiers, they evoke no enmity and their contributions are appreciated. Some of the important extenders are Karl Abraham, Hermann Nunberg, Waelder, and Fenichel.

My first task in this survey will be the examination of the way psychoanalysis was discovered. In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud (1916–1917, p. 2) enumerated three major blows that science inflicted on man's self-esteem. Copernicus showed that Earth was not the center of the universe. Darwin proved that man descended from the animal kingdom. Freud assigned the third blow to himself: he showed that man is not master in his own house because he does not know his unconscious. It was in the company of Copernicus and Darwin that Freud wished to be remembered. History has not yet rendered its verdict; possibly Freud will be remembered in a different context, in a line extending from Plato to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Bergmann, 1987, p. 155); (Makari, 1991).

Was psychoanalysis, like the New World, waiting to be discovered? Greek and Chinese science endured a long time without a Copernicus, a Darwin, and certainly without a Freud. Great as a man may be, he is the creature of his culture and a child of his time. However, within each given culture it is legitimate to ask how much time would have passed before another man would have made the same discovery, or even if the particular discovery would have been made at all. A good example is Darwin's relation to Malthus. Darwin acknowledged his survival of the fittest theory to be only the doctrine of Malthus applied to the entire animal and vegetable kingdom. Did Darwin need Malthus's dictum of 1795—that population increases at an exponential rate while food supplies can at best be augmented at a linear rate—as an impetus to discover natural selection and the survival of the fittest?

In 1837, the year Queen Victoria ascended the throne, Darwin returned from a six-year, 40,000-mile voyage around the world. The idea of survival of the fittest occurred to him in 1839, but was not published until twenty years later. Alfred Russell Wallace made the same discovery independently of Darwin and mailed him the results. Wallace too had read and was influenced by Malthus. If we take Darwin as a prototype of a scientific discoverer we see immediately how different the situation was with Freud. No one came close to his deciphering dreams, with the possible exception of Popper-Linkeus. And even Popper-Linkeus was not interested in the therapeutic use of dreams; he wanted to use them only in the service of social reform (Freud, 1932).

There were other psychiatrists—Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, Eugen Bleuler, and Adolf Meyer—who treated hysterics. But it is safe to say that none of them would have exerted the kind of influence on the Western world that Freud did. As a step in the development of psychiatry, Freud's discoveries were entirely unexpected. Freud was treating a relatively insignificant part of the world's population. His patients were middle-class, well educated, articulate, and by-and-large secular Jews. They were more
articulate and introspective than the hysterics Charcot treated. They helped Freud make observations and discoveries, and formulate theories that changed the way Western man understands himself.

The building blocks from which psychoanalysis was structured—the meaning of dreams, the significance of infancy for adult functioning, and the ubiquitous presence of transference reactions—could all have been discovered by others at other times. It was Freud's combining them into one discipline that went beyond the realm of discovery. It is this very complexity of psychoanalysis that makes it vulnerable to modification.

Possibly something like the Oedipus complex would have been discovered by a later observer, but I doubt it would have been named after a Greek hero. As I have demonstrated (Bergmann, 1992), Freud read Oedipus Rex during his adolescence, when he first fell in love with Gisela Fluss. What he discovered in his self-analysis were attenuated derivatives of the Oedipus complex: love for the mother and jealousy of the father. The impact of Sophocles' masterpiece made it possible for Freud to reach the radical conclusion of a wish for sexual union with the mother and murder of the father, a remarkable transmission of insight across two thousand years of human history. Looking back at the past, I see no royal road leading from hysteria to psychoanalysis. A path is discernible, but it could have been traversed by one man only. If the discovery of psychoanalysis was less determined, it follows that its future will also be less predictable.

A different picture emerges if we change our focus from psychiatry to the broader ferment that characterized the nineteenth-century world of art and letters. When the art historian Erwin Panofsky tried to explain the rise of neoplatonism as a dominant philosophy during the Renaissance, he found only one other movement that exerted a similar influence: psychoanalysis in our time. Whether we begin with philosophers like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Feuerbach, the plays of Ibsen or Strindberg, the novels of Dostoyevsky, Schnitzler, Proust, or even the music of Wagner, immersing ourselves in this world makes clear that the appearance of Freud is a possibility. The optimism of the enlightenment has turned to introspection and a new interest in the morbid. It is at the point where enlightenment and German romanticism meet that Freud's antecedents are to be found. As Fenichel (1941) said, the subject matter of psychoanalysis is the irrational. Its methodology, however, is rational. Psychoanalysis offered a synthesis between enlightenment and romanticism; this synthesis constituted its main appeal.

How close psychoanalysis came to being engulfed by the irrational is illustrated by an exchange of letters between Jung and Freud in 1910. On the 11th of February 1910, Jung urged Freud "to revive among the intellectuals the feeling for symbol and myth and ever so gently to transform Christ back into the soothsaying God of the vine... What infinite rapture and wantonness lie dormant in our religion waiting to be led back to their true destination!" Two days later Freud replies, "You must not regard me as the founder of a religion. My intentions are not so far-reaching... I am not thinking of a substitute for religion; this need must be sublimated" (McGuire, 1974, pp. 294–295). The correspondence illustrates the danger of a remerger between psychoanalysis and the irrational. Freud resisted Jung in the name of the spirit of rational enlightenment. The exchange also throws light on the psychology of one future heretic. Freud refused Jung's need for idealization. With this refusal Jung's libido, we may assume, had to turn back upon himself. If Freud would not assume the task of converting psychoanalysis into a new
religion, Jung would. The Jungian heresy represents an attempt to merge psychoanalysis with the irrational. There will be further attempts along the same lines.

Let us turn back to September 21, 1897, when Freud informed Wilhelm Fliess that he had lost faith in his "neurotica." He has realized "that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathexed with affect" (Masson, 1985, p. 264). This day may well be the birthday of psychoanalysis. It is one of the glorious moments in the history of psychoanalysis, yet something happened that we need to reexamine. Schimek (1975) has shown that the majority of Freud's women patients did not report to him conscious memories of seduction. It was Freud who made this construction out of their associations. Schimek comes close to saying that the seduction theory was an iatrogenic illness, for Freud's female patients experienced his unrelenting and penetrating pressure to reveal to him their hidden memories of a seduction. Even earlier, Sadow et al. (1968) showed that the seduction theory, which they charitably called "the seduction hypothesis," was a construction. Psychoanalysis proper, therefore, owes its origins to a construction that failed. Historically it is incorrect to speak of the seduction hypothesis; it was not a hypothesis but a belief. Ferenczi in his diary (1988) remarked that when Freud discovered that hysterics lie he stopped loving his patients (p. 93). It was not the clinical material that persuaded Freud to change his mind, but his self-analysis. An event intrapsychic to Freud—his self-analysis—colored the way he interpreted events in the outer reality, the associations of his patients. The subsequent demand that the analyst be analyzed was intended to protect future patients from the dangers of similar distortions. The lesson not learned that still haunts us today is that there is no royal road leading from the raw data of psychoanalysis—the memories told, the fantasies confessed, the dreams reported—to the constructions made or ignored by the analyst. Different models lead to different constructions.

At this historical juncture the concept of unconscious psychic reality as determining much of human behavior became central to psychoanalysis (Freud, 1900, pp. 613, 620); (1913, p. 159). As to technique, Anna Freud commented in 1943:

The two main foundation stones of psychoanalytic technique were the substitution of free association for hypnosis, and the reduction to a minimum of the real relationship between analyst and patient [p. 630].

The question of the role of reality and particularly traumatic reality versus wish-fulfillment fantasy has remained with us ever since. Eventually psychoanalysts became accustomed to a mixed theory of neurosis consisting of the instinctual structure and the influence of reality in early childhood. Nevertheless a measure of vagueness remained as to how much responsibility is to be assigned to each factor. Psychoanalysts can concentrate as Arlow (1969) has taught, on the analysis of hierarchically arranged unconscious fantasies as the central unit of the psychoanalytic endeavor, or one can emphasize the infant's adaptation to the peculiarities of the adults in his life as the interpersonalists or the object relations theorists urge us to do. It will be argued that one should do both, and see the persistence of the unconscious fantasy as a response to parental deprivation or indulgence, but, as a matter of fact, if we emphasize one, we will tend to deemphasize the other. At this point controversy emerges.
My second stop deals with Freud's case histories. Freud interpreted Dora's dreams brilliantly, but who besides Freud could have done so? The encounter was tragic, as Erikson (1962) pointed out. Freud understood her dreams, but not her actuality. Kris (1951) noted that the Rat Man was subjected to massive indoctrination. The Wolf Man relapsed into psychosis while in analysis with Brunswick (1928). Ironically we also count Schreber, a man Freud never met in person, as a case history. It has become painfully evident that Freud's case histories are of historical importance, but no longer examples to be emulated. Today only modifiers write case histories.

As the third moment in the history of psychoanalysis I select the paper Freud delivered at the Second Psychoanalytic Congress in Nuremberg in 1910.

You know of course that the psychoneuroses are substitutive satisfactions of some instinct the presence of which one is obliged to deny to oneself and others. Their capacity to exist depends on this distortion and lack of recognition. When the riddle they present is solved and the solution is accepted by the patients these diseases cease to be able to exist ... In place of a single sick person, let us put society—suffering as a whole from neuroses... The success which the treatment can have with the individual must occur equally with the community. Sick people will not be able to let their various neuroses become known ... [p. 148].

Early psychoanalysis, as this passage indicates, had a Utopian core, and this core will reappear in many modifiers. Freud, the "godless Jew," the secular prophet, speaks these lines. Strange as it may seem to us today, Freud thought enlightenment and shame would be the curative factors for the whole society. At this point psychoanalysis revealed itself most clearly as the daughter of enlightenment. It is at this moment in its history that it became allied with other powerful Utopian movements that captured the imagination of the young on the eve of World War I—surrealism, socialism, progressive education, and the belief in an early sexual enlightenment of children. It was this Utopian aspect that won psychoanalysis many of its adherents. Eventually these attitudes would coalesce around the popular books written by Wilhelm Reich. Karen Horney's (1937)Neurotic Personality of Our Time also belongs to this category. The touchstone for all Utopian books within psychoanalysis is the role they assign to the Oedipus complex. In all these books it is assumed that if the child is given proper parental care, the Oedipus complex will cause no particular stress. Kohut (1977) shared this view. He spoke of the oedipal phase as a joyful experience despite its anxieties, provided the parents react with pride to the child's developmental achievement (pp. 229–230). Behind this debate we find the same juxtaposition of intrapsychic conflict characteristic of our humanness against the concept of pathology created by environmental forces.

The next decisive moment I would single out is the year 1914, important in world history as the year in which World War I broke out and, according to Peter Gay, the twentieth century proper began. In this year, when the guns of August destroyed the world of the nineteenth century, Freud made two important contributions. The first was the paper "Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914a). Now psychoses were renamed narcissistic neuroses not open to psychoanalytic influence. Psychoanalytic endeavors were limited to the transference neuroses. In time this dichotomy became a focal point for controversy. Both Kernberg (1980) and Kohut (1971) argue that narcissistic neuroses are not identical with psychoses,
and the Kleinians will show that psychoanalysis can treat more severe disturbances beyond the transference neurosis.

In the other significant paper of that year, "Remembering, Repeating and Working Through," Freud (1914b) maintained a delicate balance, recognizing acting as a form of remembering, but therapeutically less desirable than recollection. Psychoanalysis became a technique that deliberately aimed to intensify transference manifestations into a transference neurosis that would actualize the infantile neurosis around the figure of the analyst. The possibilities and desirabilities of this transformation gave rise to another group of controversies. The introduction of the term "working through" was significant because it implied that merely making conscious what was unconscious does not in itself suffice for cure.

Freud was less optimistic in 1914 than he was in 1910. Nevertheless he was convinced that the infantile neurosis can yield to the transference neurosis, and once this change has come about the transference neurosis will be worked through and result in psychoanalytic cure. For a long time the ability to form a transference neurosis was the hallmark of the good analysand, and the development of the transference neurosis the dividing line between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis proper. Eventually this point too will become a focus of controversy, this time in the realm of technique. Are only transference interpretations mutative (Strachey, 1934), or should one, for optimal results, balance transference interpretations with extratransference ones? By now it has become evident that one obtains a completely different kind of analysis depending on the path pursued.

"Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) represents a turning point in the history of psychoanalysis. Freud became pessimistic. The repetition-compulsion recognized in 1914 as the active force behind the transference neurosis was reevaluated. What in 1914 was a positive force aiding the psychoanalyst in his endeavor to make the analysand experience the analysis emotionally, was now seen as operating in the service of the death instinct and therefore antagonistic to the psychoanalyst's efforts. In the transference neurosis, the analysands repeated their painful experiences that never led to pleasure. The analytic repetition no longer guarantees that the ego will obtain mastery over the traumatic experience. For the first time we hear from Freud a pessimistic note: reconstructions without memories do not solve the therapeutic problem (1920, p. 18). Furthermore, all too often the most essential memories can never be remembered and have to be reenacted. Overcoming the repetition-compulsion became the major task of the analyst.

The Ego and the Id(1923) marked not only the establishment of the structural hypothesis and the beginning of ego psychology, but also the beginning of object relations. Using the language of metapsychology, Freud found that "object cathexis can be replaced by identification" or "objects can be set up inside the ego" bringing about character change. The ego assumed features of the love object and demanded love from the id (pp. 28–30). The relationship between the self and the internalized object representations is at the core of the psychoanalytic object relations theory. In 1923 Freud emphasized the weakness of the ego, but in 1926 he laid the foundations for psychoanalytic ego psychology. Nevertheless the therapeutic pessimism expressed in 1920 reappeared in Freud's Analysis Terminable and Interminable(1937a).
Up to 1920 the relation between technique and theory was nearly perfect. The theory stated that repression, more precisely the return of the repressed, was responsible for the formation of the symptom. As Freud put it (1932, p. 221), if what is repressed contrives to force its way into consciousness or action, we are no longer normal. It was an act of genius for Freud to see that the same road that leads to abnormality also leads to cure, provided it takes place under the guidance of the analyst and in the safety of the analytic situation. The analogy to inoculation, never verbalized, is evident. And like an excessive dosage, a premature interpretation can bring out the disease rather than the cure. This simple harmony does not prevail in the structural formulation. The division of the psychic apparatus into superego, ego, and id opened the way to two different approaches in technique. Franz Alexander and James Strachey advocated modifying the superego by encouraging the analysand to project his superego onto the analyst, who would then give back to the patient his own and more benign superego. In the other camp were the ego analysts who believed that all progress must be made through modifications of the ego. In 1934 the two contrasting points of view were presented side by side in papers written by Strachey and Sterba. At that historical juncture, psychoanalysis lost its unity of approach and the controversy between ego and superego psychoanalysts came to a head in the Marienbad Symposium of 1936 (Glover et al., 1937).

Hitherto psychoanalysis was regarded as superior to all therapies since it alone was causal, a technique in which investigation and cure go hand in hand. Psychoanalysis alone cured, while other therapies were merely ameliorative. All this source of pride was called into question in Freud's last contribution to technique (1937a). It is not surprising that younger generations of ego psychoanalysts as well as the followers of Melanie Klein could not accept this pessimistic appraisal.

I thus arrived at an unexpected conclusion. Freud's about-face in 1920 came as a shock to the psychoanalytic movement, causing a disarray. Until now only certain leading disciples occasionally bolted to create their own schools. But now the full implications of Freud's thinking could not easily be fathomed. It was inevitable that different schools will emerge.

During the same period psychoanalytic technique came under the influence of Wilhelm Reich's character analysis (1927, 1928). Reich evoked powerful reactions in his patients by showing them and even caricaturing for them the rigidities in their speech and movement. Kris (1951) called Reich's approach prestructural. Anna Freud in 1936 designated it as "permanent modes of defense." With the advent of ego psychology this technique of confrontation was rejected. Fenichel's (1941) book on technique stabilized the controversy between Wilhelm Reich and Anna Freud. The Kleinians, however, continued to interpret what ego psychologists call "dormant conflicts."

One of the important tasks facing psychoanalytic historians is the reevaluation of Ferenczi's role based on his diary and the Ferenczi-Freud correspondence. The controversy between the two goes far beyond the question of "abstinence" versus indulgence. Ferenczi demanded that the analyst "take seriously" the infantile need for help (p. 260). He accused Freud and his followers of working to establish the transference: when the "patient is going through agonies, he sits calmly in the armchair, smoking a cigar and making conventional remarks in a bored tone; occasionally he falls asleep" (p. 178). The most radical and least acceptable of Ferenczi's modifications was the idea of mutual analysis. It emerged, in my
opinion, out of the incomplete analysis he had with Freud. It was the state of mutual analysis he wished to establish with Freud, and when this wish was thwarted he attempted to carry it out with his own patients. Ferenczi attempted to restore the childhood trauma to the position it lost after Freud gave up the seduction theory.

In Thalassa Ferenczi (1924) speculates that both sleep and sexual intercourse represent a regression to the period of birth and the prenatal existence. It also recapitulates ontogenetically the philogenetic adaptation to terrestrial existence. Ferenczi's idea of genitality is different from Freud's, but close to Freud's thinking in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." In their 1924 booklet Ferenczi and Rank represent, their protestation to the contrary notwithstanding, a major deviation from the standard technique. Instead of insight, they elevate the emotional experience of the analysand as central to treatment. Ultimately Ferenczi reached the conclusion that the primal scene is traumatic not because it is overstimulating or because the child feels deserted, but because the child experiences the inadequacy of his own sexual organs to gratify the adult. Ferenczi here meets Adler halfway.

From the diary, Ferenczi emerges as the ancestor of many future psychoanalytic modifiers. Two of his late papers "The Unwelcome Child and the Death Instinct" (1929) and "Confusion of Tongues Between Adult and Child" (1933) mark the beginning of object relations theory. Had the climate been propitious, he could have been more influential. Through his disciple, Michael Balint, he exercised an influence in the subsequent history of psychoanalysis. The idea that the psychoanalyst should allow the regression to go as far back as necessary until new beginnings emerge spontaneously, we traditionally associate with Balint and Winnicott, but it goes back to Ferenczi. Central to Balint's thought was the reformulation of the libido theory. Instead of conceptualizing libido as pleasure-seeking, Balint saw it as object-seeking. With this reformulation in the 1930's, the object relation theory came into its own. Through this conceptualization the role that parents play, excluded when Freud gave up the seduction theory, returned to the psychoanalytic fold.

Freud worked with two often contradictory metaphors and models. His favorite metaphor was the archaeological one. In a more pessimistic vein, he spoke of the archaeological metaphor, implying that all that was repressed is still alive in the unconscious and pressing upward to consciousness through various derivatives. This metaphor dominates "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930) and "Constructions in Psycho-analysis" (1937b).

In a more optimistic vein, Freud used the transformational model. Here he stressed the flexibility of instincts and the possibilities of sublimation. This model dominates Freud's papers on masochism, female sexuality, and "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924). In the paper of 1917 on "Transformation of Instincts as Exemplified in Anal Erotism," he told women that their penis envy could be transformed into the wish for a child, making them maternal, or into a love for a man, making them feminine.

A psychoanalytic developmental theory should be able to explain why some themes persist in the unconscious while others are capable of transformation. We have not gone very far beyond Freud, and I
would suggest that this is an important task facing the younger generation of psychoanalysts (Bergmann, 1989).

The history of psychoanalysis after Freud's discoveries shows how dominant ideas capture the imagination of generations of psychoanalysts and are usually carried to an extreme until a disappointment takes place, only to give room to new ideas. To give examples: Wilhelm Reich's ideas that resistance interpretations should always precede content interpretation and his insistence that the character armor be pierced before content interpretations are made is no longer part of psychoanalytic technique. The belief dear to psychoanalytic pioneers that child analysis, like an inoculation, is a prophylactic against adult neurosis is no longer a shared belief. The idea that psychoanalysis should be defined as the therapeutic technique that aims to maximize the role of the transference neurosis no longer holds the dominant position. The idea that psychoanalysis will become a general psychology through the study of the conflict-free sphere that so excited Rapaport and led to the entrance of clinical psychologists into psychoanalysis is no longer an active vision. The frustratingly silent psychoanalyst advocated by Karl Menninger's (1958) book on technique has lost favor. Throughout psychoanalytic history every excess taught us something new and in that sense was beneficial. The study of the history of psychoanalysis is still in its infancy and the process of change within psychoanalysis has not been carefully scrutinized.

Psychoanalysis prospered because after World War II a generation of Americans believed they were entitled to the pursuit of happiness and a better life than that of their parents. Now that the wheel has turned, and we are no longer sure every generation will have it better than the previous one, the climate of opinion is distinctly less favorable to the psychoanalytic enterprise.

As long as the psychoanalytic focus was on the oedipal fixation, it was relatively easy to see that every person represents his or her individual variation on that theme. When this specific variation was understood and accepted by the analysand, the analysis came to an end. When later on the interest shifted first to the mechanisms of defense of the ego and from there to preoedipal pathology, developmental deficits, and eventually also to the psychotic core which most if not all of our patients have, the analysis became increasingly long and the termination point murky.

The painful discovery was made that many were analyzable in terms of developing the capacity for free association of verbalization of their transference reactions, but nevertheless incapable of internalizing the process so that a good termination could be achieved. These considerations affect psychoanalysis in the marketplace in terms of cost effectiveness. The process of intrapsychic change and the resolution of the transference (Bergmann, 1988) proved more difficult than the psychoanalytic pioneers assumed. Disappointed in the results of an analysis, and yet unable to give up the hope aroused by psychoanalysis, many analysands looked to another school for another chance. Earlier generations of psychoanalysts were typically attracted to psychoanalysis after reading a book by Freud—mostly The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)—but in the last decade younger colleagues have emerged to whom Freud's writings no longer spoke. These younger psychoanalysts were drawn by the concepts and language of one of the modifiers: Melanie Klein, Kohut, Balint, Winnicott or Lacan.
After World War II the sense of professional identity of the practicing psychoanalyst changed. The psychoanalytic pioneers were inspired by a sense of identification with Freud and felt co-engaged in one of the great discoveries of the century. Their successors were practitioners rather than discoverers, members of a profession whose services were available to the rich and the not too severely disturbed of the general population. The poor and the unanalyzable were cared for by psychiatrists, social workers, and psychologists.

**The Modifiers**

The prolonged controversy between Melanie Klein and her followers on one side and Anna Freud and the ego analysts on the other is of particular interest because both claimed Freud, but different parts of Freud, as their point of origin. We are in a better position to study the controversy now that it has been published (King and Steiner, 1991). We owe Waelder's paper of 1936 a special debt of gratitude because, so early in the history of this controversy, he demonstrated the vast scope of this debate. What was at stake were (1) the psychological significance of the first year of life, (2) the role of fantasy (psychic reality) and reality in the life of the infant, (3) the role of projection and introjection during early infancy, (4) the nature of evidence in psychoanalysis, (5) the nature and structure of memory, (6) the connection between the psychosexual phases and the development of the ego, (7) the relevance of direct observation of children in the development of psychoanalytic theory, and (8) the evolution of the superego.

It is noteworthy that Melanie Klein appears in the Freud-Jones correspondence as early as 1925 (Steiner, 1985). That is two years after the publication of The Ego and the Id. Melanie Klein therefore emerged during the period of uncertainty created by Freud's reformulations. The problem merits deeper study than I can give it here, but there can be little doubt that Melanie Klein's followers felt that she answered questions about the more disturbed patients that were agitating psychoanalysts. Klein as well as her followers saw themselves as extenders. As Riviere (1936) put it, "I can claim that my hypothesis makes use of all Freud's findings and does not convert any of the principles he has laid down; but they extend the application of these principles in some directions where he himself has so far preferred not to pursue them" (p. 396). To Anna Freud and many of her colleagues, however, the Kleinians appeared as heretics about to overthrow or at least hopelessly muddle Freud's heritage. In his reply to Riviere, Waelder (1936) stated: "To all this it may be replied that the theories in question abandon none of the views with which we have long been familiar but merely add to them. I do not think, however, that it is possible simply to add to the body of our knowledge without altering it in any respect" (p. 124).

Melanie Klein's system was derived from Freud's dual instinct theory and his emphasis on the death instinct. She modified Freud to state that at birth the death instinct is more powerful than libido. The libido is transmitted to the child by the love of the mother. The fusion of aggression and libido creates the depressive position. Strange as it may seem, the best confirmation of Klein's belief about the power of the death instinct in early childhood came from Hartmann's camp. Spitz (1945), (1946) showed by direct observation that human infants develop marasmus and die if they do not receive maternal love.
Anna Freud (1943, p. 631) summarized her disagreement with Klein succinctly. For Melanie Klein the importance of preverbal fantasies is overwhelming compared with happenings after the acquisition of speech, and since these very early fantasies can emerge only in transference most if not all analytic work takes place through transference interpretations. Transference along Freudian lines assumes that the first contacts between analyst and patient are governed by normal relational attitudes. It is the deepening of the transference that evokes emotions from deeper layers. For Klein the transference is there at the moment of encounter. It is at its height when the analyst is a pure fantasy object. Experience diminishes rather than enhances the power of transference. Finally, Freudian technique aims to undo repression; Kleinian technique aims to undo projection and introjection.

Heinz Hartmann and Melanie Klein are modifiers who see themselves as Freud's heirs. Modifiers and their followers tend to engage in the irrational battle as to who is Freud's true heir. At times the argument resembles more a theological debate than a scientific discussion. They developed psychoanalysis in two opposite directions. The third modifier of note after World War II was Franz Alexander, best known for the term "corrective emotional experience" (Alexander and French, 1946). In its crude form it did not survive, but historically Kohut's self psychology can be seen as a mutation of Alexander's point of view. Freudian analysts believe that cure depends on the reliving of the traumatic past in the transference. Self psychologists see the analyst as a new selfobject who, through empathy, can avoid or at least postpone the appearance of the traumatic repetition-compulsion in the analysis. This is one of the great dividing lines in the history of psychoanalytic technique. In the subsequent literature, regardless of interpretations, all analysts increasingly grant some curative role to the fact that the analyst is a kind of person the patient had never encountered before.

Freud (1914a) postulated that secondary narcissism is augmented by the withdrawal of libido from the external world and, conversely, in states of being in love narcissistic libido is converted into object libido. Kohut questioned this convertibility and postulated that narcissism had its own developmental line. It is of historic interest to note that a generation earlier Thomas Mann, in the novel Joseph and His Brothers, described the evolution of such a narcissist into a man who saves Egypt from hunger. It seems likely that Kohut was influenced by Thomas Mann.

Hartmann and his coworkers are today at the center of a controversy. There are those who believe that Hartmann's ego psychology is at the very core of the identity of American psychoanalysis. It has given American psychoanalysis an inestimable edge over psychoanalysis on the Continent and in South America (Young, 1989).

There are also those who believe that Hartmann and his followers have turned away from the unconscious, the most valuable part of psychoanalysis, to advocate conformity and adaptation. It is argued that they misread and misunderstood Freud and buttressed their misunderstanding by the English Standard Edition of Freud's works, a translation that does not mirror Freud's thinking faithfully. Finally, they defined analyzability so narrowly that only few can pass through the eye of that needle. Even more sharply, Hartmann was accused by Edelson (1986) of neglecting the empiricism of the psychoanalytical situation as a source of data in favor of abstract theorizing, thus setting psychoanalysis back for a whole generation.
Hartmann (1939, pp. 3–21) saw psychoanalysis as developing along a straight line. He divided its history into three periods. During the first, attention was directed toward the drives and their development (psychosexual phases). This was primarily an analysis of the id. From 1926 on, the emphasis shifted to the ego from the point of view of its defenses against the id. The third period was reached in his own book. In this third era the ego and its autonomous development are the center of psychoanalytic interest. I want to draw your attention to the fact that this is a typical statement for a modifier, to see himself as standing on the apex of psychoanalytic development.

What makes a cohesive group of those who follow Hartmann is not only shared concepts and ideas, but also the set of passionately held beliefs they have in common:

1. The truly great discoveries of psychoanalysis are behind us; what is needed now is systematization.

2. The area of promise for new psychoanalytic ideas will come primarily from infant and child observations (Hartmann, 1950). Waelder (1936) went so far as to state that the final proof of psychoanalytic interpretations will come from direct observation of children. This emphasis on observation was designed to counteract the Kleinian influence. (In 1977 Kohut reacted sharply against this point of view, emphasizing that only the psychoanalytic interview yields the data psychoanalysis needs.) The new emphasis on developmental psychology yielded a number of important new concepts, such as the development of the infant from need satisfaction to object constancy, and the gradual separation between self and object representation. Most of the work of Spitz, Margaret S. Mahler, and Edith Jacobson was derived from these differentiations.

3. Hartmann’s concept of neutralization of both the sexual and aggressive drives and his concept of the autonomous ego and its conflict-free sphere are the main bridges that lead from psychoanalysis as a theory of neurosis to psychoanalysis as a general psychology. Drive neutralization was conceptualized as essential for the building-up of object relations and the reaching of object constancy. Rapaport (1951, pp. 364–365) made neutralization the main explanation for the difference between primary and secondary processes.

Contrary to assumptions, the Hartmann era, if not Hartmann himself, was interested in technique. The ego analyst interprets only what is already or almost preconscious; therefore the interpretation is parsimonious. The Kleinians interpret what is unconscious; therefore their interpretations are lengthy and cover a much larger territory. Psychoanalytic ego psychologists became interested not only in the pathology of the patient, but also the way he solved the problems he faced in childhood and adulthood, that is, an interest also in the healthy, functioning part of the ego (A. Reich, 1958).

Kris (1956a), (1956b) reevaluated the role of memories. All memory undergoes modification in the process of development. The function of memory itself can become libidinized with the important implication that recall of childhood memories by themselves need not be curative. The concept of neutralization enabled Kris to throw new light on the "good" psychoanalytic hour. This resulted in an important change of technique, namely helping the analysand to develop the integrative functions of his own ego. These functions in turn make the analysand increasingly independent of the analyst and foster the termination process: an analysis ending in the capacity for self-analysis.
There were creative analysts working in the U.S. who did not follow Hartmann, Kernberg, Waelder, L. S. Kubie, M. Kanzer, and others—H. W. Loewald, Serge, G. S. Klein, and Schaffer—who were in opposition. In my view Arlow and Brenner's reemphasis on the centrality of compromise formation already belongs to the retrenchment of a post-Hartmann era.

In Evolution of Psychoanalytic Technique (Bergmann and Hartman, 1976) I maintain that all discussions of theory are translatable into differences of technique. Anna Freud (1976) was the most vehement opponent of the so-called "widening scope." She opposed Stone (1954) and Green (1975). The debate with Melanie Klein and her followers crystallized around the timing of interpretations. But within my perspective it appears that another dimension is relevant. Could it be that Anna Freud's frame of reference supports the confinement of psychoanalysis to the neuroses, while the Kleinian frame is more suitable for the treatment of borderline conditions?

Winnicott can be seen as a modifier of Melanie Klein. Like the Kleinians, he interpreted dormant conflicts; but unlike them, he was more careful not to evoke the patient's hostility by massive interpretations. His classic of 1953 on the transitional object was still the work of an extender, but when in 1955 he spoke of the true and false self he introduced new moral categories into psychoanalysis that were alien to the traditional value-free language of Freud. He became one of the most important modifiers, pointing out that only patients who receive "good-enough" infant care can undergo psychoanalysis.

Wrestling with the Complex Heritage

What conclusions are we entitled to draw from this historical survey? If my idea that there was nothing inevitable about the discovery of psychoanalysis is accepted, it should follow that there is also no way to predict the direction in which psychoanalysis will evolve.

In the history of psychoanalysis heretics appeared before modifiers. It is likely that the concept of modifier became a reality in organized psychoanalysis after the controversies between Kleinians and ego psychologists did not result in a split. The outcome demonstrated that after Freud's death no one, not even his daughter, could claim to be his only legitimate heir. While self psychology has the status of a modification, the interpersonalists and Lacanians have the status of heretics. But this could change if we find productive ways of communication among dissident modifiers. So far, however, organized psychoanalysis survived a number of modifications but has not yet developed a productive technique of communication among different modifiers. The next generation of psychoanalysts will have to find ways to subject the modification to rational procedure so that their contributions can be tested against each other.

Case conferences demonstrate that we have reached such a degree of sophistication that any clinical material can be interpreted in a variety of ways. At this point in psychoanalytic history we cannot rely on case material to settle theoretical questions. One of the important tasks facing the younger generation of psychoanalysts is to find ways to give back to the case history its pivotal significance. This will require more candid and explicit reporting of clinical data.
If the historical point of view presented here is accepted, it follows that the different schools were not the result of mere chance. But inherent in the complex structure of psychoanalysis it should be possible to study them in an objective manner. There is a paradox here that must be faced: psychoanalysis, a rational method of approaching the irrational, has nevertheless not saved us from an irrational attachment to cherished psychoanalytic ideology. I have found it useful to test different theories by asking the following questions:

1. In the view of the theory, how does psychopathology originate?

2. Does the theory lead to the conclusion that some forms of mental illness are not treatable by this method?

3. What does the theory regard as the ideal therapeutic process?

4. What is the theory's model of the mind (Gedo and Goldberg, 1973), including its view of human nature and developments during the first years of life?

5. What steps are used by the adherents of the theory to convert the pathology of the patient into the model of mental health held by the theory?

On the whole I find it less productive to search for the common denominator or even compare the theories of the various schools, but useful to study what analysts of various schools say to their patients, particularly in moments of therapeutic crisis. I do not see the existence of different schools of analysis as the curse of the Tower of Babel, but as a unique opportunity to compare the clinical usefulness of different approaches to divergent clinical groups.

The long historical battle between the wider or narrower scope, regardless of personal predilection, has, in my opinion, de facto been settled. Patients with borderline diagnoses are increasingly seeking psychoanalytic help. Psychoanalysis cannot maintain its future position as the leading healing profession unless it finds better ways of applying its findings beyond the neuroses. Otherwise we may well remain confined to a double aristocracy of patients suffering only from psychoneuroses and able to afford seeing the analyst four or five times a week. Important beginnings in the treatment of borderline patients have been made by Kernberg. Not accidentally, he has shown how different thinkers' work can be synthesized. There have been others (Pine, 1990) who also contributed to this field. Working with more disturbed patients may show how the insights of different schools can be productively used.

If we can admit that the unknown still outweighs the known, we may succeed in reorganizing psychoanalysis from a body of practitioners into a body of workers aware that even though psychoanalysis is soon to celebrate its centennial, our divisions indicate there is still much to be learned about the alleviation of intrapsychic distress. Graduation from a psychoanalytic institute should indicate not only professional competence, but also a capacity to work with colleagues and a sense of obligation to study the many as yet unanswered problems in the field. As individuals our experience is bound to be limited, but collectively we can test hypotheses provided we create a climate in which failures can be reported as freely as successes.
Also, we must overcome the inertia of leaving basic issues unresolved over many decades. If we cannot arrive at clarification, we should at the very least know where the uncertainty begins. The survival of psychoanalysis will also depend on our ability to educate a new generation of psychoanalysts who are less partisan and more willing to look at the evolution of psychoanalysis from a historical viewpoint. I have tried to contribute to this aim. Thus an inquisitive and rational approach to current diversities, if accepted as a challenge, can become a source of new hope. And hope is essential for our survival.

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